Evaluation and mentoring of the multi-agency approach to violent radicalisation

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The EMMA project includes partners in three European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

Abstract

Multi-agency working (MAW) has increasingly been considered a promising approach to enable the early and effective identification of individuals and communities that are at risk of radicalisation and violent extremism. Multi-agency responses usually involve collaboration between local organisations and are based in the belief that the complex problems of radicalisation and violent extremism cannot be effectively addressed by one single agency. However, more than a decade after the conclusion that evaluation in the field of countering violent extremism (CVE) is still in its infancy, it remains underdeveloped and evaluations remain scarce. Challenges such as the lack of established MAW policies and procedures, and information-sharing barriers, have been reported in building effective MAW.

The 'Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency approach to violent radicalisation' (EMMA) project was established firstly to evaluate the MAW approach, and secondly to mentor peer-to-peer assessment and exchange best practice among local practitioners. It asked the question 'What works under what conditions?', assessing the approaches used in different countries by means of a realist process evaluation. This book reports the indicators of good MAW practices from a wide range of situations, and gives concrete recommendations for both practitioners and policy-makers. The EMMA project also resulted in the development of a website-based self-evaluation tool for use by local MAW practitioners that will be widely applicable across different MAW approaches in Europe.

Key words: radicalisation, violent extremism, multi-agency working, EMMA, self-evaluation

Contents

Abbreviations

CPAS	Public Center for Social Welfare
CSHs	Care and Safety Houses (The Netherlands)
CSO	civil society organisation
CVE	countering violent extremism
EMMA	Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency approach to violent radicalisation
ESS	Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit
EU	European Union
IRCP	Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy, Ghent University
LISC-R	Local Integrated Security Cells Radicalisation (Belgium)
MAW	multi-agency work
NGO	non-governmental organisation
P/CVE	preventing and countering violent extremism
PVE	preventing violent extremism
RAN	Radicalisation Awareness Network
SSV	Stichting School en Veiligheid
SWOT	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
VPN	Violence Prevention Network
VVSG	Vlaamse Vereniging voor Steden en Gemeenten (Flemish Association of Cities and Municipalities)

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Wim Hardyns, Noel Klima and Lieven Pauwels, Editors

About the Editors

Wim Hardyns is a Professor of Criminology at the Department of Criminology, Criminal Law and Social Law at Ghent University, Belgium, and Professor of Safety Sciences at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. He is a member of and/or has a coordinating role in different renowned research groups and interdisciplinary consortia such as the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP), the research platform Privacy, Information Exchange, Law Enforcement and Surveillance (PIXLES), the consortium Smart Solutions for Secure Societies (i4S), the consortium Crime, Criminology & Criminal Policy (CCCP), the consortium Digital Innovation for both Individuals and Society (DELTA), and the consortium Working Together for Mental Health (PSYNC). Professor Hardyns leads a range of projects and PhD students in the field of violent extremism and terrorism. He was the Promotor (Principal Investigator) of the scientific part of the EMMA project.

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General Introduction

As the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) policy paper of 2018 states, multi-agency structures and working processes are crucial for the early and effective identification of at-risk individuals or communities, improved information-sharing, joint decision-making and coordinated action (Sarma, 2018). Multi-agency working (MAW) breaks down historical silos between agencies, leads to an increase in cooperation between actors/services and helps to prevent services from becoming fragmented. Fragmented services are problematic because there are no common goals, and actors/services work literally side-by-side. Multi-agency responses usually involve collaboration between local actors (e.g. police, social services, policy makers), and rely on the idea that the complex problems of radicalisation and violent extremism cannot be addressed by one single agency (Sarma, 2018), just as the complex problem of radicalisation cannot be understood by one discipline. MAW platforms working to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism have only relatively recently been established in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, and both the legal frameworks for MAW and the thematic focus of the individual structures differs widely between countries.

Although practitioners and academics have endorsed the added value of MAW, there are still some prerequisites to ensuring effective collaboration, such as building trust, awareness, and ethical and legislative guidance. Two main challenges for MAW were indicated in the RAN policy paper of 2018, namely: (1) the lack of established MAW policies and procedures for countering radicalisation and violent extremism and a deficiency of thorough evaluation research of the MAW approach; and (2) barriers to information sharing (Sarma, 2018). In addition, more than a decade after it was suggested that evaluation of countering violent extremism (CVE) was still in its infancy, the field remains underdeveloped and rarely appraised (Gielen, 2020). Evaluations of MAW approaches in the context of preventing violent radicalisation are even rarer (Amadeo & Iannone, 2016; Cherney, 2020).

To tackle these challenges, especially the lack of evaluation, the 'Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency approach to violent radicalisation' (EMMA) project was established. The aim of the project was: (1) to evaluate the multi-agency approach, and develop a self-evaluation tool that looks into the context, organisation and structure of MAW networks for local practitioners and is widely applicable across Europe (Part I); and (2) to provide mentoring via peer-to-peer assessment, the development of training sessions and an e-learning platform for local MAW practitioners (Part II). The novelty of this project lies in its development of innovative tools for evaluating and monitoring MAW structures.

The Project Partners

The EMMA project is a partnership between the Flemish Association of Cities and Municipalities (Vlaamse Vereniging voor Steden en Gemeenten – VVSG, coordinator of the EMMA project), the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP) of Ghent University (Belgium), RadarAdvies (the Netherlands) and the Violence Prevention Network (VPN, Germany).

VVSG is the association of all Flemish municipalities and cities, representing their interests, and offering advice, training and many other services, with a strong commitment to a stronger integrated local approach towards radicalisation.[1]

Ghent University's **IRCP** is internationally recognised for providing more than 30 years' authoritative, independent scholarly research and being an academic service provider to policy makers, practitioners and broader society.[2] The IRCP cooperates extensively, and shares knowledge and research with topic-specific knowledge platforms such as i4S – Smart Solutions for Secure Societies, PIXLES (Privacy, Information Exchange, Law Enforcement & Surveillance) and the interdisciplinary IDC Crime, Criminology and Criminal Policy. The IRCP also focuses on dynamic partnerships with academics from other disciplines and experts from policy and practice. The IRCP is a robust and at the same time flexible research institute that focuses on research with both a short and long duration, on education, expert training, policy advice and ad hoc consultancy assignments.

RadarAdvies is a consultancy and research organisation specialised in social and safety issues. Its consultants and researchers work for civil society organisations, local and national governments and the European Commission. It has managed the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) for the European Commission since 2011. Over 15 Radar consultants work as experts for the RAN Centre of Excellence, all of whom deal with the issue of multi-agency work within all the different RAN working groups. In addition, RadarAdvies has experience in developing a toolkit evidence-based approach for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) work including multi-agency work (for two Dutch ministries), training packages for first-line practitioners for all Dutch municipalities including how to improve MAW, and has experience in the evaluation and improvement of the P/CVE network in various cities (for example, Almere, Venlo, the region of Flevoland, Roermond and Maastricht).[3]

VPN is a network of experienced specialists who have successfully been engaged in the prevention of extremism and the deradicalisation of ideologically motivated offenders since 2001. Based in Germany, VPN was one of the first organisations in Europe to focus its initiatives on the topics of deradicalisation and exit work within and outside of the penitentiary system. Additional programmes are designed to counsel relatives of (ex-)offenders, and advise and train staff in institutions such as schools, refugee centres and non-governmental

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[1] https://www.vvsg.be/

[2] https://ircp.ugent.be/

[3] https://www.radaradvies.nl/

organisations (NGOs). In 2017, VPN founded the research institute Modus, the Centre for Applied Research on Deradicalisation, to function as a bridge between academia and practitioners, creating synergies and fostering the development of innovative approaches to the current challenges of (violent) extremism.[4]

Peer-to-peer networks with MAW practitioners from the three participating countries were established during the EMMA project. VVSG, VPN and RadarAdvies worked on practice-based mentoring of MAW practitioners in order to strengthen their position and enhance the professionals' ability. On an individual level, VVSG, VPN and RadarAdvies spent time disentangling the local strengths and weaknesses surrounding this issue, in one-to-one conversations with the MAW practitioners. The peer consultancy critically (written and oral) reviewed the MAW network of peers, provided revision exercises and set targets to tackle shortcomings. In a later stage, an international workshop was organised to compare the results of the national peer-to-peer assessment networks of the different countries. Training modules were then set up, based on the practical information obtained during the sessions.

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[4] https://violence-prevention-network.de/

PART I: Research Findings and the MAW Self-Evaluation Tool

Part I contains the findings of the research by IRCP (Ghent University) on the (process) evaluation of MAW in three countries and the development process of the self-evaluation tool. The question 'What works under what conditions?' was assessed in each country by means of a realist process evaluation. This started with a systematic literature review of national and international literature. Based on this systematic literature review, process indicators for radicalisation and violent extremism were extracted. These process indicators allowed us to describe and evaluate MAW approaches in Belgian, Dutch and German (urban) settings. The data for the realist process evaluation were collected from MAW structures in cities from each of the three countries. The empirical fieldwork consisted of: (1) participatory observations during MAW meetings; (2) semi-structured interviews with different participants (key informants); and (3) focus groups to explore missing elements. The qualitative data obtained from both the observations and interviews were tested against the indicators identified through the systematic literature review, which was conducted between February 2020 and December 2021.

There are various ways to classify and conceptualise evaluation. Campbell (1969) defines it as 'the (scientific) determination of results of a certain activity in light of a previously defined goal using measurable criteria or indicators'. One way to think about evaluation is as a kind of 'chain' with three forms of evaluation, as Swanborn (2007) and Wartna (2005) suggest. The first part of the 'evaluation chain' is the *plan evaluation*. The main question in a plan evaluation is to ascertain why an intervention or programme would work. Plan evaluations take place before the implementation (or adjustment) of an intervention or programme. During or immediately after this implementation, a *process evaluation* can be conducted. Process evaluations can be used to identify the effective key components of an intervention or programme and thus indicate why a programme or intervention was successful, or not. Lastly, an *impact evaluation* can be carried out some time after the implementation of an intervention or programme. The main question here is, 'How did the intervention work?' (Swanborn, 2007; van Yperen et al., 2017; Wartna, 2005).

An ideal evaluation would consist of the three forms described above. Given the duration of the EMMA project, it was not possible to carry out a long-term assessment that included a plan, process and impact evaluation. As there is currently no thorough evaluation research on MAW in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism, a process evaluation of MAW in three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany) was conducted. This process evaluation resulted in a self-evaluation tool for local practitioners. The evaluation was based on the method of realist evaluation. Realist evaluations are primarily interested in *how* something might work – what works for whom in what situation, and how it works – rather than *whether* something works (Farrington,

2003; Pawson & Tilley, 1997). In our research, the 'how' question was primarily addressed by asking key figures for their insights on MAW. The research consisted of two research phases, and made use of primarily qualitative methods.

Research Phase 1: A Process Evaluation of Multi-Agency Working

In the first phase of the research, we carried out a process evaluation of the MAW approach in the three countries. By understanding how MAW structures try to achieve their objectives, and which processes are set in motion, it is possible to explore what works, whether it is promising, and under what conditions it works. In this way, constructive recommendations were made for MAW in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism.

Figure 1. Overview of the process evaluation phases

The aim was to answer the following research questions:

- How and under what conditions, in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism, does MAW work within the three countries?
- What are the different roles and responsibilities of the participants?
- How does communication and cooperation between the various actors take place?
- How are common aims, complementary roles and effective communication established within MAW structures?
- Are the objectives of the MAW structures achieved or not?
- What difficulties or challenges are encountered in establishing a constructive MAW approach?
- What are the key factors in the success of MAW in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism?

The first research phase started with a systematic review of national and international literature in order to provide an overview of good practices in exit

programmes[1] and multi-agency approaches in the context of deradicalisation and disengagement. Based on this systematic literature review, and starting from the objectives of the MAW structure, process indicators of multi-agency working were drawn up that enabled the MAW approach within the three countries to be described and evaluated. A full list of these indicators is provided in Appendix 3. They provide very specific, measurable information and are as concrete and clear as possible. The local, political and cultural context of the cities and their particular needs were taken into account, as these contextual factors potentially influence the implementation of the MAW approach.

In addition to the systematic literature review, preparation for the fieldwork started with: (1) the selection of the MAW structures; (2) contacting the MAW participants in each city; (3) preparing interview schedules and informed consents; and (4) drawing up observation checklists.

Data was collected using participatory observations of MAW meetings in the chosen cities. Semi-structured interviews were also carried out, with different participants from the MAW structures that were included. The qualitative data from both the observations and the interviews was tested against the process indicators listed in Appendix 3.

Finally, the results of the first research phase were shared and discussed, and missing elements were explored via focus groups in each country at the end of the first research phase. This first round of focus groups was seen as preparatory to the next research phase (the self-evaluation tool).

A SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis was carried out, and interim conclusions were drawn up. We considered both the internal factors of the MAW structure, namely its strengths and weaknesses, and external factors, in particular the opportunities and threats (over which the MAW structure has little or no control). Based on a SWOT confrontation matrix, the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats were identified (Sarsby, 2012).

Research Phase 2: Developing a Self-Evaluation Tool for Local Practitioners

The main goal of the second research phase was to develop a website-based self-evaluation tool including indicators and guidelines for local practitioners (participants in MAW structures).[2] This self-evaluation tool allows local practitioners in cities to evaluate their MAW approach. The tool is supported by a very practical manual that explains how it should be implemented by local practitioners.

The findings from the systematic review and the relevant indicators of 'good practice' were combined with the results of the process evaluation (the qualitative

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[1] Exit programmes can be voluntary or non-voluntary. They aim to supporting individuals who wish to disengage from terrorism and may require practical, medical, psychological and police involvement.

[2] This website-based self-evaluation tool is called EMMASCAN and can be consulted via the website: http://www.emmascan.eu

analysis of the observations and interviews). This created a list of promising practices for multi-agency working in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism. In order to review the self-evaluation tool, focus groups were organised in each country. The focus groups gave local practitioners the opportunity to add their own ideas of promising MAW practices to the self-evaluation tool.

The tool was presented for the first time at the closing conference of the EMMA project (31 March 2022), organised for local policy makers, practitioners and other actors working in this field.

Part I of this book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the background, objectives and results of the systematic literature review. Chapter 2 summarises the results from participatory observations of MAW meetings in each country. Chapter 3 details the semi-structured interviews with key actors from the MAW structures. Chapter 4 outlines the findings from the two rounds of national focus groups. Chapter 5 reviews the development and structure of the self-evaluation tool.

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1 A Systematic Literature Review on Evaluating Multi-Agency Working in the Domain of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

Lien Dorme, Noel Klima, Lieven Pauwels and Wim Hardyns

1.1 Background

Violent radicalisation is a complex problem, and its causes and risk factors have been the subject of much research (Jahnke et al., 2022; Litmanovitz et al., 2017; Morrison et al., 2021; Wolfowicz et al., 2021). Scholars agree that there is no standard profile of the 'radicalised individual'. Often, a combination of various risk, protective and promotive factors are at play (Lösel et al., 2018). A factor is seen as a risk when it increases the chance of a crime being committed. A promotive factor decreases the likelihood of a crime being committed and a protective factor interacts with risk factors, i.e. it decreases the effect of risk factors. Serious shortcomings are linked to the 'risk factor' approach (Farrington et al., 2016). Wikström (2007b) criticises this approach as doing nothing more than gathering and inventorying characteristics that are associated with delinquent behaviour, a minority of which may correctly be interpreted as causal, but the majority of which cannot (Pauwels et al., 2014). Bouhana and Wikström (2011) state that, if we really want to explain violent extremism, we have to evolve from a risk factor approach to a more explanatory method by conducting research into violent extremism that looks for explanatory mechanisms linking background characteristics to actual causal factors (Wikström, 2007b; and Wikström, 2011).

Radicalisation is the process by which 'a person adopts extremist views and moves towards committing a violent act' (Hardy, 2018). It is a developmental process that requires a developmental explanation. Developmental models explain why individuals become who they are, while situational models explain why people do what they do, in the context they are in. On the major problems that characterise this field, Bouhana (2019) sees no clear definition and no distinction between causal and non-causal risk factors. Most people with risk factors do not become radicalised, and some people who have no risk factors do become radicalised. This drives the policy maker to despair. We don't know what motivates individuals to become radicalised.

In order to better understand the process of radicalisation, it is necessary to understand the basic processes of human action. People's actions are the result of a perception–choice process. The basic mechanisms are the same, but the input of the environment and of individual characteristics differs. Due to the fact that this distinction is not made, different policy makers and think tanks come up with different sets of risk factors, develop different practices (the so-called 'best practices of the day') and are surprised when the expected outcome does not occur (Wikström, 2007a).

The complex and varied nature of an individual's development to radicalisation makes it challenging to design and evaluate appropriate approaches to tackle it (Mazerolle et al., 2021). Preventing violent radicalisation is therefore not a task that can be successfully undertaken by one actor, as there is no generalisable and identifiable terrorist profile, and the violent radicalisation process is very complex. In recent years, the focus has therefore concentrated on bringing together different actors to prevent violent radicalisation through a multi-agency approach. Multi-agency collaboration has been put forward as promising approach because it allows for early and effective identification of individuals who might be at risk of violent radicalisation, and leads services to cooperate rather than fragment (Hardyns et al., 2021; Ranstorp, 2018). An important factor here is the involvement of the local level in the preventive approach. Local actors are the closest to citizens, have access to most information, and are therefore in the best position to identify vulnerable individuals and develop and implement a tailor-made approach (Roberts, 2018).

Even though multi-agency collaboration has been put forward as a promising approach, evidence that it is effective in reducing radicalisation to violence is scarce and limited (Mazerolle et al., 2021). This is due first to the lack of evaluation research (Gielen, 2020), and second to the poor quality of the research that has been carried out. Mazerolle et al. (2021), for example, report evaluation methods of low quality in their systematic literature review of empirical evaluations of police-involved multi-agency partnerships. We can hardly blame them, as multi-agency partnerships have the additional difficulty that their effectiveness is very hard to measure. We can also add a third reason for this lack of evidence: the absence of adequate theories of actions and developments focusing on key mechanisms.

However, to develop effective countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes in the future, we do need to know what is effective (Neumann et al., 2015). Moreover, we need to know what is effective in what context, and how (Gielen, 2020). CVE evaluation can help us to sort this out. Gielen (2020) states:

> We are in need for an evaluation method that can accommodate the complexity and contextuality of CVE, while providing an authoritative basis for new evaluations and at the same time exposing incorrect or too normative assumptions in CVE policy. The search for methods is made more difficult by the currently limited availability of CVE evaluations, which are essentially for theory building. (...) Preferably, [the evaluation method] should also support the building of further conceptual understanding, by establishing the 'how' of the success or failure of specific measures.

The EMMA project tries to meet those needs by performing a process evaluation to identify the effective key components of an intervention or programme and thus help to understand why it was successful or not. To inform an evaluation, we first need to draw up process indicators – observable characteristics that the programme aims to influence – that allow us to describe and evaluate the MAW approach within the countries under investigation. Selecting and operationalising appropriate indicators of success are crucial steps for every outcome evaluation

(Nehlsen et al., 2020). A literature review was our first step in this process – systematically screening the literature for good practices. The overlap of all the collected data (the process evaluation and the literature review) provided a list of promising practices for multi-agency working in the context of radicalisation that formed the basis for the self-evaluation tool and practical manual.

1.2 Objectives

The systematic literature review was one of the first steps in the EMMA project. The objective was to form the basis for the EMMA process evaluation and self-evaluation tool, by:

(a) **Determining measurable process indicators** (as concrete and clear as possible) from the existing literature that allow us to describe and evaluate the MAW approach within Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

(b) Providing **an overview of good multi-agency practices** in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism.

The following research questions were identified:

(a) What (measurable) **process indicators** can we find in the existing literature that allow us to describe and evaluate MAW approaches in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany?

(b) What are **good practices of multi-agency approaches** in the context of (de)radicalisation and disengagement?

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Process

The search process was based on the first five steps of the adapted heuristic guidelines for reviews on complex social programmes with heterogeneous interventions and lack of evaluation studies, as described in Gielen (2020, p. 76):

1. Clarify the scope of the review.
2. Search for primary studies.
3. Appraise quality.
4. Extract the data.
5. Synthesise the data.
6. (Disseminate the findings).

1.3.2 Clarifying the Scope of the Review

In order to provide an answer to the research questions of the literature review, the included literature should contain an appraisal of MAW actions in the context of violent radicalisation. Sources were chosen for inclusion based on the relevance of the study to the subject of interest: **(1) have (de)radicalisation as a common**

theme and an intervention/action/approach to prevent at-risk individuals and/or disengage radicalised individuals; (2) contain at least one **MAW intervention** at the local or supralocal level; and (3) perform some evaluation of the effect of one or more MAW approaches (excluding economic evaluations), **or formulate recommendations** of good MAW practices.

This was operationalised by the following inclusion criteria:

1. **Radicalisation focus:** Does the paper describe an intervention, action or approach that is targeted at (de)radicalisation, by preventing, identifying individuals at risk, curing, disengaging and/or reintegrating?
2. **Multi-agency focus:** Is collaboration across multiple organisations described at the local or supralocal level? Furthermore, are some 'lessons learned', 'good/best practices' or specific recommendations explicitly mentioned?
3. **Evaluation:** Literature evaluating MAW programmes or interventions in the context of radicalisation. Literature including recommendations/ best practices/lessons learned related to MAW programmes/ interventions in the context of radicalisation.

Studies published in the five years prior to the start of the EMMA project were included. Older studies were not included. The included studies were therefore published **between January 2015 and March 2020.**

No exclusion criteria were formulated for geographical scope, as the realist review method suggests that we can learn from deradicalisation initiatives in different contexts.

Studies that focused on 'hard' evaluation outcomes, such as finances (economic evaluations) or surveillance, were also excluded from the review.

1.3.3 Searching for Primary Studies

Literature was identified through different searches:

Academic Search

As a first step, an initial search of the literature was done to familiarise with the topic and identify key search terms. Search terms were initially based on the systematic literature review of Madriaza and Ponsot (2015). The initial search strategy was reviewed by four experts in the field of radicalisation. This resulted in the search strategy as represented in Table 1.

Table 1. Search strategy for the academic search

Topic/context	De-radicalisation	Evaluation (what works?)	MAW
AND	AND	AND	

radicali?a?ion OR radicalism* OR extremis* OR radical* violen* OR politic* violen* OR *terroris* OR jihad* OR fundamentalism* OR politic* crime OR Nazism* OR right-wing OR far-right	deradicali?a?ion OR deradical* OR disengage* OR program* OR pr?vent* OR treat* OR interven* OR exit OR support OR counter* OR reintegr* OR rehabil* OR CVE OR PVE OR recidivism* OR desistance	evaluat* "best practice"* OR "good practice*" OR lesson*learn* OR assess* OR apprais* OR effective*	multi-agen* OR partnership OR multi-actor OR interdisciplin* OR multidisciplin* OR public-private OR inter-professional OR joint work* OR inter-agen* OR integrated work* OR multi-professional OR multi-system OR community intervention

The academic search was conducted on 25 March 2020. Two databases were searched: Web of Science and Scopus.

Web of Science:

TS=(radicali?a?ion OR radicalism OR extremis* OR (radical* NEAR violen*) OR (politic* NEAR violen*) OR *terroris* OR jihad* OR fundamentalism* OR (politic* NEAR crime) OR Nazism* OR right-wing OR far-right) AND TS=(deradicali?a?ion OR deradical* OR disengage* OR program* OR pr?vent* OR treat* OR interven* OR exit OR support OR counter* OR reintegr* OR rehabil* OR CVE OR PVE OR recidivism* OR desistance) AND TS=(evaluat* OR ("best practice*") OR ("good practice*") OR (lesson* NEAR learn*) OR assess* OR apprais* OR effective*) AND TS=(multi-agen* OR partnership OR multi-actor OR interdisciplin* OR multidisciplin* OR public-private OR inter-professional OR (joint NEAR work*) OR inter-agen* OR (integrat* NEAR work*) OR multi-professional OR multi-system OR (community NEAR intervention))*

Scopus:

TITLE-ABS-KEY (radicali?a?ion OR radicalism* OR extremis* OR (radical* w/15 violen*) OR (politic* w/15 violen*) OR *terroris* OR jihad* OR fundamentalism* OR (politic* w/15 crime) OR Nazism* OR right-wing OR far-right) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (deradicali?a?ion OR deradical* OR disengage* OR program* OR pr?vent* OR treat* OR interven* OR exit OR support OR counter* OR reintegr* OR rehabil* OR CVE OR PVE OR recidivism* OR desistance) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (evaluat* OR ("best practice*") OR ("good practice*") OR (lesson* w/15 learn*) OR assess* OR apprais* OR effective*) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (multi-agen* OR partnership OR multi-actor OR interdisciplin* OR multidisciplin* OR public-private OR inter-professional OR (joint w/15 work*) OR inter-agen* OR (integrat* w/15 work*) OR multi-professional OR multi-system OR (community w/15 intervention)) AND PUBYEAR > 2014

Using the abovementioned syntax, 111 sources were identified through Web of Science and 166 through Scopus. This is visualised in Table 2. A total of 85 duplicates were removed, leaving 192 unique sources for title analysis. From these sources, 147 were excluded based on title analysis. Sources were mainly excluded based on topic (e.g. articles on computer sciences, product development, articles focusing on the policy level rather than MAW, or terrorism profiling studies). Thirty additional sources were excluded based on summary analysis, leading to nineteen sources identified for full text screening.

See Appendix 1 for a full list of literature included in the systemic literature review.

Table 2. Academic search results from Web of Science and Scopus

	Web of Science	*Scopus*
Sources found	N = 111	N = 166
Removal of duplicates	N = 85	
Excluded after title analysis	N = 147	
Excluded after summary analysis	N = 30	
Excluded after text analysis	N = 15	
Texts for analysis	N = 4	

Grey Literature Search

Unpublished or grey literature was identified by searching a grey literature database and a systematic screening of relevant websites.

Grey literature database search: The grey literature database 'SSRN' was used. The SSRN search engine did not allow an advanced search to be carried out with simultaneous multiple search terms, therefore multiple searches were done with

several simple search terms. After title analysis of the resulting sources, two were identified for full text screening. An overview of the SSRN search strategy can be found in Table 3.

Table 3. SSRN search strategy

Search term	Sources identified	Sources identified for full text analysis
Radicalisation	48	1
Radicalization	168	1
Terrorism evaluation	83	0
Extremism evaluation	7	0
"Political violence" evaluation	2	0
Jihad evaluation	1	0
Fundamentalism evaluation	3	0

Website screening: A systematic website screening was performed to identify additional grey literature. An initial list of websites from relevant organisations, expertise centres and institutions was compiled. Two experts reviewed the initial list and added relevant websites to the list. The focus was on relevant organisations from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, since these are the countries where the process evaluations were to take place. A second reason for this is that all researchers in this project are field experts from these countries, and the list was reviewed by these experts. A third reason is the language barrier – only articles written in English or Dutch were retained. Although no geographical limitations were set, most of the websites therefore originated from the Netherlands and Belgium. In addition, through snowballing, relevant institutions or organisations mentioned on the searched websites were screened as well. Using this snowball method, the initial list was extended to forty-three websites, until saturation was achieved and no additional websites could be identified. The website screening took place in March and April 2020.

For the systematic screening, the following procedure was used. First, a 'publications' (or 'documents' or 'products') page/tab was searched. If the website lacked a particular page or tab dedicated to publications, the website's general search function was used to screen for relevant articles. If there was an advanced search option, the website was screened on the search terms 'radicalisation' and 'evaluation'; similar relevant search filters were selected where these filters were present in the search engine. When possible, a filter was added for year of publication and document type and to limit the retrieved results.

The website search was targeted at the following document types: publications, papers, factsheets, brochures, manuals and tools. Webpage articles without a downloadable document or factsheets were not included. Based on a title and diagonal screening, sixty-three pieces of literature were identified for full

text screening. See Appendix 2 for an overview of the websites and the number of identified articles per website.

Expert Literature

Experts were EMMA project partners and associates. Experts were contacted via email. A call for additional literature was also raised in a virtual EMMA consortium meeting. Twelve unique additional sources were provided by these experts.

Reference Harvesting

After full text screening of the sources found through the abovementioned search strategies, fifty-six sources met the criteria for inclusion in the literature review. Finally, the reference list and bibliographies of these sources were screened for relevant references. One round of reference harvesting was held, through which a further thirty-eight papers were identified for full text analysis.

1.3.4   Appraising Quality, Synthesis Process and Data Extraction

Each of the sources identified for full text screening was screened for eligibility according to the inclusion criteria. Sources that met all inclusion criteria were included in the literature review for full text analysis. From each source, the following descriptive information was collected: author, publication year, language, publication type. Information on methodology was collected from each article, such as evaluation type, methods and design. Information was also collected on the target group of the MAW intervention(s), the actors involved and the geographical region. Finally, recommendations were collected in nine broad categories: approach, case management, collaboration, expertise, information sharing, practical conditions, quality assurance, structure, and vision.

All data were collected in one Microsoft Excel matrix and then imported and coded in Nvivo. Good practices and recommendations were coded thematically in Nvivo, and descriptive, methodological and other data were coded using case coding and a case classification sheet. Queries on thematic and case coding were used to explore and analyse the literature.

1.4 Results of the Literature Review

1.4.1 The Sample

A total of eighty-one sources were included in the full text analysis. Table 4 summarises the number of sources identified per type of search and the number of final sources included. Twenty-five additional sources were identified using the method of reference harvesting.

The majority of the sources included in the literature review (65%) were scientific reports. Only a few sources were scientific publications (13%). The other sources were mainly books, book chapters and specific tools. This is not surprising, because more than half of the sources included in the literature review originated from the grey literature (website) search.

Half of the sources described a MAW approach targeted at a mixture of prevention and reintegration. The other sources described mainly a prevention approach.

The MAW approach was mostly targeted at radicalisation in general. Twenty-one per cent of the sources described an approach for a specific subtype, such as offenders (12%) and youth (9%).

Table 4. Overview of sources identified, excluded and included in the literature review

Identified via	#sources identified for full text screening	#sources excluded			#sources included
		Not radicalisation	No MAW	No evaluation	
Academic database search	n = 19	n = 6	n = 8	n = 1	n = 4
Grey literature search	n = 65 (SSRN: n = 2) (website: n = 63)	n = 2	n = 14	n = 5	n = 44
Provided by expert	n = 12	n = 1	n = 1	n = 2	n = 8
Reference harvesting	n = 38	/	n = 9	n = 4	n = 25
Total	n = 134				n = 81

All sources described an evaluation of MAW approaches, or described recommendations or good practices for MAW, as this was part of the evaluation criteria. Most sources (35%) took their inspiration for recommendations from their own empirical research. This empirical research mostly comprised process evaluations where MAW actors were interviewed or MAW actions observed. Almost one in four (24%) based their recommendations on outcomes from 'expert meetings' (e.g. conferences where experts in the radicalisation field sit together and discuss a certain topic). Seventeen per cent based the recommendations on a summary of the literature.

It is important to note that one in four sources did not report a clear evaluation method. In other words, recommendations were made, but the source did not mention how they came up with their conclusions.

1.4.2 Process Indicators to Describe and Evaluate MAW Approaches

The first research question from the literature review is: What process indicators (indicators that we can use to measure the MAW process) can we find in the existing literature that allow us to describe and evaluate MAW approaches in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany?

Process indicators were drawn up from the screened literature, as part of this systematic literature review. In developing the indicator list, special attention was paid to retrieving indicators that were as concrete and clear as possible. The following criteria were used to retrieve process indicators from the literature:

- Number of times the indicator occurred in the literature: Is this a repeated or single observation?
- Amount of evidence: Is a rationale for this indicator specified in the literature?
- Useability of the indicator (in terms of measurability): Is the indicator more or less measurable, or can it be transformed into a measurable indicator?
- Applicability: Could this indicator be applied in the MAW context of Belgium, the Netherlands and/or Germany?

The process indicators were grouped into nine broad categories (approach, case management, collaboration, expertise, information sharing, practical conditions, quality assurance, structure and vision). Several indicators were identified for each category. The full list can be found in Appendix 3. These specific and measurable process indicators enabled us to describe and evaluate MAW approaches and served as the basis for the interview and observation protocols.

1.5 Good MAW Practices

Our second aim from the literature review was to develop an overview of good MAW practices in the context of violent radicalisation. The literature was screened for recommendations or good practices, and below we provide an overview of these, grouped according to the broad categories used.

1.5.1 Approach

Recommendation 1: Take a holistic approach

Preventative measures that target specific groups or communities can be counterproductive in polarized environments, generating more conflict and stigmatization (Eurocities, 2016). Further stigmatization of already marginalized groups or communities must be prevented (Global Solutions Exchange, 2017). Therefore, the literature recommends a broader or integral approach targeted at early prevention, where anti-radicalisation work is combined with other issues such as social inclusion, integration, dialogue and participation (Eurocities, 2016; Romaniuk, 2015).

1.5.2 Case Management

Although this does not apply to all MAW structures, one of the (main) activities/functions of many of them will be the discussion of at-risk individuals or cases. This is, for example, the case in Belgium and the Netherlands, where individuals at risk of radicalisation are discussed at roundtables. In order to obtain a complete, holistic view of each case, participating partners are expected to share all the necessary, available information on the case (Hardyns et al., 2021).

Recommendation 2: Ensure a thorough profiling of cases.

A thorough profiling means considering the totality of the case under discussion (Holdaway & Simpson, 2018), by sharing all signals in all relevant life domains, and taking the environments and the context of the individual into account. In addition to gathering security-related knowledge, information should be triangulated from several sources and domains in order to build a comprehensive understanding of the case, the local context and potential influences (Global Counterterrorism Forum, n.d.; Holdaway & Simpson, 2018). The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2020) suggests several personal domains from which insights should be gathered: (1) commitment and motivations to violence; (2) level of adherence to an ideology that supports violence; (3) capacity to commit violence; (4) social context and intention; and (5) psychosocial and practical needs. Stone (2015) also adds personal background, criminal history and personality traits. In addition to identifying the signals that point to a possible radicalisation process, it is also important to observe resilience factors and the signals that contradict this (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020; van Wonderen, 2019). In addition, developing an individual, tailor-made approach is emphasised in the literature (Gssime, 2019; Köhler, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016b; van de Donk et al., 2020; van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018a).

Recommendation 3: Have a system for case management in place that is effective and efficient.

It is important to have an effective and efficient case management procedure in place for the registration, categorisation and treatment of cases (Köhler, 2017). It

helps to have a planned working process that follows logical steps and connects objectives (van de Donk et al., 2020). Having a case owner – a person responsible for the follow-up of the intervention – can help with coordination (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; Gssime, 2019; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020; van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018a). There is some debate about who is the most suitable case owner – whether it should be the person involved in the case, or the person with the closest or longest relationship with the individual (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016a), or whether it should be a neutral person who is not necessarily tied to the case, and is ideally not a security or police actor (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020; van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018a).

Risk assessment tools can help in the risk assessment phase of case management by ensuring that signals are evaluated objectively, but they do not replace professional judgement of cases. They can support a professional's gut feeling and can be useful for decision-making purposes, but they do not necessarily protect against misinterpretations. Some tools (such as VERA-2R) can be time-consuming and put a drain on organisational resources (Cherney, 2018a; van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018a, 2018b). Therefore, if an instrument is used it should be practical, efficient and accepted by all actors (Ranstorp, 2018; van de Donk et al., 2020). It can be a pre-existing instrument, or one specifically created for a particular use.

Recommendation 4: Set objectives for cases and monitor them.

Also in relation to case management, objectives and clear goals should be set when working on individual cases (Gssime, 2019; Köhler, 2017). This will enable partners to monitor a case's progress and know whether the desired outcome has been reached, or whether adjustments to the approach are necessary (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie, 2017; van de Donk et al., 2020).

1.5.3   Collaboration

The multi-agency approach has the potential to be effective because it fosters a coordinated effort, according to Kelman et al. (2013, in Mazerolle et al., 2021). Coordinated collaboration might be the greatest strength of successful multi-agency partnership, but might also be what makes it most fragile. Multi-agency collaboration stands or falls by good working relations.

Recommendation 5: Establish clear roles and responsibilities between the MAW partners.

Clarity on roles and expectations is a crucial precondition for success, according to the Radicalisation Awareness Network (2019).

As a prerequisite of good working relations, clear-cut rules should be established about the roles and responsibilities of the partners involved; and ways of cooperation should be defined with the partners to divide responsibilities and manage expectations (Keijzer & van de Donk, 2019). Clear roles and responsibilities should be established, with specific expectations and deliverables

for all participating actors (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2018; Ranstorp, 2018). Those involved need to be aware of each other's professional limits and competences. Also, knowing what others do (or how they do it) is part of successful cooperation. "Successful cooperation is established on three pillars: transparency, accountability and knowing your partner" (Canters & van de Donk, 2019). Learning about each other's working processes leads to a deeper understanding, more streamlined procedures and greater trust (Canters & van de Donk, 2019; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019).

Recommendation 6: Set up a shared goal.

Shared goals and purpose facilitate effective collaboration. The perfect scenario is created when partners undertake MAW out of a shared desire to tackle the problem of violent radicalisation, in combination with the recognition that they cannot do it alone (Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2019). Ideally, the shared objectives are co-created by all actors, starting from a shared sense of urgency and an attitude of equality among all actors (Meines & Woltman, 2017; Vlaamse Vereniging voor Steden en Gemeenten, 2015). MAW collaboration requires mutual understanding about the purpose of the collaboration, and enhances shared ownership and accountability (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019).

Recommendation 7: Meet on a regular basis and maintain structural contact even in times of 'peace'.

According to Roberts (2018), a significant factor in the efficient governance of a MAW structure lies in the frequency and environmental closeness of contact among partnership members. Investment has to be made in building the mutual trust of actors via frequent and periodic meeting between a fixed group of people (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2018; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016a, 2016b; Terra Toolkit, 2015). Some authors even emphasise the need for face-to-face contact, as good cooperation requires all parties to sit around the same table (Canters & van de Donk, 2019; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019).

Trust should also be built in peacetime through professional and frequent interaction (Bjørgo & Smit, 2020). It is therefore particularly important to ensure continuity, by keeping in touch on a structural basis at times when there is less or no public attention on radicalisation (Eurocities, 2016; Gssime, 2019; Meijer & Broekhuizen, 2017).

Recommendation 8: Give it time.

The duration of the professional relationship is another significant factor in the efficiency of a MAW structure. According to Roberts (2018), this enables local problems to be resolved more quickly. However difficult it is to act immediately, this recommendation is an important one to keep in mind. For this reason, it is also advised that existing (multi-agency) collaborations and networks are used as much as possible when establishing a new MAW (Global Solutions Exchange, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016c). Overlap and duplication of efforts should be avoided at all cost (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019).

Recommendation 9: Build horizontal networks.

Whereas previous recommendations on coordinated collaboration focused more on the collaboration of partners internally, within MAW we found several recommendations for building collaborations with external partners as well. No city works in isolation, therefore efficient coordination with the city administration and collaboration with external partners are crucial to the success of prevention programmes (Eurocities, 2016). Building external networks helps to foster exchange and increase knowledge (European Forum for Urban Security, 2020). Useful collaboration with external actors could, for example, be with youth departments and youth work, schools, NGOs, Muslim communities, political representatives and others (European Forum for Urban Security, 2020; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016b). Focus on willing and cooperative community leaders in doing so, and on people with significant influence in their communities (Neumann et al., 2015).

Recommendation 10: Use the triad of trust, transparency and information sharing to strengthen collaboration.

Trust seems to be an important prerequisite for effective and efficient collaboration in MAW structures, as it is mentioned in almost all of the literature included in this review. There seems to be a close relationship between trust, information sharing and transparency, with transparency and clear guidelines forming the basis (see Figure 2).

Transparency of follow-up and clear guidelines facilitate both information sharing (Colaert, 2017; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020) and trust (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; D'Hondt et al., 2019; Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2015). More specifically, in the latter case, trust is especially built through transparency about follow-up actions, and sharing these.

There is also a reciprocal relationship between information sharing and trust, where a climate of trust facilitates the sharing of information (Bjørgo & Smit, 2020; Cherney, 2018a; Meijer & Broekhuizen, 2017; Roberts, 2018; Sarma, 2018). Even though having a climate of trust was never explicitly mentioned as an absolute prerequisite for information sharing, the amount of trust is believed to have a strong, vital effect on the level of information sharing (Meines & Woltman, 2017; Ranstorp et al., 2016). On the other hand, effective information sharing can establish and build trust (D'Hondt et al., 2019; European Forum for

Figure 2. Visual representation of how information sharing, trust, and transparency and follow-up are related

Urban Security, 2020; Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap & Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019) by demonstrating that agencies can successfully collaborate through a MAW structure (Sarma, 2018). Poor information sharing may contribute to creating distrust (Universiteit Utrecht & Universiteit Leiden, 2018). In summary, all these factors seem to mutually reinforce each other, positively influencing cooperation.

1.5.4 Expertise

One of the potential benefits of multi-agency partnerships is the ability to draw on a broad range of expertise from the other partners (Crawford, 1999, in Mazerolle et al., 2021). A lot has been written in the literature about the expertise and qualities that MAW actors are expected to have.

Recommendation 11: Invest in and safeguard the expertise of the MAW team.

Various sources in the literature review pointed out the importance of investing in the knowledge and capabilities of the MAW team (De Waele, 2018; Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2018, 2019; Gssime & Meines, 2019; Jamine & Fadil, 2019; Meijer & Broekhuizen, 2017). It is particularly important to train first-line practitioners or partners who have direct and regular contact with the public, such as, for example, Muslim community leaders and first-line workers (Gssime & Meines, 2019; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019; Gielen & Advies, 2015). Training for first-line workers should mainly focus on awareness building, such as picking up signs of radicalisation, and how to seek support (Neumann et al., 2015; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019; Ranstorp, 2018; Sarma, 2018),

while training for other MAW professionals can be broader, including awareness building and case management specific expertise (Carmi & Gianfrancesco, 2017; Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2015b; Molenkamp & Wouterse, 2018), information sharing skills (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2018; Sarma, 2018), radicalisation-specific knowledge (Amadeo & Iannone, 2016; De Waele, 2018; Jamine & Fadil, 2019; Keijzer & van de Donk, 2019, 2019; Köhler, 2017; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018), practical knowledge (or skills) (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2018; Köhler, 2017; Stone, 2015) and learning how to work together (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2015b; Jamine & Fadil, 2019; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2018; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016b).

Partnership members should also keep up to date with new developments in the field and ensure they are working in line with the latest research (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; Global Counterterrorism Forum, n.d.; Köhler, 2017; van de Donk et al., 2020).

Even though many sources in the literature state that team expertise is an important quality, there is no consensus about where expertise, knowledge and skills should be obtained. While some sources mention the advantages of having an external expert pool where knowledge and expertise is concentrated and available when needed (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie, 2017; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018), others recommend strengthening in-team expertise, in order not to become too dependent on others for information (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; Haanstra, 2018). However, the latter approach is more prone to 'institutional memory loss' when people leave the partnership (Universiteit Utrecht & Universiteit Leiden, 2018). Measures thus have to be taken to prevent this, such as an effective handover, a good documentation system (Meijer & Broekhuizen, 2017) or institutionalisation of the knowledge and networks in the team to make it less dependent on individuals (Christensen & Bjørgo, 2018).

Recommendation 12: Use the available expertise (expertise-building within the team).

It is important to make active use of the expertise that is available, and share it with the team, to benefit from new experiences and knowledge. Expertise sharing allows all partners to learn from each other and to make use of each other's knowledge (Meines & Woltman, 2016; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018). It is also important to feed back the lessons learned, and bring these into practice to improve the quality of the work (van de Donk et al., 2020).

Recommendation 13: Exchange good practices cross-border.

Exchanging good practices is closely related to the previous recommendation of sharing expertise with the other members of the team. This recommendation focuses on information exchange between different MAW structures, across geographical and organisational borders. MAW structures should be encouraged

to keep up to date with the activities of other groups, to see what can be learned from them. This is not only about learning from other MAW structures, but also about sharing their own experiences, challenges and good practices. This could be an exchange with peers and relevant cities and town at a national level (The Expert Group to Prevent Radicalisation, 2016), but may also include international exchanges (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2018; Sarma, 2018). Challenges relating to crime, such as violent radicalisation, frequently cut across municipal or national boundaries. Radicalisation is a very local issue, but has an international character as well (Global Solutions Exchange, 2017). Disseminate the lessons that have been learned (Krasenberg & Gssime, 2019).

1.5.5 Information Sharing

Multi-agency partnerships are believed to be better at detecting and responding to signals of radicalisation compared to agencies operating on their own. MAW structures have the potential to interrupt pathways to radicalisation through better information sharing and referral procedures (Cherney, 2018b) and by collectively addressing risk factors in a holistic and coordinated way (Butt & Tuck, 2014). Before addressing these risk factors, concerns are usually signalled to and shared among the actors in MAW structures. In addition to fostering coordination efforts (Kelman et al., 2013), information and intelligence sharing is described as one of the mechanisms behind how MAW interventions might work in the context of radicalisation (Cherney, 2018b). But what challenges to information sharing are described in the literature, and how can these be addressed?

We distinguished three types of information flows in which information can be shared. The first is the sharing of signals from externals to the MAW structure. We will call this 'bottom-up sharing'. Secondly, we have the sharing of information within the MAW structure, between the MAW actors. This is, for example, the sharing of sensitive information about cases. We can also distinguish a third information flow, which is communication from the MAW structure to externals (top-down sharing).

Recommendation 14: Set up a signalling structure that is well known and easy to reach.

First of all, it is of utmost importance that concerns about radicalisation reach the MAW structure. Many sources in the literature therefore recommend having a central or single point of contact that is neutral, well known and easy to reach – a signalling structure – where people can report their concerns (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2019; Krasenberg & Gssime, 2019; Ranstorp, 2018; van Wonderen, 2019). This signalling structure can, for example, be a helpline, a single person or a forum, and must be well known to its potential users. The transparency of this structure's procedures and the next steps and actions is given high importance in the literature. In other words: what happens when concerns are reported, and how will this be fed back? Transparency on what information will be shared, when and among which MAW partners, as well as the possible involvement of security actors, must be in place from the outset (Geleerde Lessen

Sleutelfiguren, 2019; Köhler, 2017; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020).

Recommendation 15: Have clear agreed rules in place with all actors to guide data sharing.

Information sharing is not easy and comes with many challenges, especially in the context of violent radicalisation, where the confidential or sensitive nature of information hampers such exchange (European Forum for Urban Security, 2020). Many publications mention the tension between confidentiality and safety (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie, 2017), or the difficult equilibrium between what information is 'nice to know' and what is 'need to know' (D'Hondt et al., 2019; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016c; Vlaamse Vereniging voor Steden en Gemeenten, 2015). To tackle this, many sources emphasise the need to have clear agreed rules to guide data sharing, with everyone concerned (D'Hondt et al., 2019; Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2019; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019; Weine et al., 2017). Such rules should define what information is to be shared, how and with whom (Carmi & Gianfrancesco, 2017; Cherney, 2020; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016b).

Recommendation 16: Communicate MAW activities with the community.

According to the European Forum for Urban Security (2020), adequate communication in both directions is essential. Keeping a good top-down information flow from the MAW structure to the general public, for example by proactively communicating the goals and benefits of the MAW activities, can raise community awareness of radicalisation (Meijer & Broekhuizen, 2017; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016a; Sterkenburg et al., 2019), increase trust and shape the public perception of prevention efforts in a positive way (Ranstorp et al., 2016). Transparency of operations, actions and work methods is important in this respect (National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018). Outreach activities can help with this by clarifying the related roles and responsibilities to the public (Sarma, 2019).

1.5.6 Practical Conditions

Finally, it is important to mention that a MAW structure will operate within certain limits. There are always some practical contextual issues to take into account; CVE action does not take place in a vacuum. Legal, political and financial barriers may need to be overcome (Global Solutions Exchange, 2017). For a MAW structure to be able to function, sufficient resources are needed (The Expert Group to Prevent Radicalisation, 2016). Creating political support might not be the biggest concern, and can be challenging, but the investment can be worth it (Meines & Woltman, 2017). Another issue is the continuity of MAW initiatives – the sustainability of activities remains a major challenge (Eurocities, 2016; Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2015a; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018).

1.5.7 Quality Assurance

It is only healthy for a system's functioning to be evaluated regularly. Periodic reflection is highly recommended (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2018; Holdaway & Simpson, 2018). In this section we provide recommendations for ensuring the quality in the MAW structure is maintained.

Recommendation 17: Create a culture of learning by having regular periods of reflection.

The importance of having regular periods of reflection is – not surprisingly – highly valued in the evaluation literature. Regular assessments are recommended that include both time for reflection and an in-depth analysis of the situation (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2019; Krasenberg & Gssime, 2019; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2020). This can be done by challenging all current practices, and testing and adjusting them where necessary. Learn from things that did not go well. Structurally building in measurement and reflection opportunities can help (Romaniuk, 2015; Uhlmann, 2017), as can a structured collection of information on the MAW network's functioning; these can be used for in-depth analysis at regular time-intervals (van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018a). Evaluation can be done by external parties, but the emphasis should be on creating an internal culture of learning by having regular moments of reflection within the team.

Recommendation 18: Evaluate working procedures as well.

What is actually evaluated is, of course, as important as setting up regular evaluations. Usually, people focus on the effectiveness of an approach. In doing so, it is advised that specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) goals are set at the start, and predefined indicators should be used, so that it is possible to monitor progress towards achieving the set objectives (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2015a; Gssime, 2019). The working procedures of the MAW structure should be assessed in a similar way. For example, are processes being followed up sufficiently? Can improvements be made in the way partners and individuals work together (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2019)?

1.5.8 Structure

'Structure' refers in this context to the constellation of actors, who to include in the MAW structure and the 'ideal' group size. Which actors, and how many, to involve in the multi-agency partnership is not a straightforward question to answer, but it is nonetheless an important one.

Recommendation 19: Begin with a mapping exercise.

We have already emphasised that there is no one-size-fits-all approach, and this applies also when considering who to include in the MAW structure. In asking this question, the local context should be taken into account and a mapping exercise conducted to find the relevant stakeholders within the city (Meines &

Woltman, 2016; Royal United Services Institute, 2016; Vlaamse Vereniging voor Steden en Gemeenten, 2015). This depends not only on the local context and what organisations are out there, but also on the needs of a particular MAW structure, its strategy, and the current events and developments affecting the target group (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018). The MAW structure must be representative of the departments and organisations relevant to the delivery of the CVE strategy, and might include (mental) health, police, municipality, safeguarding (social welfare, adults and children), education representatives, CVE manager/coordinator, prisons, youth services, etc. (Ranstorp, 2018). A broad and diverse range of partners should be involved, where possible, in order to create a holistic approach (Global Counterterrorism Forum, n.d.; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016a; Terra Toolkit, 2015).

To assemble a good range of actors, one has to look, among other things, at the representativeness of those involved (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2018). The partners should be chosen to benefit the local approach to preventing radicalisation the most (Haanstra, 2018). To help with this mapping exercise, D'Hondt et al (2019) and Cocon-Vilvoorde (2017) suggest looking at the added value of a partner. The question 'What can this partner bring?' should be asked about every actor. In the literature review, the five most popular actors to include in the multi-agency collaboration were civil society/community organisations, social work/care, law enforcement/police, education, and municipality/local authorities.

Ultimately, the most important question to ask is probably: 'Will this partner benefit the local approach to preventing radicalisation?' If the answer to this question differs on a case-by-case basis, a varying composition of ad hoc and 'guest' actors might be a suitable approach (D'Hondt et al., 2019), although this should preferably be in addition to a fixed, 'core' group of actors that are structurally involved. This has the advantage that trust can be created within a smaller group, and the partnership can be kept to a manageable scale (Cocon-Vilvoorde, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016a, 2019; Vlaamse Vereniging voor Steden en Gemeenten, 2015).

Recommendation 20: Involve communities and civil society.

According to the European Forum for Urban Security (2020), the success of a radicalisation prevention policy depends in part on the active participation of civil society, and therefore it is important to involve the institutions that intervene in the lives of radicalised people. The involvement of communities and civil society is recommended in more than 30 sources in this literature review. This might suggest that these groups should be added to the 'must engage' list of prospective partners. The importance of maintaining good relations with affected communities, even in times of peace, is often highlighted (Eurocities, 2016), and their involvement will ensure a more comprehensive approach (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2016). In terms of how local groups get in touch and work with these agencies, it is recommended that a conversation and relationship

with them is built during peace time, and not only when issues arise (Eurocities, 2016).

The literature gives many examples of what communities to involve. They do not have to necessarily be the largest and most organised, but can be smaller communities as well (this is, after all, primarily a local exercise) (Haanstra, 2018). The main reason for proactively involving local communities in the MAW structure is to have more access to relevant information (Roberts, 2018; Global Counterterrorism Forum, n.d.; van Wonderen, 2019). Furthermore, they are the critical components in countering violent extremism that might be most able to reverse this process (Aldrich & Mahabir, 2019).

However, 'the right people in the right place' are not necessarily the formal leaders of communities or organisations. It may be better to include the community influencers who can reach a broad cross-section of individuals and aid with trust development with the communities (Global Counterterrorism Forum, n.d.).

1.5.9 Vision

When differences exist in actors' vision and their strategies are in conflict, their actions might undermine each other's purposes (Stephens & Sieckelinck, 2019). It is therefore important that the objectives, and the methods for how to achieve them, are streamlined between the MAW actors.

Recommendation 21: Set specific MAW objectives and a strategy on how to achieve them.

Radicalisation is an ambiguous concept, therefore it is advised that clear goals are defined for the MAW structure (Colaert, 2017) and indicators of success and failure identified (Stone, 2015). In doing so, key issues related to radicalisation should be prioritised, and these should then be used to inform the design and objective of the MAW structure. In this way, realistic goals can be set for the change the MAW structure is aiming to achieve (Holdaway & Simpson, 2018). In addition, the methods for how to achieve the specified objectives should be clarified so that there are no differences in opinion on how to tackle radicalisation (Köhler, 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2019; Schuurman & Bakker, 2016). It is important to involve all actors in the process of developing a MAW vision, objectives and strategy, in order to explore different perspectives and to establish what connects all those involved (De Waele, 2018).

Recommendation 22: Ensure a common language among partners.

Cooperation is easier if there is a shared language (Molenkamp & Wouterse, 2018). A clear and shared definition of violent radicalisation should be established, as well as descriptions of related terms and the different types of radicalisation that exist locally (Meines & Woltman, 2017). This definition must be contextualised, adapted to the local context (Holdaway & Simpson, 2018). Furthermore, language that causes polarisation must be avoided (Meines & Woltman, 2017).

1.6   Conclusion

This systematic literature review was performed in the light of the EMMA project. Its findings have been used as the basis of the self-evaluation tool and practical manual that includes hands-on information for local practitioners. The review confirmed the current lack of scientific evaluations of multi-agency approaches in the field of violent radicalisation.

The take-home messages from this literature review are:

1. There is **a powerful role for MAW structures** in the detection and prevention of radicalisation.
2. **Collaboration and trust-building** between actors might be the biggest challenge in MAW structures.
3. **There is no one-size-fits-all approach**, ever. Every approach should be tailored to its local context, and this is an absolute condition in multi-agency working. Whether this is about having an individual tailored approach per case, or taking the local MAW context into account when setting general objectives, target group and strategies, or deciding what actors to include in the partnership, etc., the local context will have an impact on many aspects.

1.6.1   Methodological Limitations

- Only one scholar performed the full text screening and analysis; no second reader was consulted to validate the results.
- Although we relied on advice from experts in the field, our methodology could not ensure that all relevant websites were included in the protocol. Hence, it is possible that key evaluation reports have been missed. However, we minimised the risk by reference harvesting. A second round of reference harvesting could have lowered the odds to a minimum.

1.6.2   Future Research

- The review focused solely on MAW evaluation literature on the topic of radicalisation, while a review of MAW cooperation on other issues might have provided useful insights applicable to the radicalisation context as well. Decker and Pyrooz (2015) suggest the long tradition of gang research as an example, as gangs have several aspects in common with radicalised groups, including group structure, demographics, marginalisation, strength of membership bonds and in-group/out-group mechanisms.
- This literature review provided an introductory insight into the roles of actors and who to include in the MAW approach. A specific analysis is needed to dig deeper, as the focus here was on broad recommendations.

1.6.3 Strengths

- An extensive screening of the MAW evaluation literature in the field of violent radicalisation was performed, and information on good practices from eighty-one sources was synthesised. The added value of this systematic literature review is that it focused for the most part on grey literature, and thus differs from the traditional systematic literature reviews in the field.
- Performing a systematic literature review where the majority of the literature consists of grey literature is not an easy task. Not only is it less straightforward and grey literature more 'hidden' and harder to find, the full text analysis of the found literature is also a lot more time consuming due to the lengthiness of most research reports, and their unstructured nature, which make them more difficult to synthesise. However, this review shows that majority of the publications on MAW evaluations in the field of radicalisation are research reports; it is therefore important, when collecting information about evaluation research into this topic, to also include grey literature, which provides valuable information on good MAW practices in the context of violent radicalisation.
- This review has provided a synthesis of the currently limited CVE evaluation literature, contributing to theory building and thus, hopefully, to a more solid basis for new CVE evaluations.

1.7 References

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2 Observing Multi-Agency Working: Participatory Observations in Belgian, Dutch and German Cities

Birte Vandaele, Lien Dorme, Lieven Pauwels, Noel Klima and Wim Hardyns

The first part of the fieldwork within the process evaluation is participatory observations. These were carried out during MAW structures' meetings in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. Prior to the participatory observations, the MAW meeting being observed explained and introduced their work, and highlighted the strengths and pitfalls of MAW that they were experiencing.

The selection of the MAW structures to be observed depended on their experience in dealing with the issue of radicalisation. The original intention was to observe eighteen meetings in three cities in Belgium, three cities in the Netherlands and three cities in Germany (two observations in each city). Due to difficulties with data protection and cancellations or a lack of meetings, usually because of the Covid-19 pandemic, we carried out eight observations in Belgium (four cities), three in the Netherlands (two cities) and three in Germany (two cities) – a total of fourteen observations in eight cities.

The observations were carried out using an observation protocol (see Appendix 4). The protocol was based on the process indicators derived from the literature review. The participatory observations were carried out both in person (n = 4) and online (n = 10) via Microsoft Teams, depending on the Covid-19 pandemic measures that were in place at the time. The following is an outline of the results. More detailed results can be found in the observation matrices (Tables 5 to 9).

2.1 Belgium

2.1.1 Observation 1 (September 2020)

The first observation in Belgium was of a face-to-face meeting in a large room with fifteen actors present from the municipality, police/security, social/wellbeing and judicial sectors (city code C). Additionally, two expert participants were present by invitation, and a researcher from Ghent University. This MAW structure is organised at police zone level, and includes several municipalities. The region covered is split into two police zones, with a separate MAW roundtable for each. This first observation was of the MAW roundtable for the first region/police zone.

The participants were seated in a roundtable/circular setup. MAW members were asked in advance to restrict the number of participants per sector/organisation to the minimum, so that Covid-19 related social distancing could be implemented. The mayor of the biggest municipality was the chair of the meeting and took a generally neutral position. An agenda was used to guide the

meeting, and minutes were taken by the MAW coordinator. Secrecy rules were repeated before the meeting began. A new actor from the social/wellbeing sector was welcomed and introduced at the table.

On the one hand, the chair focused on participation by urging participants to take action and respond. On the other hand, there was a focus on morale through the frequent use of humour during the meeting to create a pleasant atmosphere. About a third of the time was spent on case management, when fifteen cases were briefly discussed. There was sufficient nuance, and respectful language was used when discussing case management. Tools and thinking frameworks were not used during the meeting. The remaining time was spent on strategic announcements, when news from the government and its impact on the MAW structure was discussed, and on reflection on the functioning of the network.

A success factor of this MAW network was the unstructured yet efficient no-nonsense atmosphere that was created without straying from the core issues to be discussed. A potential pitfall was that there was minimal or no input from some participants – all input came from one sector.

2.1.2 Observation 2 (September 2020)

Observation 2 also took place face-to-face. Seventeen participants (city code C) and a researcher from Ghent University were present. The sectors represented were municipality, police/security, social/wellbeing and judicial. This observation was of the MAW roundtable for the second region/police zone mentioned in observation 1. Two actors attended both meetings (the information officer and the MAW coordinator).

The participants were seated in a U-shaped setup, with the coordinator seated in the middle. The mayors of all municipalities were present. An agenda was used to guide the meeting, and no meeting minutes were taken. Parts of the agenda overlapped with the agenda from the meeting covered by observation 1.

The MAW coordinator informally took the role of chair, together with a colleague from the municipality, as no formal chair had been appointed. The coordinator welcomed the new actors around the table and an introduction round was held. Secrecy rules were repeated, and this heralded the start of the actual meeting. Three cases were briefly discussed in the case management section. The meeting reflected on the functioning of the MAW structure through an exchange of ideas about how this could be improved (the 'ideal dream' scenario). The remaining time was spent on strategic announcements, when news from the government and its impact on the MAW structure was discussed.

A potential success factor for this MAW was the informal atmosphere. A potential pitfall was the low involvement of several participants in the meeting.

2.1.3 Observation 3 (October 2020)

The third observation in Belgium took place during an online Microsoft Teams meeting with eleven participants (city code A) and a researcher from Ghent University. The sectors represented were police/security, municipality, youth/education and judicial. Two additional participants from the expert sector

were invited to present during part of the meeting. This was an operational MAW meeting, which was primarily focused on case management.

A participant from the police sector takes the role of the meeting chair in this MAW. This person took a neutral position and used a predefined agenda to guide the meeting. A 'fixed', specifically appointed member of the administration from the police sector had the (returning) role of taking minutes, and did not take any further part in the meeting discussions. There was no use of a tool or thinking frameworks. Agreed rules were not made or repeated before the start of the meeting. The first half hour was reserved for reflection on the functioning of the MAW structure, via presentations from the two expert actors who had been invited for this part of the meeting, and a discussion on the presented contents. The remaining half hour was dedicated to case management. The chair took an active role in encouraging participants to speak out in the discussion and introduced each case by outlining the context or providing a short background summary. Cases were visualised using 'information fiches', which gave a short synthesis of background information per case. The case management took up about half an hour, and five cases were discussed.

Not everyone participated as actively, and at some points there were disagreements. The atmosphere was quite neutral and professional. There was sufficient nuance, and respectful language was used while discussing cases. A key success factor of this MAW was the professional approach that was used during the whole meeting. A potential pitfall was the presence of some dominant participants, which caused some discord and tension at times.

2.1.4   Observation 4 (November 2020)

The fourth observation was of an online Microsoft Teams meeting with ten participants (city code A) and a researcher from Ghent University. The sectors represented were police/security, municipality, youth/education and judicial. A participant from the police sector takes the role of the meeting chair. This person took a neutral position during the meeting and used the agenda to guide the meeting. Minutes were taken by someone who had been agreed upon beforehand.

The chair welcomed the participants. A new participant was welcomed to the table and a short roundtable was held. Five cases were discussed in the case management section. The discussion of cases lasted for about 100 minutes. Cases were visualised by using 'information fiches' on the share screen that included a short synthesis of background information per case (personal details, the actor who signalled the case, the reason for concern, family situation, school and work situation, services involved in the case, and what expectations there were for this meeting). The chair had an active role in encouraging participants to speak up in the discussion, and introduced each case by outlining the context or providing a short background. Each case was thoroughly profiled during the case management phase. Suggestions were made for follow-up actions and specific action points were agreed. In the remaining fifteen minutes of the meeting, a special call to be alert to signals of radicalisation was made by the police. No other

items were raised. The date for the next meeting was communicated before the ending of the meeting.

Potential success factors were the professional attitude and sense of urgency that was present throughout the whole meeting. There was sufficient nuance, and respectful language was used while discussing cases. The dominance of certain actors and subtle tensions between participants could be potential pitfalls.

2.1.5   Observation 5 (December 2020)

The fifth observation took place in person. There were nine participants (city code D) and a researcher from Ghent University present. The participants were seated in a roundtable/circular setup. They were from the municipality and police/security sector. An agenda had been communicated to the participants in advance.

The meeting chair is the MAW coordinator, who introduced each agenda point with some context and background information. The meeting started with a short roundtable and was then followed by case management, during which five cases were discussed. A thorough profile of most of the cases was effected through an open discussion between all participants, where information and signals were openly shared. Follow-up actions were decided for most cases. Following the case management, there was a discussion about the local strategy for how to deal with the problem of stickers with far-right content appearing on the street. The meeting closed with practical arrangements for the planning of the MAW meetings for the next year.

All participants took part in the discussion and were heard during the meeting. There was an informal atmosphere in which information could be openly shared between the participants. The easy information sharing among the participants, thorough discussion of cases, and the equal participation from all actors were success factors in this MAW meeting. These success factors might be facilitated by the small scale of the municipality.

Potential pitfalls that were observed during the meeting were the open sharing of 'nice-to-know' information (rather than 'need-to-know' information), and the use of language by some participants that can be perceived as less culture-sensitive.

2.1.6   Observation 6 (March 2021)

The sixth Belgian observation was of a meeting with eight participants (city code D) and a researcher from Ghent University. This was a hybrid meeting – one of the participants joined the physical meeting virtually, by means of Microsoft Teams; the other participants were seated in a roundtable/circular setup. The sectors represented were municipality and police/security. The MAW coordinator had sent apologies for this meeting. As a consequence, a colleague from the municipality took over the formal role as chair.

Four cases were discussed during the case management section. Three of these were discussed because of criminal behaviour in the municipality, and the meeting discussed how this behaviour could be stopped. There was no thorough

profiling of these individuals. Additionally, the information officer shared short updates on five known cases from the Local Task Force list, at the request of the mayor. The remaining time was spent on strategic announcements for subsidies for a radicalisation programme. Before the meeting closed, some actors shared interest in a new meeting where all safety topics in the municipality could be discussed, with additional partners. Most participants were positive about this type of meeting; however, some actors explained that this would not be possible, according to the current regulations in Belgium. The mayor closed the meeting by thanking the participants for their cooperation and transparency.

The meeting had a rather chaotic course, where agenda points were switched around and new agenda points added. No clear follow-up actions were decided on the cases under discussion. Furthermore, the focus of the meeting strayed away from identifying individuals at risk of violent radicalisation and instead concentrated on the criminal behaviour of citizens and how to tackle this. The goal of the MAW meeting was overshadowed by personal interests from several participants, who used the meeting as an opportunity for discussion with the police and security services. The informal, unstructured atmosphere can be seen as a success factor of this MAW structure.

2.1.7 Observation 7 (May 2021)

The seventh observation was of an online meeting with six participants (city code B) and two researchers from Ghent University. The sectors represented were the municipality, youth/education and police/security sector. There were two chairs from the municipality and an agenda guided the meeting. No report or minutes were made. Confidentiality rules were repeated at the start of the meeting. Three cases were discussed. No tools or thinking frameworks were used during the case management section. The discussion of cases took about half an hour. This was followed by a discussion of two themes, specifically on LGBTQ and far-right extremism.

A success factor of this MAW meeting was efficient consultation through their step-by-step operation. This stepwise way of working was specific to this city. Another success factor was the good flow of information and that they were very focused. A pitfall was that some actors talked amongst themselves, partly due to the online environment.

2.1.8 Observation 8 (September 2021)

The eighth observation was of an online meeting with six participants (city code B) and a researcher from Ghent University. The sectors represented were municipality, youth/education and police/security. There were two chairs, and an agenda guided the meeting. No report or minutes were made. Confidentiality rules were repeated at the start of the meeting. Case management was discussed, but there was no use of a tool or thinking framework. A pitfall was that some actors talked amongst themselves, partly due to the online environment.

2.2 The Netherlands

2.2.1 Observation 1 (October 2020)

The first observation in the Netherlands was of an online meeting with seven participants (city code E) and a researcher from Ghent University. The sectors represented were police/security, social/wellbeing municipality and expert. A representative from the Care and Safety Houses chaired this meeting; this person is the so-called 'process coordinator'. There was no meeting agenda and no minutes were taken.

The meeting was short (41 minutes) and four cases were discussed. The cases were 'network-based', meaning that no individuals were discussed at this specific roundtable, but that the case discussions were about organisations and associations 'at risk', i.e. that display problematic behaviour based on their religion or political preference. No tools or thinking frameworks were used in the case management section. The atmosphere was unstructured and rather informal. The meeting chair took the lead in the discussions; other participants were quiet but were encouraged to speak. Feedback and interaction was mostly constructive, and any criticism was accompanied by a suggestion on how to proceed further. Due to a lack of follow-up since the last meeting, this meeting ended early with some practical arrangements for the next meeting.

A potential pitfall was the chaotic discussions, caused by poor follow-up from the previous meeting. The participants should have reviewed and clarified the decisions made and action points from the previous meeting before the discussion at this meeting continued. Several of the previous meeting's action points had not been fulfilled (five items that had been agreed to had not been acted on), which was the cause of the meeting ending early and being unable to have an in-depth discussion on updates and new signals since the previous meeting (monitoring did not happen). A potential success factor was the motivating and constructive approach from the meeting chair.

2.2.2 Observation 2 (November 2020)

The second observation of a MAW meeting in the Netherlands also took place online. Fourteen participants (city code E) and a researcher from Ghent University were present. The sectors represented were municipality, police/security, social/wellbeing, health care and academia/expert.

The role of the chair, who is a part of the social/wellbeing sector, was mostly limited to introducing the cases and enabling the participants to share their opinion or to ask questions. The chair did not actively participate during the discussions and remained neutral. No agenda had been discussed in advance nor had any procedural decisions been made (such as who would take the minutes). As requested by the chair, the participants introduced themselves to the other actors. During the discussions, the majority of participants took turns speaking. Some actors remained silent during the discussion. Overall, the consultation was respectful. Participants let each other speak, listened and thanked each other for

sharing their expertise. The professionalism between the members could be considered as a strength of the MAW structure.

Three cases were discussed during the 75-minute meeting. There was no specific use of tools or thinking framework. When discussing a case, actors gave each other an update from their own perspectives or field. The meeting gave a chaotic impression due to the fact that there was no agenda, no specific profiling of cases, or allocation of tasks at the end of a case. This could be a possible pitfall.

2.2.3   Observation 3 (September 2021)

The third observation was of a recorded Microsoft Teams meeting in which personal information was subsequently removed due to privacy-related issues and strict legislation regarding this. There were seven participants (city code F) taking part in the roundtable. No researcher from Ghent University was present during the actual meeting. The sectors represented were police/security, judiciary (public prosecutor's office and probation services) and the municipality. A representative (process coordinator) from the Care and Safety Houses chaired this meeting. There was no meeting agenda and no minutes were taken.

The online meeting was the longest observed MAW meeting of all (almost three hours), and about four cases were discussed. The cases were about specific individuals, and follow-up actions were established. For each case, relevant people were called in, and participants who could not offer input for a particular case left the meeting. There was therefore a circulation of participants during the meeting, with a core group who remained present for all cases. The meeting chair took the lead in the discussions and had a gatekeeping role of calling in new participants, or letting participants leave the call.

A key success factor was the professional and neutral way in which the cases were discussed. The participants were well matched and driven to follow up cases well.

2.3   Germany

2.3.1   Observation 1 (April 2021)

The first observation in Germany (city code G) took place during an online meeting with thirteen participants, and several researchers from VPN and Ghent University. The sectors represented were youth/education, expert/academia, municipality and civil society. The meeting chair had a prominent role in questioning and encouraging participants to speak up, and took minutes and summarised the outcomes of the discussions. The chairing institution decided on all agenda points and ultimately took most decisions. This, however, wasn't necessarily intended but rather was a result of the hesitation of other participants. An agenda was drafted in advance, but was not necessarily followed during the meeting; it provided more of a guiding function. The atmosphere of the meeting was formal. There was no use of tools or thinking frameworks, and no individual cases were discussed that were at risk of violent radicalisation. Participants shared

their thoughts on different topics, and offered to share resources and information. Some actors seemed hesitant to share information with the others, although this was not stated out loud.

Some success factors for this MAW structure were high motivation and high expertise among the actors. The MAW structure was founded out of the intrinsic motivation of the civil society organisations, which creates high motivation. All actors already knew each other and had worked with each other for years. This meant that they already trusted one another. Another success factor is that there was a lot of experience in all areas of prevention: primary, secondary and tertiary in the field of right-wing extremism. There was extensive knowledge about the situation on the ground and contact with communities, and an openness about sharing knowledge with each other and combining activities.

A potential pitfall for this MAW is the fact that some participants were at times quite passive, and the chairing organisation had to take quite a dominant role in decision-making. The chairing organisation took most decisions and also organised the agenda. Although the chair constantly asked for input, some participants seemed to be hesitant. There was also a lack of purpose – it was not clear in the meeting what the MAW structure would like to achieve. The fact that the research was conducted online and the MAW structure had only begun to function at the start of the pandemic hindered information exchange. These potential problems made us aware of the difficulty of ensuring the MAW structures can be developed in a sustainable way. Some participants also acted out of self-interest. Another potential pitfall was the absence of security actors (e.g. the police). There was also a lack of funding.

2.3.2   Observation 2 (October 2021)

The second observation from this municipality (city code G) took place during an online meeting with three participants and a researcher from VPN. The sectors represented were the municipality and civil society. A chair was present who guided the participants through the agenda step by step. No rules of the meeting were made or repeated, because the rules seemed to be clear to everyone and there seemed to be a lot of trust. Minutes of the meeting were made. It was not necessary to encourage quiet participants, as everyone contributed. The chair took part in the discussion, so did not really have a neutral position. The participants seemed to know each other well, and there was a familiar and friendly atmosphere. Every opinion seemed to be respected, even if there was criticism expressed. There was a use of tools or thinking frameworks and there was case management. Every participant had specific expertise and shared it with the group. There was no trade-off for the sharing of information – all participants seemed eager to share as much information as possible. The participants worked closely together and appeared to be aware of the MAW structure's common goal. However, they remained conscious of their own organisation's capacities and interests, e.g. sometimes one actor decided how to proceed regarding the processes of their organisation. All the participants seemed to have deep knowledge and expertise and appeared to be sensitive towards stereotypes and prejudices; there was no

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incidence of disrespectful vocabulary. When a lack of knowledge was identified they agreed to put it on the agenda for next meeting.

The familiar and friendly atmosphere indicated a high level of trust between the participants, and is a success factors for this MAW structure. Furthermore, the participants were well informed about the situation and the meeting was clearly structured and coordinated.

A potential pitfall was continuity: some participants had not been present at the previous meeting, and many items on the agenda were new to them. Also, discussion about many items was postponed until the next meeting, when more participants were expected to attend. There were also some difficulties in information sharing that hindered otherwise-good communication.

2.3.3   Observation 3 (May 2021)

This observation took place during an online meeting with eleven participants (city code I) and several researchers from VPN and Ghent University. Actors from the following sectors were present: police/security, youth/education, social/wellbeing, municipality and civil society. There was a chair present who took a neutral position. Some participants' cameras were turned off, which made it difficult to know who participated in the meeting, other than the persons who spoke. At the start of the meeting, the agreed rules were stated or repeated. Some speakers mentioned that actual cases could not be shared with other actors; cases were only discussed very briefly and were always shared anonymously. No report or minutes were made. An agenda had been created and every item was summarised before the meeting moved on to the next item. There was room for everyone's input into the discussion, participants interacted in a respectful way with each other and quiet participants were encouraged to speak up. Everyone tried to be as neutral as possible when they spoke, but a notable lack of awareness of and ability to use anti-racist vocabulary was noted. There was no use of tools or thinking frameworks and there was little case management. Case work was not really managed within this MAW structure; it was instead a structure for trust building and thematic exchange, so actors made decisions related to cases without referring them back to the MAW structure. Participants displayed respect for each other's work and asked constructive questions instead of criticising others. Concrete suggestions for improvement and follow-up were made.

Some possible success factors for this MAW structure were the good connection to a large network of Muslim community organisations. This particular MAW structure was funded by the government and no other networks exist that would work on the same cases or situations.

A potential pitfall is that actors did not seem to know each other, as the network was quite large and involved many different stakeholders. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic appeared to make it more challenging to keep the network alive, particularly as it is a fairly young partnership. Another pitfall was that there were preventative actors who did not work on the same cases, so discussion stayed on a theoretical level and did not include many concrete cases. Also, a lot of actors participated on a voluntary basis, so there are few resources with which

to build joint efforts. A last potential pitfall was the limited mandate. By this we mean that MAW actors often could not perform all the actions that are necessary when a person or a community is at risk of radicalisation.

2.4 Summary Matrix

Table 1. Number of actors and actor types per observation

Country	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	NL	NL	NL	DE	DE	DE
City code	C	C	A	A	D	D	B	B	E	E	F	G	G	I
Obs. Nr.	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1
Date	09-20	09-20	10-20	11-20	12-20	03-21	05-21	08-21	10-20	10-20	07-21	04-21	10-21	05-21
Duration (min)	105	90	63	124	61	67	76	30	41	75	130	86	50	98
Breaks (min)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	20	0	0	0
N participants	17	17	11	10	9	8	6	6	7	15	13	13	3	11
Police/security (N=)	4	3	4	4	4	3	2	0	3	4	1	0	0	1
Municipality (N=)	9	9	3	4	5	5	3	2	1	3	3	2	1	3
Social/care (N=)	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	3
Health care (N=)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
Youth & education (N=)	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Justice (N=)	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	0	0	0
Citizens/community (N=)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	2	1
External (N=)	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	0
Unknown (N=)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
N apologies (UK = unknown)	12	UK	UK	UK	1	2	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK

Table 2. Indicators for structured meeting. (Y = yes, N = no, S = somewhat present, NA = not applicable)

Country	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	NL	NL	NL	DE	DE	DE
City code	C	C	A	A	D	D	B	B	E	E	F	G	G	I
Obs. Nr.	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1
Meeting start														
Welcome?	S	S	S	S	Y	S	S	S	S	S	S	Y	Y	Y
Tour de table?	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	S	S	S	S
Repeat agenda?	N	N	N	N	N	S	Y	S	N	N	N	Y	N	S
Repeat meeting rules?	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	S	N	Y
Minutes writer?	S	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	NA	N	Y	N	N	NA
Refers to earlier meeting?	S	Y	N	S	N	N	S	Y	S	N	N	Y	Y	N
Meeting process														
Context provided?	S	S	S	S	S	N	Y	Y	NA	N	S	Y	N	S
Room for input from all?	S	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	S	Y	Y	Y	Y	S
Encouraging quiet actors?	S	N	N	N	Y	NA	N	NA	S	N	S	S	NA	Y
Opportunity for discussion?	S	Y	Y	Y	Y	S	Y	Y	S	S	Y	Y	S	S
Neutral chair?	S	Y	S	S	S	Y	S	Y	S	Y	S	S	N	Y
Summary of agenda points?	N	N	S	S	N	S	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Country	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	NL	NL	NL	DE	DE	DE

City code	C	C	A	A	D	D	B	B	E	E	F	G	G	I
Obs. Nr.	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*1*	*2*	*1*
Interact with respect?	Y	S	S	Y	Y	S	S	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Judge-free zone?	S	Y	Y	Y	S	S	S	Y	Y	Y	Y	S	Y	Y
(-) Deviations?	N	N	S	N	S	S	N	N	S	N	N	N	Y	Y
Structured discussion?	S	Y	S	Y	S	N	Y	Y	N	S	S	S	Y	Y
Clear assignment of action points?	S	Y	S	S	S	N	S	Y	S	S	Y	S	S	NA
Pleasant atmosphere created by chair?	Y	N	N	N	S	S	N	S	S	S	Y	S	Y	Y
Meeting end														
Chance to share matters not on agenda?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	S	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	S
Clear meeting end?	Y	Y	Y	Y	S	N	S	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Agreements for next meeting?	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	S	N	Y	Y	Y	S
Timekeeping?	Y	N	S	S	Y	S	N	Y	Y	S	Y	S	N	Y

Table 3. Presence of good practice indicators (score 1–4, where 1 stands for least present, and 4 stands for most present, NA = not applicable)

Country	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	NL	NL	NL	DE	DE	DE
City code	C	C	A	A	D	D	B	B	E	E	F	G	G	I
Obs. Nr.	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1
Good practice indicators														
Nice vs need to know	3	NA	4	NA	1	1	4	4	NA	NA	3	2	1	2
Sharing of expertise	1	2.5	2.5	4	2.5	2	3	3	1	4	4	4	4	3
Horizontal interaction	3	2.5	2	2.5	3	2	3	4	3	2.5	3	2	4	4
Open communication	2	4	2.5	NA	4	3	3	3	NA	3	3	2	4	2
Flexibility	NA	3	2	4	2	1	3	3	NA	3	4	4	4	4
Motivation	3	2.5	2.5	2.5	3	2	4	3	2	2.5	3	3	4	3
Act according to shared goal	3	NA	NA	NA	2.5	1	4	3	NA	NA	NA	2	3	NA
Constructive behaviour	4	3	2	4	3	1	4	3	3	4	4	3	4	4
Culture sensitivity	3	3	3	3	1	1	3	4	NA	NA	3	NA	4	2
Distinguish normal/risk	2	2.5	3	3	2	2	4	4	4	NA	NA	4	4	3
Objectivity	4	4	4	3	3	2	3	3	NA	4	3	NA	3	NA
Thorough case conceptualisation	1	2	4	2.5	3	1	NA	3	NA	2.5	3	NA	NA	1

Table 4. Overview of case management descriptives in the observations (Y = yes, N = no, NA = not applicable)

Country	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	NL	NL	NL	DE	DE	DE
City code	C	C	A	A	D	D	B	B	E	E	F	G	G	I
Obs. Nr.	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1
Case management	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Tool? Y/N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
N of cases discussed	15	3	5	8	5	4	3	2	4	3	4	4	4	2
N of new cases	8	2	1	5	2	1	0	1	0	1	4	2	1	2
N of cases with thorough profiling	2	2	1	3	3	0	1	1	N	0	0	NA	NA	0
N of cases on (possible) radicalisation	5	3	5	6	3	1	0	2	4	1	1	1	4	0
N of cases on far right	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0
N of cases on far left	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N of cases on psychiatric problems	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
N of cases on behavioural problems	4	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
N of cases on crimes (general)	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N of cases on other topic	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	2
N of cases with follow-up actions discussed	6	0	5	8	3	3	1	1	1	3	4	4	4	0

Table 5. Percentage of total time in the MAW meeting dedicated to each item

Country	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	BE	NL	NL	NL	DE	DE	DE
City code	C	C	A	A	D	D	B	B	E	E	F	G	G	I
Obs. Nr.	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1
Prevention (broad)	—	—	—	—	—	—	41%	—	—	—	—	33%	—	6%
Case management	30%	19%	40%	84%	64%	60%	53%	67%	80%	64%	88%		56%	10%
Information sharing, organisational rules	—	—	—	—	—	27%	—	—	—	—	1%	22%	—	5%
Strategic meeting, coordinating, tweaking local architecture	23%	24%	—	—	33%	7%	—	—	—	—	—	—	24%	6%
Trust building between actors	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2%
Refining collaboration between services	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15%
Practical arrangements (e.g. planning)	4%	3%	6%	4%	3%		7%	33%	12%	20%		38%	10%	11%
Informal time	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7%	—	1%	6%	10%	—
Reflection on own functioning	36%	33%	32%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9%
Unassigned/other	8%	20%	22%	12%	—	6%	—	—	—	16%	10%	1%	—	32%

2.5   Conclusion

The average MAW meeting took 76 minutes and varied from 30 to 124 minutes. In most cities in Belgium and the Netherlands and in one observation of one German city, the majority of time was spent on case management. In Germany, in two out of three observations, no case management was observed. Instead, time was spent on refining collaboration between agencies, practical planning, broad prevention and organisational rules and information sharing.

In general, the internal strengths of the meetings were trust, high motivation and sufficient expertise. In addition, most meetings were well-structured, with an agenda, a neutral chair and a professional way of discussing. We observed that the presence of as many relevant actors as possible from different sectors was definitely a positive aspect, and added value to meetings. Potential weaknesses in the three countries were: the lack of clear common goals, a shortage of resources and some participants acting out of self-interest. The dominance of certain actors and subtle tensions between participants was an internal weakness in some meetings. Finding the balance between nice-to-know and need-to-know information is also very important.

The Covid-19 pandemic was found to be the biggest external threat. A lot of MAW meetings were forced to continue online, which has a serious impact on the functioning of the MAW structure. For example: not everyone was always attentive, connection problems could occur and it created a formal distance where there had previously been a more informal atmosphere. Other threats that can be noted are a constantly changing society, and the new forms of radicalisation MAW structures have to deal with.

Figure 3. SWOT analysis of summary of observations

	Internal	*External*
Positive, useful	**Strengths:** • Trust • High motivation • Sufficient expertise • Structured MAW meeting (agenda and neutral chair) • Good balance of nice-to-know and need-to-know information	**Opportunities:** • The presence of relevant actors from different sectors (ad hoc)
Negative, harmful	**Weaknesses:** • Lack of clear common goals • Shortage of resources (time, money, people) • Self-interest/dominance of some actors	**Threats:** • Covid-19 pandemic: online meetings • Constantly changing society and new forms of radicalisation

3 Key Actors in P/CVE Multi-Agency Structures in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany

Birte Vandaele, Lien Dorme, Lieven Pauwels, Noel Klima and Wim Hardyns

The next part of the process evaluation consisted of qualitative semi-structured interviews with participants of the MAW structures. The original intention was to include three cities per country and five interviews per city (3*15) in order to achieve a representative sample. Due to staff turnover involving our contacts in one Belgian city, this city was replaced by another one. Two interview had already been carried out prior to that. Furthermore, due to the difficulties in motivating a third city from the Netherlands to take part in the process evaluation, this third Dutch city was replaced by an additional Belgian city. This resulted in a sample of three German cities (n=3x5), two cities in the Netherlands (n=2x5) and five in Belgium (n=(4x5)+2), giving a total of 47 (15+10+22) interviews, two more than intended.

The in-depth interviews were carried out both face-to-face and online via Microsoft Teams, depending on the Covid-19 pandemic measures that were in place at the time. We interviewed the mayors of the included cities, different local security actors and the local socio-preventive actors. Our partners VVSG, VPN and RadarAdvies facilitated the first contacts with candidates for the scientific evaluation, by explaining the framework of the research design, and indicating the importance of participation, etc. After this introduction, we were able to get started and make contact. The interviews in Dutch (i.e., Belgium and the Netherlands) were conducted by researchers from Ghent University. The German interviews were carried out by VPN, assisted by Ghent University.

The interviews were based on a semi-structured interview guide and an informed consent form was signed each time. The semi-structured interview guide was created using the process indicators (listed in Appendix 3) that had been derived from the literature review.

This chapter outlines the findings from the interviews. It is structured according to the broad categories used to group the process indicators, and this grouping also forms the basis for the structure of the self-evaluation tool. It must be noted that this list of process indicators is not exhaustive.

The semi-structured interview guide can be found in Appendix 5. All interviews were conducted in Dutch, German or English and were fully transcribed. The interviews in German were transcribed in German and then translated for analysis. The interviews were coded using the program NVivo by means of a codebook. The codebook was based on the process indicators and gradually supplemented throughout the analysis. In total, 51 MAW actors were interviewed (47 interviews, of which four had two interviewees present) in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

Some features of the interviewees are summarised here. One in four respondents had either a coordinating function (approximately 25%) or a participatory role (the majority, almost 80%) at the MAW meeting. On average, respondents had been in the MAW structure for three years. They worked in the following sectors: police/security, municipality, judiciary, social/wellbeing, academia/experts or youth and education. The most common organisations within these sectors were the police, social services and civil services. Twenty-one female and 28 male respondents were interviewed.

3.1 Approach

The first category of process indicators is the MAW structure's approach. This broad category refers to the extent to which the local context and specific risk, protective and trigger factors for radicalisation that are present locally are integrated into its work. It also includes the level at which the approach is targeted (individual, community, family/social context, organisation/network). During the fieldwork, the phenomenon of the 'multi-problem' emerged and was placed in this category. 'Multi-problem' refers to a combination of substance abuse, mental health problems or disability and a possible radicalisation process. While analysing the MAW approach, the degree of preventive/repressive action was also considered. Lastly, the degree of responsibility was also considered within the approach of MAW structures.

3.1.1 Integration of the Local Context

The local context was an important factor in the MAW approach in all three countries. Within the local context, different areas of life were considered. Examples are: employment opportunities, the range of services available in the neighbourhood, and the local education and leisure facilities. The following quote illustrates this issue:

"We do try to offer the living conditions to that person as best we can, both in terms of work and leisure time, in order not to contradict the ideological aspect, but perhaps to present circumstances differently so that he also just gets a better picture of society, and also to show that these are all people you can turn to, that is often the problem, and possibly to work on identity formation and the like…."

An important factor of the local context was also the family and the social context of an individual or community at risk. They are often very close and may be able to exert an influence, which is why MAW structures reach out to them to get them involved. Another factor is the importance of citizen services, which are likely to be familiar with the locality and know, for example, who lives there and who has moved there.

3.1.2 Protective and Risk Factors

The use of protective and risk factors was mentioned in many interviews. Integrating protective factors was more prevalent than targeting specific risk and

trigger factors. Reintegration into society is central when considering protective and promoting factors. Possible protective and promoting factors were mostly situated in different areas of life at the local level, as described above, e.g. employment, education, family and leisure. A very important protective factor was having children. If risk factors were addressed, then the focus was mainly on identifying them and making a risk assessment.

3.1.3 Level of Action

The individual level was the most-addressed in the MAW structures in the three countries. The person-centred approach focuses on giving an individual a perspective again about different areas of life (e.g. work, ideology, finances, trust), to reintegrate them into society. Cases were mainly very person-cantered. Some important aspects at the individual level were providing a listening ear, and individual resilience. The second most-addressed level of action was the family and social context. Home visits were an important way of working. MAW structures often looked at how someone's network was functioning and activated it if necessary or possible, to counter the process of radicalisation. The social context level includes friends, school and work. If the community level was covered, it often involved training school personnel and community policemen by raising their awareness, pinpointing important signals and providing ways of working. When action was taken at the level of organisations and networks, it was often carried out by the police and social services.

3.1.4 Multi-problem

When interviewing and analysing the interviews, we repeatedly observed the phenomenon of 'multi-problem'. We placed it in the 'approach' category because it affected the approach the MAW structures took. Multi-problem refers to a combination of substance abuse, mental health problems or disability and a possible radicalisation process. The term 'dual diagnosis' is also often used. Here, the lack of actors with a psychological background also frequently arose. When individuals with multi-problems were discussed, the security aspect and public order disturbance were often mentioned. Individuals with multi-problems were not always radicalising. The following quote is illustrative:

> *"There are people coming up where they say, this one has a dual diagnosis. How should we assess that? Because that one has made a few scratchy statements, right? Is there radicalism here or not?"*

3.1.5 Preventive or Repressive Approach

The degree of preventive/repressive action used by the MAW structures was also considered. The preventive approach was mentioned most, as this quote illustrates:

> *"I think it's mostly the early detection, and especially the ruling out… that we're going to rule things out, that we're not going to be blaming people or giving them a stamp.*

That we can really filter out the anxious situations and rule out that there's nothing effectively going on…."

There was a very strong emphasis on prevention in all three countries. It was very often the starting point of a MAW structure. When there was a more repressive approach, it was usually at the beginning or start-up of a MAW structure or when a person was radicalised and posed a threat to society. The police often played a prominent role here.

3.1.6   Responsibility

The degree of responsibility that the MAW structures took was also considered when analysing the interviews with the MAW actors. When the responsibility had been passed on, the most common reasons given were capacity problems, fear of taking responsibility if things went wrong, and problems related to the lack of mandate. A quote to illustrate this:

"You are very transparent, you say, we have a common goal here, but in practice it sometimes feels like people throw something at you and back away."

The number of actors also affected the issue of responsibility – the smaller the number, the better those involved were at taking responsibility. The role of the coordinator of the MAW structure is very important here.

3.2   Case Management

The second category of process indicators is about the management of cases. Here, the sequence of the course of treating a case was tracked and coded. This started with case registration, followed by case management and documentation, including the planning of tailored actions and the possible use of a tool. Finally, there was the potential follow-up procedure and closure of a case. Transparency, or the lack of transparency, through the whole process was an important aspect of case management. An important point to note here is that in Germany case management was often not done. The German MAW structures tended to work with situations or phenomena/events as they arose.

3.2.1   Case Registration

Case registration differed between the three countries, and between MAW structures from the same country. Some MAW structures used a registration form. The Netherlands MAW structures had a specific method of case registration. Before a case was discussed at a MAW meeting, a 'weighing team' decided whether it needed to be discussed. Generally, it was found that there was not enough information to start case management easily.

3.2.2   Case Management

Just as with case registration, there was a difference in case management between the three countries, even within the countries. The main recurring activities

during case management were gathering information, dividing tasks and planning tailored actions. In Belgium and the Netherlands, a plan of action was usually established. Tools were sometimes used, but these tools were mostly very specific and developed by the MAW structure. Case documentation also varied by MAW structure. An (anonymous) report was sometimes created, and sometimes not. The importance of neutral and/or anonymised reports was stressed by several interviewees.

3.2.3   Follow-up

When case management was done, each case was very often included as an agenda item for the next MAW meeting. Cases were also followed up bilaterally or by email/telephone. In general, cases were followed up well.

3.2.4   Closure

In general, cases were closed if no new events of concern occurred. Sometimes, there was a fear of closing a case, because the MAW actors were trying to keep the risks as low as possible. A quote that illustrates the closure of cases is the following:

> *"Closed and successful or unsuccessful. It can also be unsuccessful because it can be sleeping, it can continue to muddle along…. It can happen but if, for example, we are successful in persuading someone to get their life back on track.... I'm not going to put any standards or laws on that, but that person no longer walks into the picture, then that's successful for me…. Of course, if it remains dormant, etc., then action has to happen and that is sometimes police action. That can happen, but is that also successful? Yes that is successful then…."*

3.2.5   Transparency

Transparency through the whole process was an important aspect of case management. Here, a difference between Belgium and the Netherlands can be noted: in the Netherlands people knew that they were being discussed, in Belgium they did not. Transparency is also about feedback to the applicant of the case. Here, there was a difference between MAW structures within the same country.

3.3   Collaboration

The third category of process indicators deals with collaboration processes, and has a number of subcategories. Trust within the collaboration processes was considered to be key and highly important in MAW. A quote that illustrates the collaboration processes well is:

> *"In the end, the MAW meeting is only as strong as the people in it."*

3.3.1 Communication

Communication and more openness were often points of improvement for the MAW structures that we studied. The presence of trust plays a key role in communication. Interviewees suggested that communication has to be direct, and extend in all directions.

3.3.2 Composition

In this sub-category we explored how stable the composition of the MAW structure was over time. The composition of most of the MAW structures was not stable over time. Staff turnovers was a common occurrence in all three countries. This hindered continuity and trust building. Differences could be noted in how well a follow-up with the departing person was incorporated into the MAW structure.

3.3.3 Efficiency

The role of the coordinator is important when talking about efficiency in collaboration processes. Efficient MAW meetings were well prepared, an agenda had been set and the coordinator took a prominent role in moderating the discussions. When there is not much efficiency, this is mostly due to a lack of structure during the MAW meetings.

3.3.4 Hierarchy and Power

The central question for hierarchy and power was whether there was a horizontal relationship between the actors or a vertical, hierarchical one. In most cases where a more vertical relationship was present, the police played a role. The police often function more hierarchically and this was reflected in MAW meetings. A horizontal relationship occurred when a small, unchanging group of MAW actors was present. The importance of horizontal relationships was highlighted in interviews in all three countries – equality among the MAW actors was considered very important, and for this to happen it was necessary for the coordinator to have a coordinating, moderating role during MAW meetings.

3.3.5 Working Climate

A positive climate prevailed in the interviews in all three countries. Most of the interviewed MAW actors enjoyed the MAW meetings and derived personal satisfaction from them. Good collaboration processes were present, and often there was a 'dare to share' atmosphere. Some MAW actors had a more neutral feeling about the collaboration. If there was a negative climate, it was usually because of criticisms and a lack of trust.

3.3.6   Trust

The most-identified key factor for good collaboration processes in the three countries was trust. Trust and successful MAW actions go hand-in-hand. Generally, trust was present in these MAW structures. As one interviewee said,

"Trust is actually the most important thing."

When there was little or no trust, it was usually due to professional secrecy or the secrecy of investigation issues.

3.3.7   Networking

Networking and building working relationships between MAW actors of different sectors and functions was present in all three countries. This also leads to fruitful collaboration outside the field of prevention of radicalisation and extremism. Especially in Germany, networking was the main goal of MAW meetings. It was the biggest advantage of the German MAW working groups.

3.3.8   Informal Networking

Informal networking usually happened during breaks in meetings, but it was considered to be very important for creating close collaboration. Attention was often paid to informal networking. This was again a strength of the German MAW groups.

3.3.9   Recognition

By recognition, we mean the public interest and appreciation of the MAW structure, as well as the personal recognition of MAW actors. A lot of interviewed MAW actors received personal recognition for the work they put into the MAW structure.

3.4   Expertise

The fourth category within the process indicators is expertise. Here we explored whether there was a shortage of expertise, on which topics and how this was addressed (professionalisation/training). In addition, we examined how continuity and team expertise were maintained. The local context was a key element in the field of expertise.

3.4.1   Local Context

Expertise in the local context involved the level of awareness of sensitivities and tensions between communities, specific local problems or grievances, and the different types of radicalisation in their region (e.g. extreme right or extreme left, Islam radicalisation). Interviewees occasionally mentioned that stereotypes are inevitable. This quote illustrates the importance of cultural sensitivity:

"It helps a lot if you know the difference between Sunnis and Shiites and the background and so on… So what is the background behind the community? Why can't a Turk talk to a Kurd, for example? So it's simply these differences that exist between the religions, between the ethnic groups. Yes, if you know a bit about it, it helps.… because if I didn't have a clue, they would all be Muslims and they would understand each other. They all believe in the same God, something like that. But it's not like that. So it doesn't hurt to know a little bit about it."

3.4.2   Continuity and Team Expertise

Continuity of expertise refers to the level of know-how spread across the MAW actors. In general, this was present. As described above, networking was considered to be a important aspect of MAW, and it helps with ensuring the continuity of expertise. Team expertise was something that was often mentioned in the interviews in all three countries. MAW actors said they learned a lot from each other during MAW meetings. Each MAW actor has their own specific background and knowledge, which creates different perspectives and dynamics. This allows for creativity and synergy. An interviewee named it *"assembled expertise"*.

3.4.3   Shortage of Expertise or Partners

In all three countries, interviewees reported a shortage of expertise or partners in the MAW structures. This shortage of expertise related to various topics. The most recurring shortages of expertise were on extremism, youth, the local economy and psychology. The lack of actors in the MAW structures with a psychological or mental health care background was a topic that arose quite often in the three countries. This was often thought to be because they are overworked or have to maintain a level of professional secrecy that is incompatible with MAW.

3.4.4   Professionalisation and Training

In order to explore the shortage of expertise, we asked the MAW actors whether there was any investment in training and professionalisation. This was done and considered very important in all three countries. Most initiatives on professionalisation and training were provided by external partners, mostly centres of expertise on particular topics or the government. These were usually study days and training sessions or webinars. If there were internal initiatives on professionalisation and training, the coordinator played an important role. Such initiatives usually involved a MAW actor giving a presentation with more information about a hot topic, for example during a MAW meeting. If there were no initiatives on professionalisation and training, this was mostly due to the lack of time and energy or the absence of formal structures.

3.5   Information Sharing

This fifth category of process indicators deals with the different aspects of information sharing in MAW meetings. First of all, a distinction can be made between external and internal information sharing. External information sharing is with external partners outside the MAW meeting and the public in general. For these MAW structures, this mostly involved providing information. Internal information sharing is within the MAW structure, between the MAW actors. Here, the main focus was on agreeing rules related to information sharing and professional secrecy. Important aspects in internal information sharing were the secrecy of the investigation and the balance between nice-to-know and need-to-know information. One MAW used Chatham House rules.

3.5.1 External Information Sharing

Signalling procedures existed in all three countries. Documentation was often distributed to provide more information, or signal forms were available. Transparency about the signalling procedure was important. If MAW structures shared information with the public, this was mainly done to create awareness, and the necessary caution was taken to not cause fear or target certain groups in society.

3.5.2 Internal Information Sharing

A first important aspect of the internal sharing of information is the agreed rules on information sharing. There were both formal and informal rules, with differences between the three countries and even differences between MAW structures in the same country. The agreed rules on information sharing were also not always clear to the MAW actors. Compliance to information sharing rules did not really occur. In all three countries, problems with professional secrecy and the secrecy of the investigation were prevalent. Because of these two aspects, information could often not (fully) be shared, which caused frustration and could make cooperation difficult. We also looked at the balance between sharing nice-to-know and need-to-know information. In most of the interviews, a good balance was noted.

3.6 Practical Conditions

The sixth category examines the practical conditions within MAW meetings. The two main elements are the frequency of the meetings and the available resources (human and time).

3.6.1 Frequency

Overall, the interviewees said the frequency of meetings was appropriate. If it was necessary to increase the frequency or to have an ad hoc MAW meeting, this could be done. Online meetings due to the Covid-19 pandemic facilitated ad hoc meetings.

3.6.2   Resources

In all three countries, a shortage of resources in teams and staff was very common. MAW structures that were more longstanding and well embedded indicated that they had sufficient resources.

3.7 Quality Assurance

Within this seventh category of quality assurance we explored evaluation opportunities (internal and external). Some themes for evaluation were derived while coding the interviews.

3.7.1 Evaluation Opportunities

In some MAW structures, there were some evaluation opportunities. These were mostly internal evaluation moments, primarily relating to planning and annual reports. External evaluation opportunities did not really occur.

3.7.2 Implementation of Learning

This subcategory is related to the expertise indicator. A lot of the interviewees said it was very important to stay up to date with developments and trends in society. If any MAW actors undertook training or professionalisation initiatives, that knowledge was often shared at a subsequent MAW meeting.

3.7.3 Themes for Evaluation

Some themes for evaluation that arose while analysing the interviews were: the achievement of goals on different levels, indicators of radicalisation, communication and continuity, a scheme for action, and case management.

3.8 Structure

The structure of the MAW meeting is the eighth category of process indicators. Here the main focus was on the chair and leadership. Other issues covered in this category are the MAW structure's size, the partners involved and third-party cooperation.

3.8.1 Leadership

The leadership style is very influential during the MAW meetings. The chair or coordinator has to take a coordinating role and try to not participate, or to participate as little as possible, in the discussions and decisions. Accessibility and neutrality were considered to be important features of good leadership in a MAW. Especially in Germany, emphasis was placed on the mediating role of the chair.

3.8.2 Partners Involved and Size of Group

The MAW structures are characterised by the diversity of the participating actors. Most of the interviewed MAW actors were comfortable with the size of their own MAW structure. Some found the size of their group too big.

3.8.3 Third Party Cooperation

When a relevant actor was missing from a MAW meeting, third party cooperation occurred in all three countries. Experts or actors could be invited ad hoc to a MAW meeting when their knowledge, expertise or intervention was needed.

3.9 Vision

The ninth and final category of process indicators includes the vision aspect in MAW. A distinction was made between whether the MAW structure should have a clear vision, and whether it should have a shared vision. An important aspect here was a written description of the vision.

3.9.1 (Un) Clear Vision

A written description was considered to be very helpful in creating a clear vision on the MAW objectives, but it was not thought to be the ultimate solution. Sometimes, MAW actors did not know where to find the written description of the objectives, or it was outdated. When the vision was unclear, it was often due to the MAW structure's lack of specific goals. The objectives needed to be clarified and more specific actions needed to be taken

3.9.2 (No) Shared Vision

Most interviewees thought that their MAW had an open and shared vision. A shared vision did not always happen by itself, it was continuing process. If there was no shared vision, this was often due to the fact that each MAW actor had his or her own goals too much in mind.

3.10 Conclusion

The analyses of the interviews highlighted the following internal strengths. Just as in the observations, the importance of a structured MAW meeting with a agenda and neutral chairperson was stressed. Overall, a preventive approach was used, and when there was a repressive approach it was usually at the beginning or start-up of MAW structures or when a person was radicalised and posed a threat to society. The most-identified key factor for a good collaboration processes was trust. In all three countries, there was a shortage of resources in teams and staffing, which is an internal weakness. Most prevalent, in all three countries, were problems with professional secrecy and the secrecy of the investigation. The role of the coordinator of the MAW structure was very important in relation to the degree of responsibility. When the responsibility was passed on, the most common reasons given were capacity problems, fear of taking responsibility if things went wrong, or problems related to the lack of a mandate.

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic was again the biggest external threat. Another threat that occurred again was constant social changes and all the new

forms of radicalisation the MAW structures had to deal with. To conclude, one respondent suggested:

"There is a need for a safety net for the professional as well."

This can be seen as an external opportunity for MAW structures – it is important to take care of the MAW actors as well.

Figure 4. SWOT analysis summary of interviews

	Internal	*External*
Positive, useful	**Strengths:** • Structured MAW meeting (agenda and neutral chair) • Trust as key factor for good collaboration	**Opportunities:** • Ensuring the well-being of the MAW actors
Negative, harmful	**Weaknesses:** • Repressive approach (beginning or start-up of a MAW) • Shortage of resources (time, money, people) • Difficulties due to secrecy of investigation and professional secrecy • Responsibility is passed on	**Threats:** • Covid-19 pandemic: online meetings • Constantly changing society and new forms of radicalisation

4 Towards a Self-Evaluation Tool: Focus Groups with Multi-Agency Working Practitioners

Birte Vandaele, Lien Dorme, Lieven Pauwels, Noel Klima and Wim Hardyns

As the third and last part of the realist process evaluation, two rounds of focus groups were organised within the three countries (3*2). The first round asked MAW practitioners about the proposed structure and content of the self-evaluation tool. The research team then constructed a preliminary draft of the website-based self-evaluation tool, and the second round of focus groups reviewed this draft.

A focus group is a group discussion in which a small number of participants discuss a certain topic or set of issues raised by a moderator who also guides the discussion. The researcher acted here as the moderator: posing questions, keeping the discussion going and enabling full participation and interaction for all the participants. The interaction among the participants is an essential part of the focus group. Through group discussion, the interactions, interests, ideas and motives of the participants can be derived (Vander Laenen, 2021; Wilkinson, 2004).

Depending on the Covid-19 measures in place for each country at that time, the focus groups were conducted either online via Microsoft Teams or face-to-face. For both rounds of focus groups, Ghent University provided a questionnaire with extensive instructions and a note form. The focus groups were moderated in Belgium by Ghent University, in the Netherlands by RadarAdvies and in Germany by VPN.

4.1 The First Round of Focus Groups

The main purpose of the first round of focus groups was to find out what practitioners believed a self-assessment tool for multi-agency working should include. In Belgium and Germany they took place in late September 2021. The Netherlands focus group took place in early December 2021 in an adjusted form, due to participants cancelling their attendance on the original date. The adjusted form of this meeting involved a change to the focus group questionnaire, to incorporate the structure of the preliminary draft of the self-evaluation tool.

The questionnaire started with some practical information and instructions (duration, primary goal, data security, note taking, etc.), followed by some opening questions. These opening questions were not to get information, but rather to get people talking and to help them feel comfortable. Next there were some transition question, which engaged the participants more deeply by probing for personal experiences or specific behaviours. The transition questions were intended to prepare participants to talk about the core of the topic, covered by the key questions. The key questions were the questions that needed to be answered. This is where attitudes and feelings came into play. This part started with a short

video of an example of a self-evaluation tool, to give a general idea of what the tool would look like. Views were also sought on the use of a traffic light scoring system. At the end of the focus group discussion, the moderator summarised the group discussion and checked whether participants agreed with the summary. The questionnaire (including a preliminary structure of the tool) can be found in Appendix 6. The following is an outline of the findings.

4.1.1 Belgium

Ten participants, a moderator from Ghent University and two colleagues from VVSG participated in the first focus group in Belgium. The background of the participants varied; some had a coordinating function and others were practitioners. When asked whether anyone in the focus group already used any kind of (self-) evaluation, a one yearly informal evaluation of the MAW structure was mentioned, but most of the participants did not really carry out evaluations. They found the video with the example of a self-evaluation tool very inspiring. The combination of questions and weighting through numbers was very interesting.

Focus group members asked how one self-evaluation tool could be valid for different countries, because expectations may differ based on the structure of the MAW network. One participant felt it was important to state the goal in advance. What are we evaluating, and how? Where is the margin for improvement? MAW structures were sometimes evaluated, and if so this was done annually, they were not planned and the focus was not specified beforehand. One participant asked for a tool that included different load options, such as: Did we discuss all the cases consistently? How do we look at cases? Why did we allow different elements in this case than in that case? Some interesting questions emerged: Is the goal to make this a uniform tool that can be used by all MAW structures, and to look ahead to the future as well as retrospectively at the past? Every case is different, every municipality works differently. So, is the evaluation something that you would be obliged to do? What are we going to do with all the information that has been collected? Or is it just a snapshot and we fix it straight away and that's it?

An evaluation always consists of two different parts: the evaluation of the process, and the evaluation of a case. Those are two different things. So, will they be combined? One participant suggested that it would be useful for them to be able to work at the case level, as this can be quantitative by numbers (e.g. how many cases have we discussed?), but also qualitative. The participant thought that looking at the qualitative findings would be even more important: which processes went well and what did we learn from them? Data registration is a popular topic at the moment because of the Flemish decree, so it seems important that this is also included. One participant suggested that is not practically feasible for every MAW to self-evaluate more often than annually, because of the enormous workload. It was pointed out that one would need to be careful with quantitative elements: the size of municipality, for example, also plays a role. It can also lead to political motivation to collect data, because politics always needs data. Also of interest are: an estimate of the number of persons involved, whether

there are lots of cases or very few, how signals are detected (e.g. if something is wrong with the information sharing). One participant said they would be interested to know which sector the cases come from (e.g. too few cases from the education sector). The nature of the signal can also be insightful: how broad is the scope and which cases perhaps no longer belong there?

It was suggested that process evaluation, registering the impact and effect of the things we do, is the most relevant. Measuring impact on a case is very difficult unless you know your target. Everyone pays attention to different things, so making it universal is very difficult. Measuring the impact of operation is very important, so more focus should be placed on this. The focus group also noted that many cases were already known to the police. To what extent could it still be considered preventive then? Question that arose: How preventive is your multi-agency approach, or is it quite repressive? A traffic light scoring system would not really create added value because we would be evaluating subjective feelings that are difficult to measure and cannot be reduced to three colours.

There should also be clarity about who completes the self-evaluation tool. The preference was to have everyone complete the tool separately and anonymously, with the results merged afterwards. A comment made was about the danger of average scores. A suggestion was made to review the questions as a group, in advance, so that everyone understood what it was about, and to create an informal atmosphere with trust. The group should also not be too large to engage in dialogue about the results. An external evaluator would be good to avoid politicisation and status issues, but they would need to be trusted by those involved. Trust and an informal atmosphere are very important.

A participant pointed out three important aspects: structure (strategic, tactic and operational); case management (e.g. how is case registration done?); and the current working process (e.g. information sharing). Efficiency is also an important aspect (e.g. MAW meeting frequency). Evaluation also depends on the MAW structure's vision, and this should be included in the tool: Is it clear why you are sitting in the meeting together? Is there feedback to the individual in the case? Was it a new case or a re-registration? What is a re-registration? Is there a good balance between nice-to-know and need-to-know information? Why does a case fall under the framing of radicalisation? How does information sharing work? If information is passed to another platform, is something done with it there or does the story end (the closure of a case)? Self-evaluation should take place once or twice a year, or more often if possible. It should not take too much time, but you should get enough information to make it worthwhile.

Finally, some potential pitfalls for a self-evaluation tool were: it would be difficult to balance the answer options so that they were not too complex or simple; there should be an option to leave out questions that are not relevant to certain people or are outside their area of expertise – not answering is better than providing a wrong answer, so this must be accommodated. The question/suggestion for a network to share information from the self-evaluation came up, as it did in Germany.

4.1.2   The Netherlands

As mentioned above, the first focus group in the Netherlands took place slightly later and in an adjusted form, due to the cancellation by participants on the original date. The adjusted form of this meeting involved a change to the questionnaire to incorporate the structure of the preliminary draft of the self-evaluation tool. Three participants and a moderator from RadarAdvies participated. The group's first concern after seeing the draft of the self-evaluation tool was the potentially high workload. The participants commented that a lot of time would need to be scheduled to use the evaluation tool.

In addition, the use of a tool was considered to be too much effort for municipalities that are in the early stages of developing a MAW structure.

The participants thought that the draft tool contained most of the important themes, such as collaboration and information sharing. Going through a case in an unambiguous way is important. Questions arose about this: is the use of an interpretation tool included? Is the use of the system unambiguous? Participants also indicated that they found it useful to discuss the self-evaluation tool in their working groups during MAW meetings and case management specifically.

All participants agreed that self-evaluation should be done once a year. This would enable them to check annually whether the recommendations had been properly applied. On the question, 'What do you prefer: completing the self-evaluation together or everyone separately/anonymously?', the preference in the group was for filling it in individually and then discussing it together. However, there was also the thought that if you fill it in separately, it could create distance between individuals.

The group thought that spending an hour on completing the self-evaluation tool would be an acceptable time commitment. Subsequently, one participant indicated that two hours might be needed to discuss it properly with colleagues. Another suggested that only half an hour would be needed for a discussion. The participants felt that a traffic light scoring system would not add value because it lacks nuance, due to the reduction down to three colour choices. If everything turned green, the self-evaluation would quickly stop. However, one participant liked the traffic light model as they thought it would allow them to see progress and regression quickly, and the model would be easy to fill out. For instance, holding nuanced and long conversations makes it harder to choose, so the model forces you to do so.

In concluding remarks, the participants suggested the tool should be as practical and manageable as possible for all parties involved, so that it is easy and quick to use. One participant suggested that it might work better if it were available in both a basic and an expanded version.

4.1.3   Germany

The first focus group in Germany took place with four participants and a moderator from VPN. All participants had a coordinating function in MAW structures. When asked whether anyone in the focus group already used any kind of (self-) evaluation, the answers included using external evaluation, and a

monthly/quarterly internal review of predefined goals and development with adjustments if necessary. The participants thought that self-evaluation should take place annually or twice a year. Some difficulties with regard to self-evaluation in their MAW structure were: a shortage of capacity and time, the additional workload created by the tool, biased outcomes, structural problems on the coordination level that are difficult to self-evaluate, and the risk of turning a blind eye to the lower structures of the network.

Regarding the use of scores, there were some doubts about the quantitative form of evaluation, with many highlighting that a qualitative approach would be more helpful to document the development process, instead of static results. Some important indicators for the participants were work process, trust, communication, development and agency. There were also some concerns about comparability: if the tool was not tested beforehand, it would be difficult to assess the values of indicators for every MAW structure. A traffic light scoring system was not thought to add any value, as it would be too simple to display the complexity of the indicators, and the shift from one colour to another could be misleading. They felt that a traffic light system implies an urgent need for intervention instead of analysing a development process. Sometimes there might be fewer participants in the MAW structure than before, but there may still be significant development due to other factors.

The advantages of self-evaluation are: it is easier; there is no external evaluator interfering in the process; there is no pressure to perform for an external evaluator; if it is positively perceived and agreed by all actors it would encourage better communication and a fruitful self-development process. The disadvantages are: a high risk of biased results; the additional workload; self-evaluation needs positive agreement by all actors; and it is difficult to evaluate the coordination level of the MAW structure that is responsible for the evaluation. On the question about how self-evaluation could deal with the goals specific to MAW structures, the group members felt that it would be important for MAW structures to define their development goals prior to the evaluation, and that the general question in developing the tool must be: 'Who decides which indicators are relevant and why they are relevant?'

Self-evaluation should take one or two days at most, and should take place preferably once a year, but not more often than twice a year, depending on the level of expenditure of time, the staff level, and the knowledge gained from the evaluation. A participant pointed out the problem that volunteer-led structures often have a slower development process due to capacities, so once a year is a good timeframe. The frequency should be individually adjusted to the dynamics of the MAW structure and the community. An external evaluator would be unbiased and would reduce the problems relating to capacities and time resources. However, it was also noted that the inclusion of external evaluators in a sensitive and fragile process can be a challenge and can influence the dynamics and processes.

After a self-evaluation has been completed, the MAW structure's goals should be redefined or adjusted, if necessary. A problem with transparency could arise: making the results available to all actors would be essential, but how could any

stigmatisation of certain or marginalised actors in the MAW structure be managed? The results of the evaluation and the tool should not contribute to the accountability of the MAW structure to their sponsors, but should be used solely for the self-development of the MAW structure and the community. The participants emphasised that the focus of self-evaluation must be on the process and development instead of static depictions, and on why developments and dynamics occur. Some important issues were: how to deal with expected bias; how to assess the values of the indicators when there's no comparability; and whether there are strategies to prevent stigmatisation when the results are transparent to everyone in the MAW structure. As mentioned above, it was felt that a self-evaluation tool should not be used for accountability or funding legitimacy, or in the implementation of activities.

Some potential pitfalls include: bias; the difficulty of organising the participation of each actor; if it were to be used to legitimise financing (e.g. if the self-evaluation results showed a lack of positive development, and this resulted in not receiving funding, etc.); developments take time (sometimes years); monthly self-evaluation without any visible development might lead to the conclusion of stagnation and the stigmatisation of those groups/people who are responsible for negative developments or stagnation. One participant also suggested that a network of those who use the self-evaluation tool could be part of the solution to the problem of comparability. EMMA could function as a network or platform for exchange about the values, indicators, factors and strategies.

4.2 The Second Round of Focus Groups

The main purpose of the second round of focus groups was to review the preliminary draft of the self-evaluation tool. The group discussions gave local practitioners the opportunity to complement the tool with their own ideas of promising practices of MAW in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism. The second round took place in early December 2021 in Belgium and Germany, and early February 2022 in the Netherlands. The Netherlands meeting was held later because the first round had been later. The format of the Dutch focus group was slightly different to the German and Belgian, in that the group got to test the self-evaluation tool out.

In Belgium and Germany, the second round of focus groups went as follows. First, we showed the group a prototype of the self-evaluation tool in website format, and demonstrated how it worked, along with a report of the results. The website allowed users to see a progress bar, open sub-questions (e.g. when answering yes or no), check whether all questions have been completed and see definitions of certain terms (by hovering over them with a cursor). The website can only be used from individual accounts, so all data is stored securely. The person responsible for the evaluation fills in some practical data (such as frequency, which sectors, selection of the cases/situations, etc.) and then sends an invitation to the other participants of the MAW structure. They would each create

an individual account and complete the self-evaluation. Afterwards, the coordinator would be able to download the anonymised report.

Next, we explained the different parts of the draft of the self-evaluation tool and asked the following questions:

- *Structure:* Are all important and relevant topics included in the structure of the tabs? If not, which are missing?
- *Clarity:* Are the questions clearly formulated? Is the terminology appropriate?
- *Scales:* How is the use of the scales experienced? The scales would be visualised using a gauge meter – what do you think? Which colour codes would be suitable (e.g. green to red, or rather more alternative colours)? General remarks?

A note form was again provided. The following is an outline of the feedback we received.

4.2.1 Belgium

Eleven participants, a moderator from Ghent University and two colleagues from VVSG participated in this focus group.

On the questions about *structure*, comments were made about each part of the self-evaluation tool. Some questions in the structure section were confusing for some participants. According to one, it is not really about the structure of the MAW network but about its organisation. The participant thought there should be questions about the degree of embeddedness in local policies: how well is it accepted and are its recommendations implemented? Is there a policy plan? Also, sectors can change and get different results depending on the changes. Another participant raised concerns about the different levels of MAW structures in Belgium, and said that the self-evaluation tool needs to be applicable to all three levels.

Relevance was also very important to the participants. Each question must be relevant, because people often drop out if the questionnaire is too long. Focus on what you really need to know.

Regarding *clarity*, there were some remarks on terminology, clarity in the question wording and the level of difficulty. What also needs to be considered is the difference between external and internal actors of MAW structures. In the vision part, it was suggested that an option should be added to indicate that further discussion is needed. The tool is only about written documents and that can perhaps come across as too official; perhaps it should assess other, less official, sources of information (e.g. discussions, meetings). It might be more relevant to ask to what extent the vision on paper matches the local practice.

There was also a suggestion that the part about vision should be structured on three levels: prevention, cure and repression. The questions about vision should also be more dynamic and maybe the term 'vision' should be changed to 'goals and instruments'. In the part on current working (and also the part about case management), there were some concerns about working with a typical and an

atypical case. Some participants were not sure whether using a typical and an atypical case would provide an accurate evaluation of the MAW structure's current working. There was a discussion about the utility of the part about case management; one participant found it totally unnecessary. There was also a concern about how much time people would have to complete the case management section, and whether they should do so immediately after something had been done, or a few months later. It would be better to use a case where everyone was present, otherwise not everyone can fill in the questionnaire.

In the part about information sharing, some questions need further explanation or clarification. Other suggestions included adding questions about other professional and ethical elements, and delving deeper into why information is (not) being shared. In the part about collaboration, a participant suggested the tool should be more interactive, maybe with the ability to choose some statements. In the part about knowledge, adding 'collaboration in the field' might be a way to gain knowledge. Some general remarks were to make the self-evaluation tool more dynamic, emphasise the difference between vision on paper and in practice, and not lose sight of the different focuses (levels) a MAW structure can have in Belgium (e.g. case oriented, strategic, policy). There was also a suggestion to add a 'flashing light' when you hit certain scores.

4.2.2   The Netherlands

This focus group was later than the other two, and was used to test the website out. This meeting also included some Belgian participants. This test was also conducted with each of the MAW actors from Belgium and Germany. The participants were sent a link to the self-evaluation tool website a couple of days in advance. Via a Microsoft Teams meeting we asked for their specific feedback while they were using the different parts, to obtain very detailed comments, which were very useful in finalising the tool.

4.2.3   Germany

The second focus group in Germany took place with nine participants and a moderator from VPN.

On the questions about *structure*, comments were made about each part of the tool. Structure: the following are missing from the structure – organisational embeddedness in municipal structures, the perception of the financial and human resources, and the record of the results by taking minutes during the meetings. Current working: 'allocation of roles' should be differentiated into 'role conflict', 'role clarity' and 'communication between roles'. There was also a discussion about whether the category 'general efficiency' needed clarification or not. 'Overall satisfaction with the case management' needs an additional open text box so that respondents can add further comments if they indicate they are 'not satisfied with the case management'. Information sharing: perception of one's own limited scope of action due to data security should be added.

Regarding *clarity*, there were no objections but the German version may need to be reviewed concerning formulation.

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There were also no objections to the use of *scales*. The use of gauge meters got positive feedback, as they have a higher degree of differentiation than the traffic light scoring model. The colour code used does not really matter as long as the visual separation of them is clear.

A general remark was that the function of the tool is still a bit unclear and they suggested it could be signposted and structured in the following way: *1. Evaluation of case management:* processual, continuous re-evaluation of the work during the case management, the tool should be adjustable to the specific situation. *2. Evaluation of the overall work of the MAW structure:* periodically, depending on the structure, once or twice a year. *3. Evaluation of the MAW structure on the basis of one or two cases:* periodically. Some other remarks were: can functions 1 and 2 also be used separately depending on the requirements of the specific situation? There were also some general question on how change can be tracked over time, and how often and when evaluation should be executed.

4.3   Conclusion

The main purpose of the first round of focus groups was to generate input on what practitioners believed a self-assessment tool for multi-agency working should look like in general. It was very helpful to hear their ideas and practical experiences of potential pitfalls and key elements. Participants in both Belgium and Germany suggested that a network to share the information from the self-evaluation would be useful. Following on from the first round of focus groups, and based on the data obtained there and from the interviews and observations, we then started to work on a preliminary draft of the self-evaluation tool.

The main purpose of the second round of focus groups was to review this preliminary draft. This occurred in Belgium and Germany. Due to some difficulties with planning the second round of focus groups in the Netherlands, the second Dutch focus group was structured differently. It carried out a practical test of a more developed version of the self-evaluation tool website.

4.4   References

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5 Developing a Self-Evaluation Tool Focusing on Multi-Agency Working for Local Practitioners in the Area of Violent Extremism

Wim Hardyns, Noel Klima, Lien Dorme, Birte Vandaele and Lieven Pauwels

As there is currently no thorough evaluation research on MAW in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism (Gielen, 2020), we carried out a process evaluation of MAW within three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany). Process evaluations are used to identify the effective key components of an intervention and thus help us to understand why a programme or intervention was successful or not. The combination of all the data from the systematic literature review, participatory observations, semi-structured interviews and two rounds of focus groups created a list of promising practices for multi-agency working in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism. These were translated into a self-evaluation tool. This self-evaluation tool has been developed for a specific target group, namely local practitioners within MAW structures, and will allow cities to evaluate their MAW approach. It is supported by a practical manual that explains how local practitioners should use the tool. The manual can be found on the self-evaluation tool's website (www.emmascan.eu), which also includes hands-on information and supporting material for conducting successful MAW self-evaluation.

5.1 Steps in the Development of the EMMASCAN

The development of the tool (named the EMMASCAN) proceeded in several steps and with different sources. First of all, we derived nine process indicators and good practices from the systematic literature review. These formed the basis for the interview guide and observation form. After analysing the good practices and data from the participatory observations, semi-structured interviews and results from the first round of focus groups, we created a preliminary draft of the self-evaluation tool.

The main purpose of the second round of focus groups was to review the preliminary draft of the self-evaluation tool. The group discussions gave local practitioners the opportunity to complement the tool with their notions of promising practices of MAW in the context of radicalisation and violent extremism. Two of the focus groups tested a more developed version of the self-evaluation tool website. We asked the focus group participants for their specific feedback while they were using the different parts in order to obtain very detailed comments, which were extremely useful in finalising the tool.

5.2   Structure

The EMMASCAN self-evaluation tool comprises several modules, as shown in Figure 5. Module 1 deals with the overall structure of the MAW network and the practical conditions. Module 2 examines the MAW structure's vision. Module 3 explores the current working. This module is completed twice (modules 3A and 3B), for a typical and an atypical case/situation chosen by the coordinator. There is a choice aid for this in the manual (see Appendix 7). Module 4, on case management, should only be filled in (twice – modules 4A and 4B) if the MAW structure is doing case management; this will be indicated by the coordinator. Module 5 is about information sharing. Module 6 explores the collaboration processes within the MAW structure. Module 7 is about knowledge transfer and expertise in the MAW structure. The final stage is to download a report of the self-evaluation.

In order to use the website, the coordinator must create an account. They can then, via the dashboard, invite the other MAW actors to complete the EMMASCAN. The coordinator can choose to omit certain modules if, for example, they want to focus specifically on evaluating their case management. On the dashboard, the coordinator will also be able to see how many people have completed the EMMMASCAN. A privacy security mechanism is in place: at least 50% of the invitees will have to fill out the tool before a report can be downloaded. There is a clear privacy statement on the website and an explanation about what will happen with the entered data, and how it might be used in further research. A feedback option is also provided.

5.3   Conclusions and Recommendations

The aim of the EMMA project was to offer an evaluation of the multi-agency approach through the development of a self-evaluation tool for local

Figure 5: The EMMASCAN structure

practitioners that is widely applicable across different MAW approaches in Europe. This book describes the realist process evaluation of MAW in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, and the development process of the self-evaluation tool for local practitioners. The development of the self-evaluation tool website proceeded in several steps and with different sources.

By comparing the Belgian LISC-R (Local Integrated Security Cells Radicalisation), the Dutch CSHs (Care and Safety Houses) and some German MAW approaches, we identified different ways in which MAW networks can be structured, organised and interpreted. MAW approaches tend to vary in terms of legislation (e.g. on information sharing), structure (e.g. level of organisation, key actors), procedures (e.g. case management) and goals (e.g. target groups, role and function). Despite the geographical proximity of the three countries, there is not one general MAW approach in the field.

The realist process evaluation consisted of a systematic literature review, participatory observations, semi-structured interviews and two rounds of focus groups in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. The realist process evaluation has shown that MAW is a promising approach that allows the early and effective identification of individuals and communities at risk of radicalisation and violent extremism. Combining internal strengths and external opportunities leads to maximum utilisation of opportunities. In general, two key success factors for MAW networks are having structured MAW meetings with an agenda, and having a neutral chair/coordinator. Trust is a key collaboration process element. The presence of as many relevant actors from different sectors (whether or not ad hoc), and ensuring the well-being of the MAW actors, are two external opportunities. If MAW networks continue to focus on trust and well-structured MAW meetings, the maximum can be obtained from these opportunities. If external partners from other sectors also experience trust, cooperation can improve. For example, in the structure of the MAW meeting, consideration can also be given to people's wellbeing.

Potential attacks by external threats can be defended by deploying the MAW structure's own strengths. The biggest threat were the online meetings due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The online meetings have had a serious impact on the functioning of the MAW structure. For example: not everyone is always attentive, connection problems can occur, and it creates a feeling of distance where there used to be a more informal and intimate atmosphere. Further focusing on trust and a high level of motivation can reduce the distance created by online meetings. Another threat was the constantly changing society and new forms of radicalisation. Again, good collaboration, trust and sufficient expertise can ensure that these challenges can be properly anticipated and met.

Potential weaknesses can be tackled by using the opportunities the MAW structures possess. In all three countries, issues with information sharing related to professional secrecy and/or the secrecy of the investigation were a weaknesses. A shortage of resources (time, money and people) could also be observed sometimes. The potential presence of other sectors can create new insights and relationships. This could provide inventive and innovative ways of thinking or solutions and address problems with professional secrecy or secrecy of the

investigation. If MAW actors' wellbeing is also high during the MAW meetings, then this can increase trust and impact on any problems around professional secrecy or secrecy of the investigation.

The combination of external threats and internal weaknesses should be avoided as much as possible. If a distance is created through online meeting, then responsibility could be passed on more and the self-interest or dominance of some MAW actors could also weigh more or be expressed more strongly. A lack of knowledge about new forms of radicalisation and the constantly changing society in combination with a shortage of resources and/or a lack of clear common goals are pitfalls that should be avoided as much as possible.

Figure 6. Combined SWOT analysis of interviews and observations

	Internal	*External*
Positive, useful	**Strengths:** • Structured MAW meeting (agenda and neutral chair) • Trust as key factor for good collaboration • High motivation • Sufficient expertise • Good balance of nice-to-know and need-to-know information	**Opportunities:** • Ensuring the well-being of the MAW actors • The presence of as many relevant actors from different sectors (ad hoc)
Negative, harmful	**Weaknesses:** • Repressive approach (beginning or start-up of a MAW) • Shortage of resources (time, money, people) • Difficulties due to secrecy of investigation and professional secrecy • Responsibility is passed on • Self-interest and dominance of some actors	**Threats:** • Covid-19 pandemic: online meetings • Constantly changing society and new forms of radicalisation

5.4   Reference

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PART II: Mentoring MAW Actors

Part II describes how the practical elements of the MAW model were fine-tuned. Three representatives of the EMMA project (RadarAdvies, VVSG and Violence Prevention Network) carried out guidance and mentoring of MAW structures. All the representatives are fulfilling the roll of mentor in regard of the approach to tackle radicalisation leading to violent extremism. The novelty of this work lies in the in-depth focus on facilitating peer-to-peer assessment of MAW officials, individual consulting and creating training modules for start-ups/advanced users/experts.

Structure of Part II

Chapter 6 considers the monitoring and evaluation of MAW practices in the context of P/CVE. Evaluation is a crucial element in legitimising implemented policies, and a powerful tool for policymakers and influential stakeholders. There is, however, a lack of knowledge on how collaborative process evaluation can be executed successfully, especially when evaluating MAW in P/CVE. There are numerous challenges in evaluating MAW, for example the complexity of interventions and variables, the changing nature of interventions, the diversity of intervention processes and outcomes. This chapter details these challenges, and proposes guidelines and good practices in evaluating MAW in the context of P/CVE.

Chapter 7 explores the importance of formalisation processes in successful MAW approaches. Formalising P/CVE approaches and making them sustainable helps to build trust between diverse stakeholders, makes processes and responsibilities more transparent, and facilitates cooperation through a common frame of reference. It can also help to lower dependency on individual actors and support the integration of new members. Based on work carried out during the EMMA project, including national and international meetings, peer-to-peer exchanges, and surveys, the chapter identifies five key challenges in formalisation processes and highlights good practices.

Chapter 8 summarises changes in the landscape of violent extremism. New ideologies and forms of extremism, such as lone actors and the incel movement, are emerging that are less organised and more online, and occur more on an individual or peer group level. This chapter outlines these new types and trends, and provides key information on how multi-agency approaches can tackle them, together with some inspiring practices from the EMMA project.

One of the key strengths of a multi-agency approach is trust, which, when it exists, enables participants from different organisations to share insights, knowledge and information. There can be considerable friction in the way different organisations and services look at a given situation, and attempts to bring together different world views or perspectives are not always easy. Chapter 9 shares practical tips to break through a hierarchical and tense relationship and

achieve equality among the actors and respect for each one's position, contribution and professional frame of reference. The importance of the role of the coordinator to manage the interplay of personalities and content is also explained.

Chapter 10 explores case management. Effective case management requires a process-oriented approach from registration to aftercare, in various steps, with information exchanged at each step. This chapter reviews a number of crucial elements, including case definition, the links or participants in the MAW structure that add value, assessment and qualification of a case, the risks of tunnel vision and overreaction, and different ways to help close a case. The chapter concludes with some key points for successful case management.

6　Evaluation in P/CVE Multi-Agency Working

Annika von Berg, Laura Kotzur, Sophie Scheuble and Ariane Wolf

6.1　Introduction: What to Avoid in Evaluation

Research on evaluation has a long history, which has always been shaped by societal and political trends. By definition, the potential for social innovation is a key element of the evaluation outcome (Logvinov, 2021: 33), meaning that one possible result of evaluations is to trigger social improvements and innovations of the programmes at hand. Evaluation is also highly relevant in itself and for knowledge production, especially in the field of P/CVE where it concerns a phenomenon with far-reaching consequences and great social impact in terms of fear, anxiety, feelings of insecurity and polarisation. Furthermore, there are many actors concerned with the prevention of radicalisation. Governments often finance external projects in order to test methodologies or to gain specific expertise on radicalisation, often by establishing new funding sources. Given the constantly changing landscape and programme requirements within the field of P/CVE, programmes may be implemented through new organisations or staff within and outside of government that do not always have much experience in setting up, running and evaluating programmes.

Evaluation and its methods are an essential part of the legitimisation of implemented policies and therefore powerful tools for policymakers and influential stakeholders. Evaluation and insights into which projects and measures work therefore have important consequences for resource distribution. Lastly, evaluation can identify unintended consequences. Intervening too early, too extensively or with the wrong actors in a radicalisation process can have adverse effects. Well-intentioned measures can run the risk of stigmatising certain groups. In short, the security risks in this policy domain, the proliferation of actors involved and the vulnerability of the target groups require a thorough evaluative process (Flemish Peace Institute, 2022). Evaluation and its implementation is therefore a widely discussed topic in many fields.

Yet, there is little research and few examples of how collaborative process evaluation can be executed successfully, especially in evaluating MAW in P/CVE. Moreover, practitioners appear to have had plenty of negative experiences with regard to evaluation. For example, during an EMMA workshop on evaluation, people from various institutions participating in local MAW were asked to think of bad evaluation practices. Over the years of their longstanding experience, a rather long list of bad practice had been accumulated. Participants said that a purely external motive for evaluation, such as funding or legitimacy, was considered bad practice. Evaluation was seen as more promising in cases where it supported the improvement of MAW for the actors involved and the quality of implementation practices, and when it contributed to a long-term internal improvement. External motivation is just one point on a rather exhaustive list of

bad practices in the evaluation of MAW. Another issue participants mentioned was badly arranged time frameworks of evaluation processes. In practice, these meant executing an evaluation for no good reason during periods of high workload, or executing it too often or in odd cycles (e.g. every ten years). Placing the workload mainly on practitioners is also bad practice, as it impairs their ability to handle everyday tasks. Furthermore, informal or formal hierarchies can affect evaluation outcomes as they sometimes pressure interviewees or participants to answer in certain ways. Not knowing the purpose of an evaluation and receiving feedback only on output indicators (such as numbers of cases and meetings) were considered bad practices in evaluation. Participants also criticised cases where evaluators had unrealistic expectations, such as participating in case-conferences, which is often not possible due to security clearances and data-protection. Finally, opaque financial relations between donor and evaluator were considered to jeopardise the objectivity of evaluation results. Participants mentioned similar concerns regarding the mixing of political issues or goals with evaluation objectives. Given this rather long list of bad practice that practitioners had experienced with regard to evaluation processes, one might wonder how evaluation in MAW can succeed. This chapter will therefore highlight and propose guidelines and good practice in evaluating MAW in the context of P/CVE.

6.2 What Has Been Done So Far: Research and Existing Tools

In recent years a variety of efforts have been made by a range of state and civil society actors to prevent and counter violent extremism, and the importance of developing tools and knowledge for evaluation in P/CVE is constantly increasing. It has become clear that a comprehensive development of initiatives to provide flexible evaluation tools is necessary. From a scientific point of view, there is little research on MAW in the context of P/CVE. According to a presentation by Klima et al. on the EMMA project at the 26th German Prevention Congress, there are only eight pieces of expert literature that deal with MAW in the context of P/CVE. Other publications can mainly be classified as reports. Furthermore, Klima et al. (2021: 16) highlight that the most discussed recommendations focus on information sharing, collaboration between actors and the composition of actors. In an article published by Hardyns et al. (2021: 32) in the context of the EMMA project, the authors highlight that there are no 'blueprints' or existing tools for teams practising MAW to use to evaluate their own work as an alternative to external evaluation.

Due to this lack of research, findings on MAW evaluation in adjacent fields such as prevention programmes, criminology and desistance are insightful bodies of knowledge. Additionally, research on natural disaster management and health-related MAW also offers some insights into MAW evaluation. Insights from the evaluation of multi-agency anti-crime partnerships may offer pointers for theory, design and measurement issues that could be taken into account when considering the evaluation of MAW in the field of P/CVE. For example, 'responsiveness to the causes of complex problems, […] ability to encourage interagency cooperation', 'the ability to attack problems from multiple sources of

influence', 'to target multiple causal mechanisms, and their potential for satisfying the public's growing desire for input, information sharing and connectedness with local government' (Rosenbaum, 2002: 18) could be considered as factors in evaluating MAW. In addition, evaluation may be based on meeting the needs of stakeholders, relatively unbiased reliable and valid results, trustworthy results in terms of controlling for distorting factors and generating generalisable results, and should include context variables (Rosenbaum, 2002: 193, 212). Additional variables to consider are activities and processes via categories, which may be measured via variables such as type of partnership, leadership, structure, decision-making responsibilities, partnership-dynamics, other partnership traits or implementation activities (Rosenbaum 2002: 201–207).

It is important to continuously and rigorously monitor the effects of prevention work, as this may avert undesirable consequences by discovering malfunctioning systems or interventions early on, as evaluation in the field of disaster aid demonstrates. This hints at the need to connect evaluation and monitoring in order to track changes, a good practice mentioned by participants at the workshop mentioned above. This also highlights that changing team leaders and main contact persons has caused continuity problems. This problem is not limited to disaster relief MAW, but may be extended to MAW in P/CVE. This is in line with what discussions and peer-to-peer work in EMMA showed. Therefore, we recommend that continuity of personnel (including, e.g., processes in place to ensure continuity, in cases of staff change) should be an item for evaluation. The report also suggests a focus on impact and outcome rather than output. Building on the importance of impact, the most crucial element in a MAW evaluation is developing and communicating the purpose of the evaluation for the MAW structure and the specific benefits for stakeholders. Since most examples of MAW in P/CVE lack human and financial resources, and since evaluations are time consuming, there is a pressing need for a meaningful process from which each stakeholder can profit (Sylvestre et al. 2008: 217).

Although these points may help in evaluating MAW, there are numerous challenges in evaluation, such as the complexity of interventions and variables, the changing nature of interventions, the diversity of intervention processes and outcomes, and the problem of not having a controlled lab-like environment for experimental research (Rosenbaum, 2002: 192). While quasi-experimental designs and using control groups whenever possible is a sound argument from a scientific viewpoint, we would like to emphasise that this is not possible in C/PVE since the field is connected to high risks for society. Case studies, as in the EMMA self-evaluation tool, are a desirable alternative to the experimental framework if conducted thoroughly and in depth (Rosenbaum, 2002: 195).

> While inputs, processes, and short-term outcomes are critical components of any evaluation, we cannot lose sight of the fact that partnerships are formed to alleviate specific social problems and are often expected to produce tangible long-term results. Furthermore, partnerships represent only one approach to social intervention (versus, for example, the independent actions of separate agencies). […] The complexity of inputs, processes, and outcomes associated

with multi-agency partnerships should not be used as an excuse to avoid precision in conceptualisation and measurement or to argue that 'anything goes' when it comes to evaluation.

(Rosenbaum, 2002: 212)

These examples show that research concerning the evaluation of MAW is available, yet the research does not consider P/CVE MAW. Additionally, there appear to be no tools or standards on how to evaluate MAW in P/CVE. The EMMA project attempted to take a first step in closing these gaps in research and evaluation methods by developing a tool to evaluate MAW in C/PVE. The tool addresses several pitfalls and the bad practices mentioned above. First and foremost, it is an internal evaluation tool and is specifically designed to obtain and analyse information concerning features of the MAW structure such as information sharing, cooperation and case management. The tool was developed using feedback loops between developers and users, thus taking users' critique and perceived problems into account. It is intended for use by different MAW approaches in Europe, regardless of their set-up and individual characteristics (Hardyns et al., 2021: 22). While it is a promising approach, the tool still has to prove itself.

6.3 Good Practices: Workshop Outcomes and Literature Analysis

In the workshop mentioned above, a section was dedicated to developing best practices. Participants discussed how evaluation should ideally be carried out as a basis for developing good practice. The following elements of best practice were identified, organised chronologically:

1. Before an evaluation, meetings should be held to establish agreed rules concerning the indicators, the research questions and the goals (formative approach).
2. Indicators should be outcome indicators and of qualitative nature (such as level of expertise, turnover, training).
3. The role of evaluators should be clear. Evaluators can either be external partners, which would facilitate an objective view, or members of other cities that deal with similar problems. In either case, evaluators must be independent.
4. The motivation for evaluation must be internal, such as improving the processes or work in general and generating long-term impact.
5. Concerning the timeframe, participants of the workshop highlighted that continuous evaluation is perceived as more useful than annual evaluation, as it offers the possibility of linking it closely to monitoring and to implemented changes.
6. In terms of timing, evaluation should be carried out before decisions are made.

From an academic point of view, context variables should be considered, as they may help determine the source of problems in MAW and hint at how problems

can be addressed. Even though there is little research and practical experience on evaluating MAW, one cannot just follow an 'anything goes' approach, especially as the bad practices mentioned may do more harm than good. An alternative to standardised evaluation could be detailed case studies.

6.4 Putting Things into Perspective and a Proposed Guide to Evaluating MAW

When evaluating MAW, one faces a considerable number of scientific, practical and organisational challenges. But evaluation remains crucial to improving MAW. Nevertheless, some experience exists, which helps in constructing the following guide:

1. Establish an understanding of why evaluation is important. If there is no shared understanding of the importance, motivation will probably be low.
2. Decide on the goal of the evaluation. This will determine which kind of evaluation is to be done (e.g. outcome evaluation vs pragmatic evaluation) (Gielen, 2017: 114).
3. Make sure that the resources required are available, such as time, expertise and evaluation tools fit for MAW-specific needs and interests. This should be clarified before the evaluation, to allow real engagement in the evaluation process and to plan ahead.
4. Make use of available resources such as existing research and evaluation reports (Gielen, 2017: 4).
5. Establish an atmosphere of trust, in which MAW members are able to express critical thoughts with minimal influence from factors such as hierarchies.
6. Do something with the results of the evaluation. For example, try to address deficiencies or problems and monitor whether this changes later evaluation results.
7. Use network resources, e.g. those generated via EMMA and icommit, to tackle identified problems.
8. Expectation management: Do not expect an evaluation to show an impact that your MAW will not be able to achieve. If your MAW deals with individuals at risk of radicalisation, do not expect the evaluation to demonstrate successful change of root causes. Therefore, formulate a theory of change on what the MAW structure intends to achieve and how (Gielen, 2017: 114).
9. If you intend to use external evaluators, demand an extensive evaluation plan. If possible, include the evaluators before the project or intervention has started (Gielen, 2017: 114f.).
10. Combine smart indicators. This means including structural indicators (an essential condition, such as educating social workers on the topic of radicalisation, so they are aware of the problem), activity indicators (e.g. that X meetings of the MAW structure took place to enable exchange about current challenges concerning radicalisation in the municipality) and

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outcome indicators (e.g. that the number of crimes associated with extremism is reduced by X per cent) (Gielen, 2017: 115).

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7 Sustainable P/CVE Approaches: The Importance of Continuation and Formalisation for Multi-Agency Networks

Laura Kotzur, Sophie Scheuble and Ariane Wolf

7.1 Central Insights: The Importance of Continuity and Formalisation for MAW Structures

Radicalisation and violent extremism remain highly complex challenges in the EU, requiring comprehensive strategies and multi-faceted approaches. Many initiatives in the field of P/CVE therefore pursue concepts of MAW in which actors from diverse contexts and with specific expertise cooperate with the common goal of addressing radicalisation and violent extremism. While the work on complex cases and local trends in the field of P/CVE requires stakeholders to work together in strong and trusting networks, they often find themselves confronted with a lack of financial and human resources. In order to support, mentor and evaluate (often newly established) regional structures, the consortium project EMMA was formed. After two years of working closely with networks in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, EMMA found that formalisation processes (including documentation, clear distribution of roles and reporting) can be a highly significant element in supporting the continuation and stabilisation of MAW at an early stage. Formalising approaches helps to build trust between stakeholders, makes processes and responsibilities more transparent and clear, and facilitates cooperation through a common frame of reference. Furthermore, this can prevent tasks from being distributed disproportionately, allow new team members to integrate quickly, build trust across agencies and be a first step towards anchoring MAW in organisations rather than individuals. This chapter discusses the potentials and possible pitfalls of formalisation approaches in multi-stakeholder work. It is aimed specifically at networks that still find themselves in the formation phase, but also at those that have already been working together for several years but seek to continue working on their stabilisation strategies and formalisation approaches.

From our work with local authorities in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, this chapter identifies five key challenges with regard to formalisation processes. It summarises good practices the project has identified, based on national and international meetings, peer-to-peer exchanges and surveys amongst participating cities.

7.2 Reality Check: Challenges in Establishing Continuity and Formalisation

7.2.1 Challenge 1: Varying Mandate Strength

The organisation of MAW structures depends on local circumstances and legal frameworks. As the mentoring process in the EMMA project has been targeting local networks in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, it has shown that varying degrees of institutionalisation and mandate lead to different framework conditions for cooperation. Compared to the Netherlands and Belgium, structures in Germany are far less centralised. Hence, the set-up of local networks varies between regions and from city to city. When it comes to joint case assessment, regulations for information-sharing between civil society actors and security authorities vary in German federal states (Bundesländer) (El Difraoui et al., 2021). In some German federal states, police have a specific 'point of contact' for civil society agencies. These officers or organisational units serve as contacts for questions on cases relevant to prevention and disengagement work. In some municipalities in Belgium, MAW is geographically organised at police zone level, which provides a clear framework for stakeholders' responsibilities.

7.2.2 Challenge 2: Skills Transfer and Ensuring a Stable Network

Within Germany, local networks in the field of P/CVE are often established at the initiative of civil society organisations or municipalities. As MAW structures are not always firmly institutionalised, many of the actors involved participate in MAW meetings outside of their regular working hours, generating additional burdens on key stakeholders. As a result, the success and duration of cooperation is highly dependent on the motivation and capacities of the individuals involved.

For MAW in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, continuity and formalisation processes need to be adjustable depending on the regional context. The main challenge is to create a network of experience and expertise that functions as the foundation for best practices in ensuring the continuity of each MAW. Local multi-agency structures in cities are often confronted with cases and trends in local extremist scenes that require long-term, continuous work, sometimes for years, and individual follow-up. In the face of these challenges, continuity within case work and organised skills transfer and communication across the institutions involved becomes a key asset in responding to local challenges of violent extremism.

7.2.3 Challenge 3: Acquiring Resources

As mentioned above, German local MAW in particular often relies on stakeholders who take part in network meetings on top of the day-to-day obligations of their regular work. Many lack financial and human resources to do so, resulting in a need to keep the workload of local multi-agency structures as low as possible while also ensuring the necessary continuity and professionalism.

Furthermore, many of the civil society organisations involved and needed in such networks rely on short-term project funding, exacerbating the challenge of retaining key staff and ensuring long-term case work has continuity. For stakeholders, the question therefore arises: How much formalisation do we need in order to work together efficiently while at the same time not limiting ourselves in our necessary flexibility to respond to newly emerging challenges? As continuity and formalisation processes are often time-consuming, involved actors often have no time to deal with detailed minutes, target agreements and similar documents. However, it is especially because of their challenging position and fluctuating staff that a certain level of formalisation is essential to ensure the continuity of MAW.

7.2.4 Challenge 4: Missing Support Structure

Especially in Germany, newly founded MAW structures lack support structures that can enable formalisation. Based on the research interviews we conducted as part of the project and the participatory observations that took place in the different cities, it became apparent that there is a lack of tools, materials and support that might guide formalisation processes in multi-stakeholder teams.

To date, no comprehensive international networks exist to provide hands-on support, exchange and/or mentoring for local multi-agency structures. Despite the differences in structures in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, we found a high level of interest among practitioners in exchanging lessons learned and expertise among peers – both nationally and internationally.[1] In particular, participating cities highlighted their interest in exchanging information and experiences on current and emerging trends and the development of responses to counter them, and also on the structural and institutional challenges faced by multi-agency structures.

One example of a common challenge faced by all participating cities, albeit to varying degrees, is the establishment of a procedure of information sharing across the different institutions and stakeholders involved in MAW. There was a recurring theme of reluctance to share information across different institutions, and a need to bridge the respective obligations and institutional cultures. This is particularly challenging when guidelines on the formalisation of these processes are missing and legal frameworks are unclear or difficult to understand.

For instance, within the federal structure of Germany, different national and state-specific regulations apply, outlining differential limitations to the sharing of case-specific data for different stakeholders. In the absence of a specific national regulation or mandate for multi-agency work, stakeholders need to interpret existing regulations as they apply to P/CVE work. In Belgium, there is a law and a regional Flemish decree that set out the guidelines for information sharing. However, it should be noted that it is still difficult to convince social actors to

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[1] This is in line with previous peer-to-peer exchange projects done at Violence Prevention Network, which strongly underlined the transformative potential of topical long-term peer-to-peer practitioner exchange (RecoRa & VPN, 2019).

participate in a MAW consultation process. Legislative backing is one aspect, but multi-disciplinary cooperation also requires a change in the mentality of the actors to break through (administrative) barriers and traditions of working independently. A central component to this work is a high level of trust among actors, which is often fostered by positive experiences and collaboration, allowing social actors to work at eye level with other entities.

Based on the EMMA experience, one national and one international follow-up project emerged to continue the support work with local multi-agency actors. The VVSG in Flanders will continue to focus on guidance and coaching of MAW actors in order to provide them with customised support for the start-up and development of their cooperation. VPN coordinates the new EU-funded project icommit,[2] which develops hands-on training and support for city-level multi-agency teams across the EU. This project seeks to improve inter-institutional communication and strengthen social and civil society stakeholders by developing a toolkit to monitor, assess and communicate case progress.

7.2.5 Challenge 5: Diverging Interests

When stakeholders from different organisations and institutions with different professional backgrounds come together, it can be difficult to align their interests and goals. A coordinated and coherent approach is important, especially in case conferences, where different institutions discuss an individual case or client and decide upon next steps. Civil society organisations, specifically those working in secondary and tertiary prevention (as is common in the German context), mainly target individual causes of extremist attitudes and the personal convictions of their clients. While the work of security authorities is structured by the primary goal of guaranteeing public safety and the principles of confidentiality, for practitioner-oriented approaches the highest standards for the protection of trust must apply. This balancing act between the need for cooperation and exchange on the one hand, and finding common ground based on sometimes very different interests and approaches between the groups of actors on the other, continues to be one of the decisive challenges in this field of work.

7.3 Good Practice in Formalisation and Continuity

On the basis of peer-to-peer meetings, informal exchange and semi-structured interviews with MAW stakeholders and a workshop with key actors involved in MAW, we were able to identify good practice and lessons learned from their vast experience and expertise in the field:

7.3.1 Before Getting Started: Decide on a Common Goal and Shared Set of Values

The concept of MAW is defined by a diversity of actors with different perspectives and backgrounds working together in order to address the complex challenges of

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[2] https://multiagencycooperation.eu/

P/CVE work. Although MAW participants do not always have to agree, it is helpful to discuss and decide on a shared set of values that help reach the joint objectives.

(a) **Agree on the basics:** To discuss and document joint objectives as well as basic rules and work processes helps achieve goals. It can be helpful, especially for newly founded MAW groups, to discuss overarching goals at the beginning (for instance: Which cases is the MAW structure dealing with? How do different stakeholders define extremism?). As mentioned above, for most actors in MAW teams, consultations and team meetings with other members happen alongside or in addition to many other professional tasks. Some stakeholders may even participate in the joint meetings on a voluntary basis without remuneration for their efforts (community members, etc.). It can be helpful to refer to the target agreements regularly and check whether the work is still proceeding towards them.

(b) **Getting to know each other:** Especially for heterogeneous groups, this can be challenging and takes time. However, this is an essential process of building trust. A first basis here can be the consensus that a variety of actors need to be involved and engaged in order to deal with the problem.

(c) **Separation of strategic and operational levels:** Separating the two levels can ensure that MAW structures are continuously developed and that individual MAW members remain capable of acting. This is also crucial to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are at the table when discussing specific topics, but at the same time to ensure that the capacities of actors who do not need to be involved in certain arrangements are not unnecessarily stretched. Separating different challenges in this way can also help in addressing them: Are the political needs and hurdles of the MAW structure known? Who are possible contact persons? Which institutions and MAW groups may have already solved similar problems?

> **Example:** One of the best-known international MAW approaches is the Aarhus model. The conditions for success were a strong mandate from the beginning and various opportunities to exchange information. These conditions are rare – and hence the model was not transferred to other cities in Denmark. However, there are inspiring examples of cooperation based on much weaker mandates in other cities.

(d) **Seeking support:** The multi-faceted (and ever-changing) challenges to local MAW groups also require additional support structures. Under the EMMA project, we emphasised the importance of communicating the needs and hurdles of MAW to the networks and to policy makers. Local and national networks for MAW stakeholders may exist, such as VVSG's network of Flemish cities. On an international level, the newly started EU project icommit aims to improve stakeholders' responses and risk mitigation for disengagement and reintegration (D&R) efforts, and offers

phase-specific support for multi-stakeholder teams working together on a city level. In addition, icommit provides multi-agency support with specialised experts to advise them on their local challenges.

7.3.2   Getting Started: Clarify Legal Questions/Mandate

After setting out joint objectives, these should be checked against external frameworks such as legal contexts, political mandates and resolutions.

(e)   Review the framework conditions in your country/federal state and check whether there are possible resolutions that can be referred to. This information can also serve as a basis for external communication strategies and the acquisition of funding for your MAW.

(f)   Familiarity with the relevant data protection regulations is essential, especially when planning MAW case conferences. Anonymised case discussions can also violate the legal basis if, despite anonymisation, conclusions can be drawn about an individual. The framework conditions on the prohibition and obligation to disclose can differ depending on the situation and the country.

7.3.3   Once Started: Prioritisation of Which Shared Documents are Actually Needed

Having set a shared agenda internally and externally, the next important step is to put the results of this process on paper. This is not only helpful for possible new members of the MAW structure and internal processes, but also for public communication and positioning in a wider field with a range of actors.

(g)   Decide on which documents are needed and avoid over-formalisation. Once the first steps have been taken and MAW has been established, consideration can be given to the creation of documents. However, too many documents can lead to an overly bureaucratic procedure and reduce intrinsic motivation.

(h)   Create engagement instead of deterrence: In many cases, MAW must respond to evolving and not always predictable situations. Formalisation is therefore helpful in order to ensure liability, but it should not interfere with the flexibility of approaches.

(i)   Take your time: Formalise and produce documents in small steps. Not all documents have to be in place at the beginning. It is much more about developing continuously, remaining flexible, being able to react to new developments and involving all actors. A needs assessment can be a good way of involving MAW stakeholders.

7.4   Written Formalisation: Rules of Procedure/Guidelines

Drafting guidelines for working together is fundamental for successful cooperation in a multi-stakeholder team. Essential points that should be addressed are:

(a) Definition of concepts and terms: When many stakeholders from different professional areas work together, it is important to find a common language. Security-oriented terminology from law enforcement and security agencies is foreign to civil society organisations and vice versa. To ensure a common definition of terms, it is advisable to agree on an already existing definition and to adapt or expand it if necessary.

(b) Rules of procedure: Referring to the mandate and mission in the rules of procedure/guidelines can help to create commitment.

(c) Composition of teams: It is crucial to ensure role clarity for all stakeholders. Questions of who leads meetings and the role(s) and responsibilities of individuals should be answered. Creating overview charts on individual roles and responsibilities can also help with external communication and expectation management, and makes it clear what the MAW structure can achieve.

(d) Establish a procedural decision-making process: As a rule, there should be clarity over which body makes the final decision in certain cases. For cases in which this is not clear and there is disagreement among MAW participants on how to proceed, a voting process may be useful. These processes and the decision-making should be transparent for all involved.

(e) Establish rules concerning minutes and participant lists, and decide how to deal with call logs. A common decision should be made on what information should be documented and shared and what information should only remain among the present stakeholders, especially with documents such as minutes.

(f) Involve external actors according to a 'level system': If clear guidelines are in place, it is easier to save resources and only invite relevant (external) policy makers, researchers, practitioners, etc., depending on thematic questions or on the severity of the case.

7.5   Conclusion

This chapter has discussed what formalisation procedures can help to achieve continuous improvement and development of MAW structures. Documenting common goals as well as rules of procedures and working processes can help to keep track of the initial goal in the long run. In everyday work, it can be helpful to refer to the goal agreements regularly, and check whether the approach is still being directed towards them. Formalising MAW structures can help to lower dependency on individual actors and support the integration of new members. In other words, it can be a first step towards anchoring the MAW structure in organisations rather than individuals.

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8 The Flexibility of MAW Approaches Towards New Emerging Challenges: Including the Online Dimension and Dealing with Multi-Problematic Cases

Ceren Özkan, Lieke Wouterse and Malon Peeters

8.1 Introduction: The Changing Landscape of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

Radicalisation and violent extremism are phenomena that have mostly been visible as organised international terrorism, such as Islamist jihadism by Daesh. While the threat from this group remains high, the occurrence of jihadi terrorist attacks has been lowered. The landscape of violent extremism is currently undergoing rapid change and is moving away from internationally organised groups. The emergence of new ideologies and forms of extremism, like lone actors and the incel movement, make the landscape more fractured and diversified. These new challenges and variations are often less organised and more online, and occur more on an individual level (e.g. a lone actor) or peer group level. While these new phenomena and ideologies may be present and similar in different countries, the manifestations are more local, with radicalisation hotbeds and lone actors, which makes it harder for local actors to tackle them (Europol, 2021).

In a local context, the involved actors will always face changing trends in (violent) extremism. This could be either large or small changes in the phenomena. This topical chapter provides key information on how multi-agency approaches and structures can deal with the ever-changing landscape of extremism. How can the multi-agency approach find a systematic answer to these changes? This chapter is of particular interest to first-line practitioners and policy makers involved in multi-agency work, especially those working in the local context in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

8.2 New and Emerging Challenges in Violent Extremism

We are currently seeing new types of extremism on the rise, such as the increase in lone actors and online extremist communities. We are also seeing emerging trends in terms of ideology, such as the rise of right-wing extremism, accelerationism, incels and anti-government extremism. This section briefly outlines these newly emerging types and trends.

Right-wing extremist ideologies are spreading through international networks and mostly attract young people via online platforms. The Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, the German domestic intelligence services and the Belgian Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis reported on the

growth of right-wing extremism and that the likelihood of right-wing terrorism is conceivable based on the growth of youth engagement in online international right-wing networks (NCTV, 2021; OCAD, 2020; BfV, 2020). Many of these youngsters seem to have mental health issues and to lack social support (NCTV, 2021). However, connecting violent right-wing extremism with mental disorders risks oversimplification. In most cases, mental health is one of several underlying factors impacting individuals' radicalisation processes (Alberda et al., 2020). One of the new/current main ideas disseminated by right-wing networks is accelerationism. Accelerationism is a right-extremist ideology spreading via international social media platforms in which the followers justify, glorify and provoke race war. The chaos that would follow from the race war is assumed to create a political vacuum in which a white ethno-state can be installed (NCTV, 2021; OCAD, 2020).

Lone actors are socially isolated extremists who radicalise through newspapers, magazines, social media and other propaganda. This type of extremism is not new as such, but the type is growing with the rise of new ideologies and types of extremism. In most cases, lone actors plan, prepare and carry out attacks without the direction of an organisation. This can be either a jihadist attack carried out alone or right-wing leaderless resistance. Moreover, it can also be on one single issue, such as an internet-based conspiracy theory or environmentalism. While some lone actors also show mental health disorders, this does not seem to be the case for every profile. Although it may be impossible to identify one single, comprehensive profile for the lone actor, it is important to recognise the lone actor profile/type and that the lone character is often embedded in active online communities, which tend to migrate to offline spaces (Lloyd and Pauwels, 2021).

Another challenge is the emergence of new online extremist communities as a type of extremism, such as the incel movement, anti-authorities extremism, conspiracy theorists (e.g. QANON) and anti-vaxxers. There is some overlap in ideas between these communities. Incels are 'involuntary celibates', who feel frustration over the absence of sexual relationships in their life and blame women for this. They post on online forums, threatening women and society in general. The incel movement is not merely anti-feminist and urging targeted violence, it also advocates societal change by promoting a society with absolute male supremacy. This has resulted in extremist attacks in the USA and Canada, and the movement is now growing in Europe (RAN Practitioners, 2021a). Another form is the Covid-19 related extremism, which is a result of uncertainty, disinformation, mistrust, polarised narratives and conspiracy theories spreading through various online channels. People are more active than ever online as a result of social isolation during the pandemic (Wansink & Timmer, 2021). Their aim is to undermine the credibility of official approaches and policies on Covid-19 and, nowadays, the shift is towards a general anti-authorities extremism by undermining the credibility of authorities as such. The sentiments of this new group overlap considerably with those of existing classic ideologically inspired networks and movements (e.g. left-wing and right-wing extremism). Supporters of the new protest movement of anti-government extremism also form an

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important reservoir from which existing classic extremist ideologies try to win converts (OCAD, 2020).

8.3   What Does Multi-Agency Cooperation Need?

Flexibility towards new challenges means that multi-agency cooperation structures need to work on the following objectives:

1. Have a strong basis to your multi-agency cooperation, in the long term.

In order to be flexible towards emerging challenges, the multi-agency structure should have a solid basis to their cooperation (on individual cases). This solid basis has to remain strong in the long term as well. Some key elements to keep your multi-agency cooperation strong are:

- Identify existing local networks and create partnerships.
- Work on a structure for (early) signals, in which local partners know how, where and when to report on particular signals of radicalisation. Furthermore, invest in the knowledge of and trust from various communities in order to keep them sharing signals and information (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit, 2022).
- Focus on a structured, comprehensive and multi-disciplinary approach when diagnosing cases.
- Decide on a case/process coordinator, who has a helicopter view of the process. Agree clear-cut rules on the processes and protocols to foster cooperation and clearly communicate on expectations towards one another. In addition, work with a systematic protocol for information-sharing and interventions (European Commission, 2021).

2. Stay up to date with knowledge about the most recent and relevant trends in radicalisation that lead to violent extremism, raising awareness on new trends and keeping the sense of urgency about these new trends among local partners in P/CVE.

One of the key points in the cooperation structure is being able to recognise the type of extremism and radicalisation in particular case(s). In order to keep up to date on emerging challenges, to improve knowledge on radicalisation and violent extremism in general and to select the right interventions, there is a need to continuously invest in local training programmes. The training providers should be experts in the field. In addition, work with reliable people who have been part of these extremist networks in the past, because they can be a great asset and source of information. An added value is to organise a strategic table alongside the operational table to discuss new phenomena and work out an appropriate approach.

Furthermore, make sure that your local partners external to your organisation also stay up to date. Local partners do not always have enough expertise, time or resources to recognise, for example, right-wing extremist ideology in schools and in other social networks such as sports clubs. In cooperation with the multi-agency

actors, the coordinator should work on the alertness of local partners and communities to right-wing extremism and others extremist ideologies, in order to receive signals. This is an ongoing process, but identify and involve these local partners and communities in the training sessions (as developed during the EMMA peer-to-peer exchange sessions).

In addition, invite mental health professionals to your multi-disciplinary case meetings to discuss the mental health dynamics of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. An increasing number of studies discuss possible connections between radicalisation and mental health disorders. For example, recent research on terrorism convicts who have been diagnosed with at least one psychiatric disorder shows that in more than half of these cases the mental health problems could be linked to the terrorist offence (Alberda et al., 2020). The municipality of Eindhoven, one of the EMMA participants, has developed cooperation with a mental health professional, who is present at multi-disciplinary case meetings. This has led to an improved sense of urgency for all partners involved regarding the theme of mental health issues and its interplay with radicalisation leading to violent extremism. In some general cases, working on the mental health issues of some individuals will help in the prevention of radicalisation. The mental health focus has also improved case management for individuals that do indeed have mental health issues, especially for lone actors (EMMA P2P Exchange, 2021).

To keep up to date on phenomena, some municipalities in the Netherlands organise 'Living Labs'. A variety of local professionals attend these periodical meetings with experts who specialise in different types of radicalisation and violent extremism. Sometimes these meetings are also intended to further explore a specific topic or trend, to gain more knowledge and expertise (EMMA P2P Exchange, 2021). Furthermore, local professionals actively work on and with the presented topics. For example, the professionals look at the use of the app Telegram.

It is also important to involve citizens from local communities in order to stay up to date as a multi-agency network, and to raise awareness among them on preventing and signalling radicalisation. Host dialogue sessions with citizens to understand their worries and ways of thinking. Let people with different opinions hold a dialogue to exchange ideas on fake news, disinformation, conspiracy theories, polarisation and online and offline extremism.

Since the new challenges, as presented above, entail a large online component (right-wing extremism and incels for example), the case 'investigation' and approach should combine online and offline working:

- Assign 'online responsibilities' within your multi-agency network: who should do what online and how should different organisations work together on online matters (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2021)?
- Work with social media police officers: they can have a strong role in prevention via the most popular social media platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, Instagram and Discord. This is also an important tool to keep up to date with the fast-changing landscape of online platforms.

- Keep up to date and active on online gaming platforms: youngsters use platforms such as Discord to communicate while gaming. Discord is a platform gamers use to talk with peer gamers without visually seeing one another. With the ability to game and communicate with gamers all over the world, right-wing extremist networks are also spreading via this platform. More gamers are exposed to right-wing extremist ideologies in this way. Initiatives like gaming with police or youth workers make youngsters more alert to the signals of extremism and radicalisation among peers and to signs of recruitment efforts (RAN Practitioners, 2021b; RAN LOCAL Conclusion paper, June 2021). By entering their 'comfort zone' through gaming, police officers from the community connect with the youth and earn their trust. This gives the police the ability (either during the gaming or in one-on-one interaction) to speak with young people, help them with different problems they might experience, inform them and carry out preventive work.
- Learn from other good case practices: Belgian municipalities are starting to experiment with screening open sources via a special software tool. This project and the use of this tool help to map problems around disinformation and online polarisation. In addition, it helps to track the evolution of these challenges (RAN LOCAL Conclusion paper, June 2021).
- Cooperate with tech companies and the social media industry in order to signal extremist content, to remove it and to protect people from radicalisation through algorithms (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2021).

3.   *Continuously re-evaluate your multi-agency cooperation.*

It is important to continuously evaluate your multi-agency cooperation. Do the involved actors have enough expertise to handle new cases? Is everyone up to date on the most recent trends? And does a certain standardised approach still work for new phenomena, or do we need to add new or different expertise to the table, for example? To aid MAW in its evaluation efforts, the EMMA project published a topical paper on evaluation (see Chapter 6 of this book) and Ghent University has designed an evaluation tool. This topical paper on monitoring and evaluation provides further information on why evaluation is essential in multi-agency working. The evaluation tool is a practical, hands-on tool that helps MAW groups evaluate their own work. The paper and tool can be found at: **https://emmascan.eu/**

8.4 Three Inspiring Practices from the EMMA Network

8.4.1 Belgium: Online Youth Work and Detection of Online Signals

One of the challenges that various Flemish cities and municipalities are currently facing is to transform their offline methodologies and operation into an online context. That is why various projects are currently being initiated to start up or further develop online prevention work. In this way, municipalities can also capture signals of radicalisation online and get to work on them. The Covid-19 pandemic has forced several municipalities to take some first steps in this direction, but this operation needs to be reinforced further to be able to apply the current prevention interventions appropriately to a broad spectrum of toxic polarising tendencies and radical threats that can proliferate in the online reality.

In this respect, municipalities are committed to developing methodologies for online outreach work within the contours of current prevention work. This can be done by using online youth work to create a bond with young people online and through innovative projects that focus on capturing online signals. Online youth work is based on finding preventive answers to social problems of loneliness, exclusion and alienation, whereas online detection responds to curative person-oriented approaches in which intervention and reconnection with social institutions are crucial.

'Press to Pause' is an initiative in Genk in Belgium that focuses on online outreach work to reduce young people's lack of social connections. The focus is on detecting frustration and radicalisation, in an online safe space, for youngsters between the ages of 12 and 25. In a first session, young people and police officers play a game together on Discord. This creates a sense of connection. This gamification method seeks subsequently to provide accessible online support. In a later session, an interaction will be organised between first-line care providers and young people on the topic of addiction. The focus in these sessions is always on building something together.

8.4.2 The Netherlands: Staying up to Date on Emerging Challenges

The process coordinator of the MAW structure in this Dutch example tries to have a diverse working week with creative initiatives to gain more knowledge on emerging challenges. The coordinator works on the usual tasks, such as leading the multi-disciplinary case meetings and checking in with the local partners. It is a continuous process of network building and being recognisable for partners to signal cases of radicalisation.

The coordinator's work continues in the neighbourhood outside. Together with multi-agency partners, the process coordinator plans field activities. These field activities are a way of actively trying to keep up with new phenomena and challenges. For example, the coordinator and the multi-agency partners will walk round a certain neighbourhood for a 'sticker safari'. During the walk, everyone searches for the newest additions of stickers in the neighbourhood, then they identify these stickers. What message do they see? How frequently is the sticker seen? To which group or idea does the sticker belong? What does it say about local

structures? This field research is perfect to get out of the office bubble and learn more about current trends together.

The process coordinator and multi-agency partners use sticker safaris and living labs to search for visible expressions of new challenges and changed sentiments in different neighbourhoods. In this way, the multi-agency cooperation gains new knowledge and stays up to date with new challenges.

8.4.3 Germany: Building Trust Through Online Intervention – U-Turn

U-Turn is a Dortmund-based NGO focusing on prevention and exit work in the field of right-wing extremism (RAN Practitioners, 2021c). Their online intervention approach focuses on reaching out to members in online groups that spread conspiracy theories or antidemocratic propaganda (these groups must include known members of extremist groups trying to recruit).

The specific target group consists of individuals who are not leading members of extremist organisations, but who share content that suggests an affinity for conspiracy theories or authoritarian methods (their ideology remains vague and is not fully developed). Since this group is relatively easy to reach through the online groups and often willing to challenge their beliefs, because they are not yet fully radicalised, intervention efforts with these individuals initially take place online. Having created a relationship of trust with these members, interventions continue offline in order to challenge their views and provide them with support to deal with difficult situations and mental health problems. U-Turn aims to identify underlying personal problems among the targeted group members and build a relationship that offers support but also challenges their world views.

The goals are:

1. Understanding conspiracy theories and how they work, why they are attractive and how they affect believers and society alike, and show the contradictions in their reasoning.
2. Empowerment through supporting the target group on mental health issues, integration into (new) social groups beyond the online sphere to gain new ideas and views, and support in dealing with ambiguity and insecurity.
3. Media literacy by identifying trustworthy sources, who is an expert, and an understanding of conflicts of interest.

8.5 Conclusion

This topical chapter is intended to give information and practical ideas on how multi-agency cooperation can work on and anticipate the ever-changing landscape of radicalisation and violent extremism. Three main objectives are important in cooperation structures:

1. Have a strong base to your multi-agency cooperation, for the long-term.
2. Stay up to date on knowledge of the most recent and relevant trends in radicalisation leading to violent extremism.
3. Continuously re-evaluate your multi-agency cooperation.

Besides the practical tips in this chapter, it is also valuable to exchange best practice and lessons learned with colleagues in different municipalities. It is even better to broaden this exchange with colleagues in municipalities in other countries, as was the goal of the EMMA project.

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9   Hierarchy and Cooperation Within Multi-Agency Networks in the Field of P/CVE

Maarten De Waele and Katrien Van Mele

The discussions have fire and passion, and sometimes tension. Someone summed this up well at one point. He said, "It's the job of the police to be a bit paranoid, see the bad in people and see bad intentions, while it's the job of you as prevention workers to maybe be naive and believe in the opportunities. And as soon as that is reversed, we have a problem."

(MAW local coordinator, Belgium)

9.1   Introduction

The strength of a multi-agency approach lies in the way the individual participants trust each other to the point that they share new insights, knowledge and in-depth information with each other. This might seem obvious, but there are still some obstacles to achieving it. As the quote above illustrates, there is a good deal of friction in the way different organisations and services look at a given situation. It is therefore not surprising that attempts to bring together such different world views or perspectives are not always easy. Collaborating means making room for alternative ways of thinking, something we are not always naturally very comfortable with. In this chapter, we discuss practical tips to break through a tense relationship.

9.2   Finding Common Ground

When a group of people start a collaborative process, they do not necessarily start with a unified view or a shared vision of how they look at certain situations. Rather, starting to collaborate begins with recognising that other partners have an equal role in addressing the problem. At the start, therefore, it is important to clarify what tasks and expectations each person brings to the table. In this way, clarity can be created about the interfaces and boundaries within which to work together.

In MAW approaches to violent radicalisation, it is clear that there is a difference in the modus operandi of security and non-security actors. While security agencies are mainly focused on minimising the risk to society, civil society actors are more focused on individual needs and strengthening the resilience of individual clients. This is reflected in the different motivations of the actors at the table. Multi-agency cooperation is not about giving up one's own viewpoint, but rather a way of finding common ground within the framework and recognising everyone's role.

Figure 7. Finding common ground in a MAW structure

One EMMA participant expressed it as follows:

"Multi-agency working is like WAT relationships – working apart together – and finding a way to have a common agenda or common agreement on how discussions are made in practice."

This illustrates how independent organisations with their own structure and work culture relate to each other at the MAW table and collaborate with a shared goal, without losing their identity.

But how do we start, if a search for an abstract shared vision on how to tackle the phenomenon might take up too much time and, ultimately, create little clarity at the table? For example, scientific research does not provide a uniform definition of 'radicalisation'. Simply trying to agree on a definition of this term can lead to hours of discussion about how exactly we look at this particular phenomenon. Practitioners indicate that it is crucial to have a constructive discussion on the strategic objectives of the consultation within the MAW structure. This thought process focuses primarily on four essential questions:

1. Who is the subject of discussion at the table? (= target group)
2. What do we want to accomplish? (= common goal)
3. How do we want to accomplish it? (= method)
4. Why do we want to accomplish it? (= outcome)

The first question in particular will guide the approach. The best way to improve existing services is from the perspective of the target group. In this way, organisations will break through the 'insider–outer' thinking (guarding their own interests). Putting the 'user' first is the cornerstone of service design, and it is crucial to achieve relevant actions as an organisational network. Putting the user first means that you have to get a picture of who that target group is, what their needs and wishes are and how the existing 'offer' is experienced (Cousaert & Briels, 2021).

The answer to the first question will affect the approach and composition of our MAW structure. We can illustrate this best by using an example within the EMMA project. When we look at how the multi-agency approach to radicalisation

is carried out in the different countries, we note that in the Netherlands and Belgium, unlike Germany, there is a multi-agency approach that focuses on a case-oriented or person-oriented approach (individual case management). In other words, individuals are discussed, and the guidance that can be developed for this person is explored. Different approaches are used in Germany; some MAW groups focus on case discussions, and others are more focused on discussing occurring phenomena, movements, situations, etc. In the latter case, actors often discuss strategies for dealing with certain situations or groups (situation analyses). A possible 'common ground' analysis for these different forms of multi-agency approach could be as follows:

	Individual case management	*Situational analyses*
Target group	A (possibly) radicalised individual	Extremist groups
Common goal	(Re-) integration into society	Correct and up-to-date analysis at group level
Method	Analysis of the individual (vulnerabilities and potential strengths) and (assigning or implementing) appropriate guidance/follow-up	Exchanging information about trends and developments in the radicalisation field
Outcome	Safety and social integration	Safety and social integration

In some examples of German MAW, the common ground will therefore mainly focus on information sharing to get a better picture of the interactions and activities at a group level (meso). In the Netherlands and Belgium, actors will probably focus more on an individual, tailor-made approach. However, when thinking about the outcome or the reason why a MAW structure was founded, you often see little difference. After an international EMMA project meeting, a group thinking about the right MAW model came to the following conclusion:

> *"All MAW structures face the same challenges, but also have the same goal: a focus on positive living together prevails when addressing the prevention of radicalisation. Trust is described as the crucial element for a sustainable collaboration within MAW."*

9.3 A Cross-Cutting and Horizontal Cooperation Network

The starting point for a multi-agency approach is equality among the actors and respect for each other's position, contribution and professional frame of reference. In an ideal scenario of the multi-agency approach, there should be no formal hierarchy among the various members and everyone should decide to what extent they actively participate. However, passive participation does not relieve an actor

of his or her responsibility. After all, each participant bears responsibility for the success of the predefined goals. In addition, the horizontal relationship between the parties should not become coercive and actors should not attempt to pressure one another.

Is it feasible to establish a non-hierarchical relationship in such a multi-agency setting? In some MAW situations, the actor introducing the case to the table usually has the final decision-making power. Also, the presence of police (or political) actors automatically formalises the proceedings of a meeting, which can lead to intensive discussions among non-police actors about what information is put on the table. To this extent, it is important to invest time in a relationship of mutual trust and create an atmosphere in which open discussion can take place. A few MAW groups have stated the importance of having informal meetings in addition to formal ones. Having lunch together or once in a while going for a drink can be some good occasions for this. It is also clear that consistently having the same individuals represent their organisations at MAW meetings is very important, so participants really get to know each other. Regular changes in personnel would make this more difficult.

Bringing together people with different viewpoints can result in innovative plans and ideas. This can happen when MAW is used to tackle radicalisation. An integrated or holistic perspective on a person or situation can open up a whole new spectrum of possible measures. Having an insight into an individual's relationships, health, work or financial situation (protective factors) can open up space to think about possible opportunities for stronger commitment to the MAW, in a way that a focus only on risks might not. As one of the local coordinators commented:

> "Sometimes MAW can also be a spontaneous and atypical method to bring about change. For example in our city we started MAW on neighbourhood development together with social partners, and then you see that the whole bureaucratic logic of doing certain things in a certain way just falls apart."

If you have any doubts about the composition or operation of your network, take a look at our website. Here you will find some tools that can help you think about the partners in your network (only available in Dutch): Partners in het netwerk (vvsg.be).

9.4   The Coordinator as Bridge Builder (and Jack of All Trades?)

Good coordination (internal communication, planning and follow-up) starts with the role of the chair/coordinator, who must manage the interplay of personalities and content. They form the backbone of the MAW structure and must be strictly neutral regarding the organisation they represent and their (personal) preferences. This does not imply that the coordinator cannot have an input. On the contrary, the coordinator should continue to inspire those involved, and prevent meetings from degenerating into non-discussions or polarised debates. They must also direct the discussion and mediate when there is no consensus. The coordinator keeps in mind the general interest and the predefined objectives and

focuses on the added value of the multidisciplinary approach. However, neutrality is not always easy in practice, because the individual's professional role, for example as a local government employee, can affect their decisions and actions. In the Netherlands, the position of coordinator is usually given to a third party who manages the process, namely an employee of the regional care and security houses.

Local government employees who manage organisational networks must be well versed in many fields. Coordinators direct, monitor and report. They evaluate whether the right players with the right goals are at the table. At the same time, there is also the danger that the coordinator will assume a too dominant position. In practice, a coordinator often also takes on other roles in the MAW structure, as a reporter, a case registrar, a case manager (or someone who is responsible for the supervision and follow-up of the case), a case director (or person who supervises the follow-up of a case), a vision developer, a network promoter, etc. It might be assumed that giving a coordinator multiple roles is quite acceptable. But a good coordinator is not necessarily a good case manager. Nobody is good at everything, so it is relevant to think about what roles are included in the management of a network and what mandate the coordinator and other participants have. Mandates outline the boundaries within which the coordinator should move (the size and scope of the assignment) and their overall goals.

An interesting tool that can be used to check your position as a coordinator of your network is this one (only available in Dutch): Mijn positie als netwerkmanager (vvsg.be).

9.5   Keeping the Dialogue Open

It should be clear to everyone within the MAW scenario who plays which role and what this means in practice. It is therefore also recommended that the MAW structure determines in consensual consultation which roles are essential for the operation, defines the roles and entrusts them to concrete persons. Transparency is the key to this: this process should ideally be a joint one, the results of which could also be summarised in a 'cooperation protocol'. This does not have to mean that the roles are set in stone at the end of this process. On the contrary, the role definition should be continually reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted. We discussed this in more depth in Chapter 7 of this book.

Within our own EMMA network, participants were not always convinced of the added value of some kind of cooperation protocol. A local coordinator said about this:

"In our city we don't have a formal agreement yet. Everything is agreed informally and very organically. However, the process of making the formal agreement can often be more interesting than the agreement itself."

Most coordinators agree with the latter statement and indicate that a 'cooperation protocol' will only have real value if it is regularly reviewed, and not neatly

tucked away in a cupboard or something we can cross off our 'to do' list. It is necessary to maintain an open dialogue among the partners.

9.6 Balancing Interpersonal Trust and Sustainability

In practice, we find that the multi-agency forms of working that seem to be most effective are often networks where there is trust at the table. Not necessarily trust in the other actors who are present, but a sufficient level of trust to share information and knowing that this trust will not be damaged by the others around the table. Facilitating mutual trust is crucial in newly formed groups. Openness and equality in communication with everyone around the table contribute to this. Once trust has grown among partners, the lines of communication are often much shorter than before, and people contact each other when they need to or keep each other informed of new developments. Difficulties with information sharing and other barriers are largely overcome if agencies experience working together on the basis of trust (Sarma, 2019).

In some cities and municipalities, the aim at the start of the MAW cooperation was to establish a good relationship of trust with the police by tackling a number of issues together:

1. Taking joint courses and training on radicalisation.
2. Pairs of social workers and police officers reaching out to third parties such as parents or teachers.
3. Organising informal team-building activities by, for instance, giving someone from the police a desk at the local administration's office once a week (and/or vice versa).
4. Before or after the meetings, having an informal meeting with the actors at the table (breakfast, coffee or lunch).

Regardless of the tremendous importance of trust, there are some potential dangers in placing too much emphasis on interpersonal trust. Consider, first of all, mobility within the network. Suppose you have invested for years in facilitating trust at the table between the various actors, but at some point a central trusted figure leaves the network. In such cases, the network will probably have to re-evaluate itself and consider to what extent this role can be taken up again. And to what extent will a new person in the network have the necessary trust to take on the role?

> *"Changes in personnel can make the bond of trust more difficult. Time is needed to rebuild interpersonal trust."*

> (Respondent, EMMA questionnaire 2)

Certain agreements, especially informal ones, may not be taken over easily by the new person, possibly endangering the previously efficient informal functioning of the network. Also, when too much importance is attached to trust, a form of confirmation bias can arise in which it becomes more important to maintain trust at the table than to discuss the situation professionally.

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9.7   Conclusion

In this chapter, we have described a theme that has been much-discussed within our EMMA project. It is by no means easy to provide an appropriate response to the tension that naturally arises based on the way individuals view a phenomenon from their professional context. To conclude, let us summarise the four most important findings in this chapter:

Working together does not necessarily start with a unified vision, but with a clear view of the shared goals and target audience, and a shared understanding of the method being used and the ultimate impact to be achieved together.

A cross-cutting network like MAW does not benefit from a hierarchical relationship among partners, but needs a hands-on coordinator who knows the network fully and plays to its strengths.

A cooperation protocol with agreed rules can be a useful tool, as long as there is an open dialogue among the members about the content and observance of these rules. Evaluating this regularly with the network is important.

The partners do not have to trust each other blindly, but they do have to be convinced that the trust they have placed in each other will not be damaged.

9.8   References

Cousaert, P. & Briels, G. (2021). *Lokaal besturen in de genetwerkte samenleving. Over regie voeren en het opzetten van organisatienetwerken in lokaal sociaal beleid*. Uitgeverij Politeia nv.

Cousaert, P. & Briels, G. (2022). Mijn positie als netwerkmanager. https://www.vvsg.be/kennisitem/vvsg/mijn-positie-als-netwerkmanager

Sarma, K. (2019). *Multi-agency working and preventing violent extremism: Paper 2*. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/pages/page/multi-agency-working-and-preventing-violent-extremism-paper-ii-april-2019_en

10 Case Management and Information Sharing Within Multi-Agency Networks in the Field of P/CVE

Maarten De Waele and Katrien Van Mele

"Case management is the right tool because you look at those individuals and groups in the community with many different partners and through the lens of integrated security. Initially, our MAW was intended to discuss serious cases. Based on these experiences, we can now place more emphasis on prevention, on preventing illegal acts."

(Mayor of Kinrooi, Jo Brouns, 2022)

10.1 Introduction

Effective case management requires a process-oriented approach from registration to aftercare, in various steps. These steps are mostly not determined by law but have increased in practice. Information is exchanged at each of these steps. This happens constantly and at all stages of the process. At the start of a case, immediately after a notification, it is crucial to collect all relevant information, in order to make a good assessment of the situation. It is therefore important that information about both risk and protective factors is shared. In this chapter, we look at a number of crucial elements in case management.

10.2 Case Definition

In case management, it is noticeable that the biggest sources of discussion are registration and the closing of cases. Because discussions will be about preventive measures, i.e. prior to any possible future criminal behaviour, it is not always easy to determine whether or not signals of concern meet the theoretical or legal definition of 'radicalisation' or the 'prevention of terrorism'. Predictions of future behaviour are difficult to make. This is why the multi-agency approach to radicalisation often differs from other MAW approaches, such as the approach to domestic violence or to individuals with a long crime history. The latter often have a clearly defined, fixed definition of the problem, while the approach to radicalisation is often more fluid.

Radicalisation is often not an isolated phenomenon. So an individual who is radicalising should not be approached exclusively and automatically from the perspective of 'radicalism'. Practical experience teaches us that it is better not to stigmatise someone with the label 'radicalised person', especially in the early stages of radicalisation.

One respondent commented:

"I always think: don't push people in pre-crime situations into a registration that might be to their disadvantage in the future."

If there are clearly other phenomena at work (such as a problematic family situation or identity formation), it is best to use these problems as a way to approach the individual. Naming something that at that moment is still only nascent reinforces the potential drift towards violent radicalisation. Judging someone too quickly, and labelling them as radicalised, can all to easily lead to nominating them to be discussed in a MAW structure. This must be avoided at all costs.

In addition, radicalised individuals don't usually think of themselves as radicalised, so labelling them in that way can deter them from cooperating.

10.3 The (Mandated) Links Within the Chain

Links or participants in the MAW structure are representatives of various services or organisations that add value to the realisation of an intangible social product. A chain can only be fully closed when all links are part of the whole. This ensures that no further questions on the case (individual or group) remain unanswered (De Groof et al., 2015).

Before the start of MAW, it is important that the participants in the MAW structure and colleagues from their organisation/institution who don't sit at the MAW table are able to spot signs in time and know how to act on them. Informative activities about support and signalling can be organised so that they receive sufficient support, are aware of the situation, are able to ask questions and know where to turn if they pick up signals (Van Broeckhoven, 2015). Local coordinators must therefore consider: Who will participate in the consultation and in what capacity? Does the participant take on the role as a representative of their facility or sector, or do they mainly bring their own voice to the debate? Is the participant mandated by their organisation/department to take decisions? To what extent do they have to give feedback first? By which regulations are the attending members bound (Cocon Vilvoorde vzw, 2017)?

When forming a MAW group, it is crucial to clarify which organisation each member represents. Facilitating mutual trust is crucial in newly formed groups. Openness and equality in communication between everyone around the table contribute to this. How members view the problem, and how they dealt with relevant situations they have already faced are also important aspects. Well-informed partners and a definition of each other's roles creates a stronger network, and clarifies individuals' responsibility and the credibility of (the members in) the network.

In addition to the MAW participants, it is important to include the broader network. The group of professionals who are supposed to be able to pick up signs of radicalisation is a lot bigger than the group who actually take part in MAW case meetings. These front-line workers are closest to the public and have the best feel for what is going on in the local population. They are the eyes and ears in the local

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community, and can alert the MAW participants to local tensions and possible hot spots.

10.4 Quality Assessment

Each case is unique and requires a bespoke approach. Careful assessment and the qualification of a case are crucial in determining the right approach. Currently, most case consultations work as follows: the information submitted by one party is supplemented as far as possible by additional information from other parties, a discussion is held, and a decision is taken as to which approach is to be applied or not.

However, we also notice that MAW groups are looking for ways to quantify discussions or make them more objective. Some MAW groups choose to use some form of predetermined criteria. A criteria-based structure can help to support the assessment of cases with greater objectivity. By this we mean a tool that helps to visualise the different aspects of a case. This tool often includes a set of questions, analysing various life domains of an individual. There are two major categories:

- **Risk assessment tools:** These assess the extent to which an individual still poses a threat to society or themself. An example is the VERA 2R tool, which is mainly used in a detention context to assess the risk of relapse or recidivism.
- **Screening instruments:** These do not have the immediate objective of identifying the security risk of an individual. Rather, the aim is to find out which individual strengths and vulnerabilities are already known and which information is still missing, in order to obtain a better picture of the individual.

In addition, some MAW groups have developed a scale or radicalisation continuum that is based on their own needs and suited to a specific local context. This may be a catalogue of criteria against which a case is assessed or a discussion guide that gives the case consultation a clear and uniform structure.

MAW can also use instruments that support analysis. The RAN paper on social diagnostics (Ruf and Walkenhorst, 2021) reports on some potentially interesting materials, including a qualitative analysis. Social diagnostics systematically collect, analyse and interpret data on a certain individual. Like medical diagnostics, social diagnostics assess an individual, his or her internal state, social position, social context and all categories of factors relevant to radicalisation and deradicalisation. The RAN paper cites a number of methods used in social diagnostics:

- **Network maps:** A visual representation of the individual and his/her social environment, which may help MAW actors assess existing relationships.
- **Biographical timelines:** These may help identify pivotal moments in a person's life and understand the challenges and subjective narratives of their biographies.

- **Inclusion charts:** These can be used to explore the relationship an individual has with society, without ascribing personality traits or characteristics.

These forms (tools, scales and analytic instruments) are all intended to ensure that the participants in a case consultation speak a 'shared language' and that a verification of all the elements of a case that are considered crucial is possible. This forms the basis for an objective assessment of the case.

10.5   Beware of Tunnel Vision

An important point of attention for MAW is made by Groen et al. (2017) in their book on the approach of Family Justice Centres. They point out a potential danger that, in a chain approach, excessive attention is often paid to dealing with absolute high-risk situations. This creates a potential bias of over-estimating a phenomenon. The added value of a chain approach is to draw lessons from urgent cases to develop strong preventive and proactive actions in the context of security in the family, prevention of violent radicalisation, etc.

10.6   Closing Cases

Closing a case is not easy. From the viewpoints of both security and care, it is crucial to have a rough picture of the history of clients or individuals who are to be followed up. However, from the moment there are no longer any concerns about the individual in the context of radicalisation, the reason to discuss an individual in the MAW consultation group is also removed.

Many local coordinators have indicated that it is generally easier to get onto the list of allegedly radicalised persons than to be removed from it. There seems to be an overall lack of hard criteria on when to close a case, and a widespread fear that positive developments might be reversed in the future (a fear of 'letting go'). A respondent in the EMMA project stated that the way we look at case closure today can often be problematic:

"The closing of a case is rather an assessment that no further assistance is needed at the time of the decision and not a guarantee for lifelong deradicalisation."

He expressed his believe that cases deserve the benefit of the doubt.

Regardless of how we look at this decision, it will always be a fraught one. As stated earlier, these are often pre-crime situations where it is extremely difficult to make predictions about future behaviour, and where nothing can guarantee that individuals or groups will refrain from illegal actions.

In the EMMA network, ways were identified that could help MAW structures to make this choice. U-Turn Dortmund, for example, pointed out that they would like to see three questions answered positively when considering how the success of a particular follow-up or guidance service can be measured:

The individual who is the subject of the case:

1. joins a (peer) group that is not connected with radical groups;
2. is willing to reflect critically on ideology;
3. is willing to rethink the role that she/he played in a radical context.

10.7 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, we list the most important elements for the success of case management, a task that is by no means easy and where adjustment and adapting to new circumstances is crucial:

Find a shared language about how you view the phenomenon, with an understanding of both the safety and care perspective.

It is crucial that all life domains of the individual are covered by the partners in the chain. Test whether your network succeeds by doing a network analysis of your MAW group.

Consider the use of supporting tools that make the assessment process at the table more objective, including when it comes to closing cases.

Be aware that in a MAW structure you will only see a certain proportion of cases (high-risk ones). Therefore, avoid over-reaction in your approach to the phenomenon.

Evaluate your work critically and be aware of new evolution in the field.

10.8 References

Cocon Vilvoorde vzw. (2017). *Project R. Naar een multi-agency approach in Vilvoorde in het kader van een preventieve aanpak inzake radicalisering*. https://www.kennisplein.be/Documents/Draaiboek Project R.pdf

De Groof, K., Stas, K., Blow, H., & Brepoels, P. (2015). *Ketenaanpak bij familiaal geweld: rol en positie van de hulpverlening. Handboek familiaal geweld*. Uitgeverij Politeia nv.

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General Conclusions

The EMMA project combined research-based knowledge with practice knowledge, creating a network of practitioners and experts. Based on our work with MAW structures in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, a self-evaluation tool for local practitioners (EMMASCAN) has been developed that is flexible to use and widely applicable across different multi-agency working structures in Europe.

MAW approaches vary in terms of legislation (e.g. on information sharing), structure (e.g. level of organisation, key actors), procedures (e.g. case management) and goals (e.g. target groups, role and function). Despite the geographical proximity of the three countries, there is not one general MAW approach in the field of P/CVE. However, the project has demonstrated that MAW approaches can effectively identify individuals and communities at risk of radicalisation and violent extremism, at an early stage.

Despite local, regional and national differences in how MAW structures operate, the project identified standard ways in which MAW networks can be structured, organised and interpreted. Two key factors in successful MAW networks are structured meetings with an agenda, and having a neutral chair/coordinator. Building and maintaining trust are key collaboration process elements. The involvement of as many relevant actors from different sectors as possible (whether ad hoc or regular), and ensuring the well-being of the MAW actors, are two external opportunities. If MAW networks continue to focus on trust and well-structured MAW meetings, the maximum can be obtained from these opportunities. If external partners from other sectors also experience trust, cooperation can improve. For example, in the structure of the MAW meeting, consideration should be given to participants' wellbeing.

MAW requires a clear view of the shared goals and target audience, and a shared understanding of the method being used and the ultimate impact that those involved wish to achieve. A cooperation protocol with shared agreements can be a useful tool, as long as there is open dialogue among the members about the content and observance of these agreements. Evaluating this regularly with the network will improve the working relationship and make it sustainable. Trust needs to be built by convincing all parties of the added value of exchange.

A MAW network's own strengths need to be reinforced, in order to build a safe space for trust building and to create a strong environment for exchange that can absorb external threats. One of the biggest threats during the EMMA project was the switch to online meetings due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This had a serious negative impact on the functioning of the MAW networks. The online meetings created a feeling of distance between participants which was detrimental to an informal and intimate atmosphere. Another external threat is the constant changes in society and new forms of radicalisation and violent extremism. Good collaboration, trust and sufficient expertise can ensure that these challenges can be properly anticipated and met.

The presence of actors from different sectors adds value to MAW structures. A lack of clear common goals, shortage of resources, and some actors acting out of self-interest are all potential weaknesses. The dominance of certain actors and subtle tensions between participants can be considered an internal weakness in some MAW structures.

Potential weaknesses can be tackled by using the opportunities the MAW networks possess. A weakness in all three countries was the legal status of information sharing related to professional secrecy and/or the secrecy of the investigation and/or the de facto resistance to share information. A shortage of resources (time, money and people) could also be observed as a general problem. The presence of other sectors than the public services can create new insights and relationships but also calls for an extra (innovative) effort with regard to the legal status and trust building. This could provide inventive and innovative ways of thinking or solutions and address problems with professional secrecy or secrecy of the investigation. It is important to find the balance between nice-to-know and need-to-know information, to make MAW effective and efficient.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to multi-agency working. The approach is usually tailored to the local context. The local context has an impact on many aspects of MAW in this field, including whether to have an individual tailored approach per case, setting general objectives, target group and strategies, deciding what actors to include in the partnership, etc.

More research is needed into the roles of actors, and who to include in the MAW approach. An important finding is that there is a difference in the set-up of MAW structures and in their focus. Whereas in most of the included cities in Belgium and the Netherlands work was done on a case management level, in most of the German cities that were examined the work was more focused on general local tendencies and developments in communities. The self-evaluation tool EMMASCAN takes this into account and was created with modules that can be adapted according to the focus of the MAW structure.

The project also demonstrated that formalisation procedures can help to achieve continuous improvement and development of MAW structures. Documenting common goals as well as rules of procedures and working processes can help to keep track of the initial goal in the long run. In everyday work, it can be helpful to refer to the goal agreements regularly, and check whether the approach is still being directed towards them. Formalising MAW networks can help to lower dependency on individual actors such as the initiator or coordinator, avoid a concentration of knowledge in specific individuals and support the integration of new members. It is important to define a shared language on the phenomenon of violent extremism, with a mutual understanding of both the safety and care perspectives. It is also crucial that different domains are covered by the partners in the MAW.

In order to sustain efforts over the long term, a strong basis for multi-agency cooperation is required. The MAW actors must have up-to-date knowledge of the most relevant trends in radicalisation leading to violent extremism. This can be done through training and/or by adding new members from relevant organisations. Most importantly, a continuously re-evaluation of the MAW

structure is required. EMMASCAN helps in this respect by supporting local practitioners' evaluation of their MAW structure. The exchange of information between local practitioners can be considered an important second pillar of knowledge, alongside scientific research. This knowledge exchange may be within a country, but equally can be international.

To conclude, the practice-based elements of this project confirmed what was discovered through the review of scientific literature – that there is a strong need for scientific evaluations of multi-agency approaches in the field of P/CVE. EMMA is one among several different evaluation initiatives and projects. Evaluation results and knowledge on this topic should continue to be shared and knowledge exchange must be encouraged.

Appendix 1: Literature Included in the Systematic Literature Review

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
E01	Y	Bjørgo & Magnæs Gjelsvik	2015	Norwegian research on the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism: A status of knowledge	ENG	Report	Expert
E02	Y	D'Hondt et al.	2019	Van start-up naar scale-up. De veiligheidsketen in de praktijk: multi-agency samenwerkingsvormen	NL	Report	Expert
E04	Y	European Forum for Urban Security	2020	PRACTICIES: Partnership against violent radicalisation in cities (a group of European cities work together to prevent violent radicalisation)	ENG	Report	Expert
E06	Y	Ranstorp	2018	Developing a local prevent framework and guiding principles: Part 2	ENG	Report	Expert
E07	Y	Cocon-Vilvoorde	2017	Project R. Naar een multi-agency-approach in Vilvoorde in het kader van een preventieve aanpak inzake radicalisering	NL	Report	Expert
E08	Y	Jamine & Fadil	2019	Tussen preventie en veiligheid. De Belgische aanpak in de strijd tegen radicalisering (onderzoeksrapport)	NL	Report	Expert
E10	Y	Sarma	2018	Multi-agency working and preventing violent extremism I	ENG	Report	Expert

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
E11	Y	Winterbotham	2020	How effective are mentorship interventions?	ENG	Report	Expert
G01	Y	Aldrich & Mahabir	2019	Countering violent extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: An evaluation	ENG	Publication	SSRN
G02	Y	Roberts	2018	Detecting radicalisation in communities: The role of multi-agency partnership and the power of local information	ENG	Report	SSRN
G03	Y	Geleerde Lessen Sleutelfiguren	2019	Geleerde Lessen Sleutelfiguren	NL	Manual	Website screening
G04	Y	Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit	2018	Samen werken aan preventie van polarisatie en radicalisering	NL	Manual	Website screening
G05 +G06	Y	Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit	2015	Format Quickscan lokale (preventieve) aanpak radicalisering + Format Quickscan lokale (preventieve) aanpak radicalisering – toelichting vragen	NL	Tool	Website screening
G08	Y	Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit	2015	Quickscan Radicalisering en Maatschappelijke Spanningen. Een verkennend onderzoek onder gemeenten naar lokale problematiek, beleid en behoeften	NL	Report	Website screening
G09	Y	van Ham et al.	2016	Radicalisering in de gemeente Arnhem. Resultaten van onderzoek onder mentoren, welzijnswerkers en jongeren.	NL	Book	Website screening

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
G11	Y	Feddes & Gallucci	2015	Literature review on methodology used in evaluating effects of preventive and de-radicalisation interventions	ENG	Publication	Website screening
	Y	Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit	2019	Geleerde lessen Multidisciplinair casusoverleg	NL	Webpage	Website screening
G15	Y	van Wonderen	2019	Van polarisatie naar verbinding in buurten	NL	Manual	Website screening
G16	Y	Global Counterterrorism Forum	NA	Good practices on community engagement and community-oriented policing as tools to counter violent extremism	ENG	Report	Website screening
G17	Y	Köhler	2017	Structural quality standards for work to intervene with and counter violent extremism	ENG	Report	Website screening
G20	Y	Radicalisation Awareness Network	2016	Joint meeting RAN POL and RAN LOCAL: Who is in charge?	ENG	Report	Website screening
G21	Y	National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism	2018	Evaluation of Forsa and the Family Support Centre	ENG	Report	Website screening
G24	Y	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	2018	The role of civil society in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism	ENG	Report	Website screening

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
G25	Y	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	2020	Non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism	ENG	Report	Website screening
G27	Y	Gssime	2019	Individual case management	ENG	Report	Website screening
G28	Y	Radicalisation Awareness Network	2016	How to set up a multi-agency structure that includes the health and social care sectors?	ENG	Manual	Website screening
G30	Y	Meines & Woltman	2016	How to create local networks?	ENG	Manual	Website screening
G31	Y	Radicalisation Awareness Network	2016	Working group meeting: Multi-agency cooperation	ENG	Report	Website screening
G34	Y	Meines & Woltman	2017	Local action plan academy	ENG	Report	Website screening
G35	Y	Radicalisation Awareness Network	2017	Cooperation between local authorities and schools in multi-agency interventions and the prevention of radicalisation	ENG	Report	Website screening
G37	Y	Lenos & Keltjens	2017	The role for police officers in multi-agency working and information sharing	ENG	Report	Website screening
G38	Y	Lenos & Haanstra	2017	The role of police officers in dealing with jihadist returnees	ENG	Report	Website screening

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
G39	Y	Van der Velden & Krasenberg	2018	Embedding social and health care workers into institutional structures	ENG	Report	Website screening
G40	Y	Haanstra	2018	Engaging with communities: Collaboration between local authorities and communities in PVE	ENG	Manual	Website screening
G41	Y	Terra Toolkit	2015	TERRA toolkit: Beleidsadvies gemeenten	NL	Manual	Website screening
G42	Y	Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap & Ministerie van Volkgsgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport	2017	Weerbare jongeren, weerbare professionals	NL	Report	Website screening
G43	Y	Holdaway & Simpson	2018	Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation	ENG	Tool	Website screening
G49	Y	Gssime & Meines	2019	Strasbourg's P/CVE approach and its multiagency partners	ENG	Report	Website screening
G50	Y	Sarma	2018	Multi-agency working and preventing violent extremism I	ENG	Report	Website screening

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
G52	Y	Canters & van de Donk	2019	Building bridges	ENG	Report	Website screening
G53	Y	Meijer & Broekhuizen	2017	Samenwerken met sleutelfiguren bij het tegengaan van radicalisering	NL	Report	Website screening
G54	Y	Meijer et al.	2018	Voedingsbodems voor radicalisering in Zwolle: Prevalentie en implicaties voor beleid	NL	Report	Website screening
G55	Y	Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie	2017	Evaluatie van het actieprogramma integrale aanpak Jihadisme	NL	Report	Website screening
G56	Y	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten	2015	De rol van gemeenten in de aanpak van radicalisering	NL	Report	Website screening
G57	Y	Radicalisation Awareness Network	2019	Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: Approaches and practices	ENG	Report	Website screening
G58	Y	Keijzer & van de Donk	2019	Management of exit programmes	ENG	Report	Website screening
G59	Y	Krasenberg & Gssime	2019	Taking mental health insights into account in local P/CVE	ENG	Report	Website screening
G60	Y	Sterkenburg et al.	2019	Local-level management of far-right extremism	ENG	Report	Website screening

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
G62	Y	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten	2015	Handvaten voor een lokale aanpak van radicalisering	NL	Report	Website screening
G63	Y	De Waele	2018	Hoe een lokale integrale veiligheidscel uitbouwen?	NL	Book	Website screening
G64	Y	Sarma	2019	Multi-agency working and preventing violent extremism: Paper 2	ENG	Report	Website screening
G65	Y	van de Donk et al.	2020	Peer and self review manual for exit work	ENG	Tool	Website screening
G68	Y	Bjørgo & Smit	2020	Lessons from crime prevention in preventing violent extremism by police	ENG	Report	Website screening
S01	Y	Neumann et al.	2015	Countering violent extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice	ENG	Report	Snowball
S02	Y	van der Heide & Schuurman	2018	Re-integratie van delinquenten met een extremistische achtergrond. Evaluatie van de Nederlandse aanpak	NL	Report	Snowball
S03	Y	Uhlmann	2017	Evaluation of the Advice Centre on Radicalisation: Final report	ENG	Report	Snowball

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
S06	Y	Stone	2015	The outcome of a long process: Tracking terrorist rehabilitation and the beginning of a longer one — implementing best practices in regional contexts	ENG	Book	Snowball
S08	Y	Schuurman & Bakker	2016	Reintegrating jihadist extremists: Evaluating a Dutch initiative, 2013–2014	ENG	Publication	Snowball
S09	Y	van der Heide & Schuurman	2018	Reintegrating terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch approach	ENG	Publication	Snowball
S12	Y	Bhulai	2017	Supporting community-based initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism in South and Central Asia	ENG	Report	Snowball
S13	Y	Royal United Services Institute	2016	CVE practitioner workshop: Opportunities and challenges for civil society in pushing back against violent extremism	ENG	Report	Snowball
S14	Y	Universiteit Utrecht & Universiteit Leiden	2018	Quickscan Amsterdamse Aanpak Radicalisering en Terrorisme	NL	Report	Snowball
S15	Y	Lenos & Smit	2019	What role do police play in the resocialisation and risk management of released former terrorist offenders?	ENG	Report	Snowball
S16	Y	Christensen & Bjørgo	2018	How to manage returned foreign fighters and other Syria travellers?	ENG	Report	Snowball

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
S17	Y	Cherney	2018	The release and community supervision of radicalized offenders: Issues and challenges that can influence reintegration	ENG	Publication	Snowball
S19	Y	Colaert	2017	Deradicalisering. Wetenschappelijke inzichten voor een Vlaams Beleid	NL	Book	Snowball
S20	Y	Ranstorp et al.	2016	Preventing and countering violent extremism: An initial rapid evidence assessment and analysis plan examining local authority action plans and programming elements	ENG	Report	Snowball
S27	Y	Global Solutions Exchange	2017	Innovations in civil society and other locally-led efforts to prevent violent extremism	ENG	Other	Snowball
S28	Y	Global Counterterrorism Forum	2016	Initiative to address the life cycle of radicalization to violence: The role of families in preventing and countering violent extremism: Strategic recommendations and programming Options	ENG	Report	Snowball
S29	Y	Molenkamp & Wouterse	2018	Triple P: Coordination and collaboration between police, prison and probation services in dealing with violent extremist and terrorist offenders	ENG	Report	Snowball

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
S31	Y	Carmi & Gianfrancesco	2017	Identifying the strengths and gaps in multi-agency responses to vulnerable adolescents at risk of exploitation through radicalisation	ENG	Report	Snowball
S32	Y	Sestoft et al.	2017	The police, social services, and psychiatry (PSP) cooperation as a platform for dealing with concerns of radicalization	ENG	Publication	Snowball
S34	Y	Eurocities	2016	City responses on preventing radicalisation and violent extremism: Social inclusion as a tool?	ENG	Report	Snowball
S37	Y	The Expert Group to Prevent Radicalisation	2016	Less radicalisation through an effective and coherent effort: Recommendations of the Expert Group to Prevent Radicalisation	ENG	Report	Snowball
S38	Y	Muslim Public Affairs Council	2015	Safe spaces: An updated toolkit for empowering communities and addressing ideological violence	ENG	Tool	Snowball
S39	Y	Romaniuk	2015	Does CVE work? Lessons learned from the global effort to counter violent extremism	ENG	Report	Snowball
S40	Y	Weine et al.	2015	Lessons learned from mental health and education: Identifying best practices for addressing violent extremism	ENG	Report	Snowball
S42	Y	Cherney & Hartley	2017	Community engagement to tackle terrorism and violent extremism: Challenges, tensions and pitfalls	ENG	Publication	Snowball

ID	Incl	Main author	Year	Title	Lang.	Type	Retrieved from
W01	Y	Amadeo & Iannone	2016	Successful public–private partnerships: The NYPD shield model	ENG	Publication	WoS/ Scopus
W05	Y	Cherney	2020	Evaluating interventions to disengage extremist offenders: A study of the proactive integrated support model (PRISM)	ENG	Publication	WoS/ Scopus
W15	Y	Stephens & Sieckelinck	2019	Working across boundaries in preventing violent extremism: Towards a typology for collaborative arrangements in PVE policy	ENG	Publication	WoS/ Scopus
W17	Y	Weine et al.	2017	Violent extremism, community-based violence prevention, and mental health professionals	ENG	Publication	WoS/ Scopus

Appendix 2: Screened Websites (Grey Literature Search)

	Link	Region	Date of search	Why searched?	Identified publications
1	Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit (ESS)	NL	23/03/2020	Recommended by expert	6
2	Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving	NL	26/03/2020	Partner of ESS	3
3	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	2
4	Stichting School en Veiligheid (SSV)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
5	Wegwijzer Jeugd en Veiligheid	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
6	Rijksopleidingsinstituut tegengaan Radicalisering (ROR)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
7	Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	2
8	Landelijk Steunpunt Extremisme (LSE)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	1
9	Oumniaworks	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
10	Meldmisdaadanoniem	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
11	Gemeente Amsterdam	NL	23/03/2020	Found on ESS website	0
12	Movisie Kennis en Aanpak van Sociale Vraagstukken	NL	23/03/2020	Found on ESS website	1
13	Verwey-Jonker Instituut	NL	23/03/2020	Found on ESS website	3
14	Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkaanse Nederlanders (SMN)	NL	23/03/2020	Found on ESS website	0 (website error)
15	Hulplijn radicalisering	NL	23/03/2020	Found on ESS website	0 (website error)
16	Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0

	Link	Region	Date of search	Why searched?	Identified publications
17	Ministerie van Binnenlandse zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (BZK)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
18	Ministerie van volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (VWS)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
19	Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap (OCW)	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0
20	Exits	NL	23/03/2020	Partner of ESS	0 (website error)
21	RadarAdvies	NL	23/03/2020	Partner in EMMA project	0
22	VVSG	BE	02/04/2020	Partner in EMMA project	2
23	VPN	DE	02/04/2020	Partner in EMMA project	1
24	RAND	Global	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	0
25	RAN	EU	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	33
26	International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)	NL	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	0
27	UNODC	Global	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	0
28	CONRAD	BE	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	0
29	Movisie	NL	03/04/2020	Found on website KIS	1
30	SPIOR	NL	03/04/2020	Found on website KIS	0
31	Terratoolkit	EU	03/04/2020	Found on Stichting School en Veiligheid (SSV) website	1
32	AIVD	NL	03/04/2020	Found on website SSV	0
33	Nederlands Jeugdinstituut	NL	03/04/2020	Found on website SSV	0

	Link	Region	Date of search	Why searched?	Identified publications
34	Centrum voor criminaliteitspreventie en veiligheid (CCV)	NL	03/04/2020	Found on Wegwijzer jeugd en veiligheid website	0

35	Steunpunt GGZ (Parnassia groep)	BE	03/04/2020	Found on Wegwijzer jeugd en veiligheid website	0
36	Bureau Beke	BE	03/04/2020	Found on Wegwijzer jeugd en veiligheid website	1
37	Platform JEP	NL	03/04/2020	Found on Wegwijzer jeugd en veiligheid website	1
38	Vlaanderen – Portaal Preventie van Gewelddadige Radicalisering en Polarisering	BE	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	0
39	Impact Europe	EU	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	1
40	GIRDS	DE	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	1
41	Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)	Global	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	1
42	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)	EU	03/04/2020	Recommended by expert	2

Appendix 3: Good Practice Indicators

Approach

Integration of local context	
The approach targets specific risk and trigger factors that are present in the local context	no / partially / yes
Tools are used to identify triggers for radicalisation in the local context	no / partially / yes
The local approach is in line with the forms of radicalisation present in the region	no / partially / yes
The local approach forms an answer to the specific problems that arise in the region	no / partially / yes

Theoretical basis	
The approach of the network is based on the latest scientific evidence/research	no / partially / yes
The approach of the network was reviewed by an external expert or experienced practitioner	no / partially / yes

Integration of protective factors	
The approach is targeted towards enforcing protective factors	no / partially / yes

Levels of action	
The approach is targeted on the:	
Individual level	no / partially / yes
Level of the social network (direct environment of the family)	no / partially / yes
Level of the community/group	no / partially / yes

Holistic and integrated approach

Are actors in the social sector *(care, education, mental health)* trained in recognising signals of radicalisation?	no / partially / yes
Are actors in the social sector aware of the topic of radicalisation in their community?	no / partially / yes
Are security actors aware of what role the social sector can play in tackling radicalisation?	no / partially / yes
Does the region have a strong and well-functioning networks with actors that (can) play a role in prevention *(e.g. youth work, school, care, community workers)*?	no / partially / yes

Case Management

Case management system

Is there an effective case management system in place for registration and reception of cases?	no / partially / yes
Is there a system/procedure in place for categorisation of cases?	no / partially / yes
Is there a procedure in place for closure of a case?	no / partially / yes
Does follow-up take place after closing a case, to address positive and negative aspects?	no / partially / yes

Case documentation system

Is there an effective case documentation system?	no / partially / yes
Do members keep a ratio of closed an uncompleted cases as quality standards?	no / partially / yes

Planning of tailored actions

Is the approach tailored to the outcome of the case risk analysis?	no / partially / yes
Is the approach tailored to the individual concerned *(e.g. individual action plan)*?	no / partially / yes
Are objectives defined in the plan of action?	no / partially / yes

Is there a clearly defined end to the action after the attainment of the objectives?	no / partially / yes

Transparency at case reception

Is (at least) oral consent for the transmission of personal data obtained at the first consultation/contact?	no / partially / yes
Is it clear to the individuals which personal data may have to be transmitted to which bodies?	no / partially / yes
Is it clear to the individuals what actions can be expected?	no / partially / yes

Collaboration

Connecting/Investing time in the professional relationship among members

Does or did the MAW structure receive time and opportunities to develop and grow in 'quiet' times/times of 'peace'?	no / partially / yes
How long did the team exist before engaging in (de)radicalisation actions?	… years/months
Or did a successful network exist in the past with the same actors?	no / partially / yes
Are there opportunities for informal networking between the MAW members *(e.g. lunches, receptions)*?	no / partially / yes
Are investments made in building relationships between the actors *(e.g. introductory meeting to become acquainted, involvement of the actors in regional events)*?	no / partially / yes

Mutual trust

Are actors willing to be open and honest when sharing information?	no / partially / yes
Do the actors trust each other to share information among each other?	no / partially / yes

Continuity		
	Are the MAW meetings held frequently and on a structural basis?	no / partially / yes
	Or is there a history of staff turnover?	no / partially / yes
	Are all actors informed when the composition of the network changes?	no / partially / yes
	Is any change in composition of the network the result of a mutual decision?	no / partially / yes

Networking		
	Does the MAW structure make use of already existing networks and collaborations?	no / partially / yes

Positive climate		
	Are actors in the MAW structure:	
	Flexible?	no / partially / yes
	Easily accessible?	no / partially / yes
	Engaged in and motivated about the MAW activities?	no / partially / yes
	Culturally sensitive?	no / partially / yes
	Are more quiet members of the MAW structure heard as well?	no / partially / yes
	Is workload monitored for the MAW actors?	no / partially / yes
	Or is there a risk for overload for several MAW actors?	no / partially / yes
	Does the local government in the MAW structure take the role of:	
	Director *(stimulating collaboration, coordinating, monitoring)*?	no / partially / yes
	Facilitator *(supporting and facilitating the role of the network, provision of financial resources and training, making contact with other network)*?	no / partially / yes
	Participant *(attending meetings, close communication)*?	no / partially / yes
	Do the values and beliefs of the individual actors concur with the MAW structure's objective?	no / partially / yes
	Do members feel involved and have a positive feeling towards achieving the MAW structure's objectives?	no / partially / yes

Are members open to constructive criticism and feedback from others?	no / partially / yes
Do members distinguish between constructive and destructive criticism and feedback?	no / partially / yes
Do personal or organisational interests/gains take precedence over achieving the MAW objectives *(e.g. promotions within their organisation)*?	no / partially / yes
Is it possible for caseworkers to enlist psychological support if they need it?	no / partially / yes

Hierarchy/power

Is there a horizontal relationship between actors rather than a hierarchical one?	no / partially / yes
Or do some actors have more power over others?	no / partially / yes

Recognition

Does the city/local government invest in public recognition and appreciation of the MAW structure?	no / partially / yes
Is there clear interest from the mayor/local government in the MAW structure?	no / partially / yes

Expertise

Local context

Are actors aware of the sensitivities and tensions between communities?	no / partially / yes
Are actors aware of the specific local problems, grievances and risk factors in the region?	no / partially / yes
Are actors aware of the types of radicalisation that play in their region?	no / partially / yes

Continuity		
	Is the know-how spread across multiple actors in the MAW ?	no / partially / yes

Sharing		
	Does the MAW have access to expertise from other networks?	no / partially / yes
	Is the MAW aware of existing information and expertise that is available for communities *(e.g. from expertise centres such as ESS, LSE)*?	no / partially / yes
	Can MAW actors learn from each other?	no / partially / yes
	Is the MAW team multidisciplinary with complementary and mutually beneficial knowledge and expertise	no / partially / yes
	Or does the expertise of the team overlap?	no / partially / yes
	Do actors actively share knowledge and expertise to enable all parties to learn from each other?	no / partially / yes
	Can the MAW team rely on the expertise of a pool of experts, if specific expertise is required that the team does not possess?	no / partially / yes

Team expertise		
	Is the necessary expertise present in the team to be able to fulfil their general mission?	no / partially / yes
	Can MAW actors distinguish community cultural, societal and religious behaviour from potential criminal and violent extremist indicators and behaviours?	no / partially / yes
	Do team leaders and senior members possess appropriate experience and knowledge?	no / partially / yes
	Are MAW actors aware of ethical guidelines and behaviour?	no / partially / yes
	Do MAW actors possess the necessary specific (content) knowledge on relevant types of radicalisation *(e.g. jihadism, extremism)*?	no / partially / yes
	Do MAW actors possess the necessary experience, skills or knowledge on case management?	no / partially / yes
	Do MAW actors possess collaboration skills?	no / partially / yes

Do MAW actors possess the necessary experience, skills or knowledge on local risk assessment and context mapping?	no / partially / yes
Do MAW actors possess the necessary communicative skills?	no / partially / yes
Do MAW actors know each other's roles and functions?	no / partially / yes
Are MAW actors culturally sensitive?	no / partially / yes
Is the recruitment of new actors undertaken according to the relevant experience and expertise of the candidate?	no / partially / yes

Professionalisation/training

Are investments made in the training and professionalisation of the MAW team?	no / partially / yes
Is training organised on a regular basis?	no / partially / yes
Are training methods and materials often updated and revised to keep up with new developments?	no / partially / yes
Is the staff training in line with the latest research?	no / partially / yes
Are efforts made to provide support for new team members?	no / partially / yes
Is the emphasis of training on knowledge as well as practical skills?	no / partially / yes
Are actors aware of each other's needs for professionalisation/training?	
Is it clear what expertise is lacking for whom?	no / partially / yes
Is training tailored to the different needs of the actors?	no / partially / yes

Professionalisation/training (external)

Are information moments/moments to promote expertise around (reporting possible signals of) radicalisation organised for:	
The direct environment: peers and parents?	no / partially / yes
Frontline workers?	no / partially / yes
Professionals?	no / partially / yes

Communities?		no / partially / yes
Are relevant actors in the social domain *(e.g. in care, education, wellbeing)* trained in recognising signals of radicalisation?		no / partially / yes

Information Sharing

Bottom-up and top-down information sharing from externals to the MAW structure (information input)

Signalling structure

Is there a structure in place where signals or worries about radicalisation can be reported?		no / partially / yes
Are core (external) partners included in the signalling structure *(e.g. youth work, schools, social organisations)*?		no / partially / yes
Is there a primary point of contact appointed for questions and signals from the local partners?		
In the case of a smaller city/region: Is the MAW structure connected to a contact person from a larger municipality who fulfils a regional coordinating role?		no / partially / yes

Signalling procedure

Can information on problems in the area be safely shared, without endangering the relationship with the individual concerned?		no / partially / yes
Are there many (perceived) thresholds for sharing of signals or problems?		no / partially / yes
Or: Are thresholds for sharing of signals or problems kept to a minimum?		no / partially / yes
Are the contact person(s) highly accessible and easy to contact?		no / partially / yes
Can information on problems in the area be quickly shared?		no / partially / yes

Top-down communication /awareness among the general public

Is there communication with the general public, with a clear explanation of the actions, objectives and point of contact?	no / partially / yes
Do all actors use the same message when communicating about the actions to the general public?	no / partially / yes
Is the structure/procedure for information sharing known about by relevant partners *(care, education, community centres, religious institutions, sport centres, police, etc.)*?	no / partially / yes
Do relevant actors know where (or to whom) to report signals or worries about radicalisation?	no / partially / yes
Do relevant actors know when to report signals or worries about radicalisation?	no / partially / yes
Do relevant actors know what information to report in case of signals or worries about radicalisation?	no / partially / yes

Quality of information

Do signals reach the MAW structure on time?	no / partially / yes
Is the received information on problems/signals in the area clear and complete?	no / partially / yes

Transparency

Is it clear to those reporting signals what will be done with the reported information (processing)?	no / partially / yes
Is it clear to those reporting signals what feedback they can expect?	no / partially / yes
Is it clear to those reporting signals what information is shared with whom?	no / partially / yes

Within the MAW structure (between the MAW actors)

Agreements on information sharing

Is it clear to MAW actors:	no / partially / yes
When information needs to be shared (and when not)?	no / partially / yes
What information needs to be shared (and what not)?	no / partially / yes
Who informs and activates the other actors?	no / partially / yes
With whom the information is shared?	no / partially / yes
Who has access to what information and who does not?	no / partially / yes
How the information is shared (procedure)?	no / partially / yes
What will happen to the information and how/when it will be fed back (procedure)?	no / partially / yes
Are rules on the sharing of information specified in the MAW structure's privacy regulations or any other written form *(e.g. in local strategy or action plan)*?	no / partially / yes

Compliance to information sharing rules

Does the MAW structure comply with clear (national) basic principles and rules with regard to the sharing of information with third parties?	no / partially / yes

Neutral information sharing

Are interpretations of the reported facts avoided and clearly distinguished from facts?	no / partially / yes
Are signals contradicting the possible radicalisation discussed as well?	no / partially / yes
Is the information source reported?	no / partially / yes

Practical Conditions

Resources

Are there enough financial resources to be able to perform the action?	no / partially / yes
Are there enough human resources to be able to fulfil the MAW structure's mission?	no / partially / yes
Or are MAW actors sometimes overloaded?	no / partially / yes
Is there enough time to fulfil the MAW structure's mission?	no / partially / yes

Continuity

Can the long-term continuity of the programme be safeguarded?	no / partially / yes

Quality Assurance

Preparation/planning

Are (SMART) objectives and indicators identified that allow evaluation of the MAW structure's efficacy?	no / partially / yes
Is reflection/evaluation structurally embedded in the MAW structure?	no / partially / yes

Evaluation opportunities

Are there ad hoc moments of internal reflection on the MAW structure *(e.g. reviewing why a case was not successful)*?	no / partially / yes
Does follow-up/review of cases take place? *(Also see earlier under case management)*	no / partially / yes
Does an evaluation/reflection of the MAW structure take place periodically?	no / partially / yes

	Are staff assessed according to the quality of their work *(e.g. appraisals)*?	no / partially / yes
	Do the MAW actors know whether they are doing a good job and where they can improve?	
External evaluation opportunities		
	Are there opportunities for the community to evaluate the MAW structure?	no / partially / yes
	Do participants have the possibility to provide feedback *(participant satisfaction)*?	no / partially / yes
Implementation of learning		
	Are insights from evaluations communicated back to the process cycle?	no / partially / yes
	Or are no efforts made with the insights from evaluations?	no / partially / yes
Themes for evaluation		
	Does reflection/evaluation focus on outcomes *(e.g. n of successful/closed cases)* as well as process?	no / partially / yes
	Is the reflection/evaluation also focused on the way the team collaborates?	no / partially / yes

Structure

Composition of actors		
	Are all relevant partners identified and involved in the action?	no / partially / yes
	Is there a broad range of partners that allows all sectors of the regional society to be involved?	no / partially / yes
	Are community influencers involved in the MAW network (rather than formal community leaders only)?	no / partially / yes
	Is there diversity in the background of the actors *(e.g. psychological, theological)*?	no / partially / yes
	Is there diversity in the age of the actors?	no / partially / yes

Size

Does the size of the team allow for efficient collaboration?   no / partially / yes

Or is the team too cumbersome to be able to function well?	no / partially / yes
Or is the team too small (needing more or a wider variety of actors) to be able to fulfil their mission?	no / partially / yes

Vision

Clear vision

Is there a written description of the action, including a clear vision on radicalisation?	no / partially / yes
Are objectives and target groups of the action clearly defined?	no / partially / yes
Are tasks and activities of the network clearly defined?	no / partially / yes
Are tasks and roles of the network members clearly defined per actor?	no / partially / yes
Is it clearly described how the activities and tasks contribute to the aim(s)/objective(s) of the network?	no / partially / yes
Do members know where to find the vision document?	no / partially / yes
Are MAW members aware of the existence of a vision (document)?	no / partially / yes
Do members know what to expect from the other actors in the MAW?	no / partially / yes

Shared vision

Do members agree on and support the vision of the MAW?	no / partially / yes
Did members contribute to the development of the vision?	no / partially / yes
Did all members sign the vision document?	no / partially / yes

Appendix 4: Observation Protocol

Observation form

City/municipality: ....
Meeting name: ....
Date of observation: ...../....../...............

Observation:

Start: … ….
Interruptions (if any)
.... – .... (..... minutes)
.... – .... (..... minutes)
End: ....
Total observation duration: ....
minutes

Meeting:

Start: … ….
Interruptions (if any)
.... – .... (..... minutes)
.... – .... (..... minutes)
End: ....
Total meeting duration: ....
minutes

Setting (virtual/face-to-face)

Location: ....
Room size: ....
Special features? ....

Materials:

Screen	present/used	Handouts	present/used
Laptop/PC	present/used	....	present/used
Blackboard	present/used	....	present/used

Participants, N = ... (researcher not included) + **SETUP** (drawing of the setup with actor types indicated):

Police/security actor	Justice actor
Municipality actor	Expert actor
Social/wellbeing actor	Community/citizens
Health care	Researcher (UGent/VPN)
Youth & education	

Structured Meeting

Meeting start:

a) Does the chair speak a welcome word?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
b) Do participants have the chance to introduce themselves?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
c) Do they go over the agenda items before the start of the meeting?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
d) Are agreed rules made or repeated before the start of the meeting *(e.g. rules about secrecy, when to speak up,…)*?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
e) Is it decided who takes minutes? (Who is this? ....)	yes / somewhat / no / NA
f) Is there referral to (the) previous meeting(s) *(e.g. citing action points from previous meeting, short summary)*?	yes / somewhat / no / NA

Process

a) Is the background, importance and goal mentioned per agenda item?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
b) Is there room for everyone's input into the discussion?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
c) Are quiet participants encouraged to speak up?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
d) Is there ample opportunity for discussion and judgement-making?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
e) Does the chair take a neutral position?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
f) Is every item on the agenda summarised before moving on to the next?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
g) Do the participants interact in a respectful way with each other *(e.g. let each finish their sentences, friendly language, constructive criticism)*?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
h) Are ideas and opinions allowed without criticism or judgement?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
i) Does the discussion sometimes stray from the central agenda point/discussion?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
j) Is the discussion clear and structured (not chaotic)?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
k) Is it clear which tasks are assigned to whom?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
l) Does the chair create a pleasant atmosphere during the meeting?	yes / somewhat / no / NA

Meeting end

a) Do participants have the chance to share varia points (any other business)?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
b) Is the end of the meeting clearly marked *(e.g. final word from chair, thanks for attendance and cooperation)*?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
c) Are arrangements made for subsequent meetings *(e.g. specific date, location, points to add to next meeting's agenda)*?	yes / somewhat / no / NA
d) Is the time and progress of the agenda items monitored *(e.g. timely announcement to move on to next agenda item, timely end of discussion, meeting ends at planned time)*?	yes / somewhat / no / NA

Tallying

Refer to (shared) purpose:	Comment/input from actor around the table is ignored:
Refer to protocol or rules:	Joke/laughter:
Actor complements another actor with own expertise/knowledge/ experience:	Actor did not live up to the agreement/ follow-up didn't happen:
(Additional) information cannot be shared in the group:	Something else that is striking:
Expertise is lacking – to consult external party:	Something else that is striking:

Approach

Are certain tools/tools/thinking frameworks used?   yes / no / NA

If so, what are tools/tools/thinking frameworks used for? Specify each instrument (by name or by description).[1]

- (a) For case-management (general): …………………………………………...
- (b) To make a risk analysis of an individual (risk evaluation instrument): …………………………………………...
- (c) To make a risk analysis of the local context: …………………………………………...
- (d) To identify triggers of radicalisation: …………………………………………...
- (e) To show/illustrate theory: …………………………………………...………
- (f) G. Other: …………………………………………...…………...…………...…

Case Management

Were you allowed and able to observe the case management?   yes / no / NA[2]

Is there a fixed system or procedure in operation for categorisation of cases?   yes / somewhat / no

Is the closing of one or more cases discussed?   yes / somewhat / no

- (a) How many cases were eventually closed? ……….
- (b) How many cases were not closed after the meeting? (for follow-up) ……….

Rate the following questions/indicators for each discussed case in the table.

---

[1] VERA-2R, EU RAN Returnee 45 model, ERG22+, IR-46, TRAP 18, HCR20, IVP, MLG v2, SQAT, RRAP, VAF, Moghaddam staircase model, piramidemodel McCauley &Moskalenko, Model v Precht, Dynamic piramid model (Noppe), wheel of skills, etc.

[2] No = case management took place, but not observed. NVT = no case management took place

	Case 1	*Case 2*	*Case 3*	*Case 4*	*Case 5*	*Case 6*	*Case 7*	*Case 8*	*Case 9*

Case description

	Case 1	*Case 2*	*Case 3*	*Case 4*	*Case 5*	*Case 6*	*Case 7*	*Case 8*	*Case 9*
Short description of the case *(keywords, no names, anonymity)*									
Case origin: Which actor brings up the case?									
Theme: radicalisation? Or other?									
Is it a new case (N) or update of a known case (U)?									

	Case 1	*Case 2*	*Case 3*	*Case 4*	*Case 5*	*Case 6*	*Case 7*	*Case 8*	*Case 9*

Profiling

	Case 1	*Case 2*	*Case 3*	*Case 4*	*Case 5*	*Case 6*	*Case 7*	*Case 8*	*Case 9*
Does a thorough profiling of the individual take place?[1]									
Supplemental input from other actors (What? Who?)									
a) Primary need satisfaction (food and drink, health, physical limitations, subjective body experience, etc.)									

---

[1] By profession (a–e)?

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6	Case 7	Case 8	Case 9
b) Physical activity (safe/permanent residency, healthy material conditions, financial situation, etc.)									
c) Personal history (education, life events, caregiving history, psyche, etc.)									
d) Positively experienced day (school, work autonomy/self-determination, etc.)									

	Case 1	*Case 2*	*Case 3*	*Case 4*	*Case 5*	*Case 6*	*Case 7*	*Case 8*	*Case 9*
e) Self-image (realisations, future, self-confidence, coping style, etc.)									
f) Social inclusion (family connection, support, influence of loved ones, feeling part of a group, etc.)									

Intervention

Decided on a follow-up action?									
What is/are the follow-up action(s)?									

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6	Case 7	Case 8	Case 9
How was this decision made?									
Is this an *individual* (I) tailored action, or a *general* (A) action?									
What levels is the action aimed at (if tailor-made action)?									
a) Individual									
b) Social network: family									

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6	Case 7	Case 8	Case 9
c) Social network: friends, peers									
d) Community/group									
e) Other									
Who's going to follow up on the case? ('NA' if no follow-up)									
Is a case manager appointed? Is this the one closest to the case?									

	Case 10	*Case 11*	*Case 12*	*Case 13*	*Case 14*	*Case 15*	*Case 16*	*Case 17*	*Case 18*

Case description

	Case 10	*Case 11*	*Case 12*	*Case 13*	*Case 14*	*Case 15*	*Case 16*	*Case 17*	*Case 18*
Short description of the case *(keywords, no names, anonymity)*									
Case origin: Which actor brings up the case?									
Theme: radicalisation? Or other?									
Is it a new case (N) or update of a known case (U)?									

	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12	Case 13	Case 14	Case 15	Case 16	Case 17	Case 18

Profiling

	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12	Case 13	Case 14	Case 15	Case 16	Case 17	Case 18
Does a thorough profiling of the individual take place?[1]									
Supplemental input from other actors (What? Who?)									
a) Primary need satisfaction (food and drink, health, physical limitations, subjective body experience etc.)									

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[1] By thorough profiling we mean that consideration is given to the unique setting and experience of the individual. What aspects are cited to gain insight into the actions of the individual in question (a–e)?

	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12	Case 13	Case 14	Case 15	Case 16	Case 17	Case 18
b) Physical activity (safe/permanent residency, healthy material conditions, financial situation, etc.)									
c) Personal history (education, life events, caregiving history, psyche, etc.)									
d) Positively experienced day (school, work auton-omy etc.)									

	Case 10	Case 11	Case 12	Case 13	Case 14	Case 15	Case 16	Case 17	Case 18
e) Self-image (realisations, future, self-confidence, coping style, etc.)									
f) Social inclusion (family connection, support, influence of loved ones, feeling part of a group, etc.)									

Intervention

Decided on a follow-up action?									

	Case 10	*Case 11*	*Case 12*	*Case 13*	*Case 14*	*Case 15*	*Case 16*	*Case 17*	*Case 18*
What is/are the follow-up action(s)?									
How was this decision made?									
Is this an *individual* (I) tailored action, or a *general* (A) action?									
What levels is the action aimed at (if tailor-made action)?									
a) Individual									

	Case 10	*Case 11*	*Case 12*	*Case 13*	*Case 14*	*Case 15*	*Case 16*	*Case 17*	*Case 18*
b) Social network: family									
c) Social network: friends, peers									
d) Community/gro up									
e) Other									
Who's going to follow up on the case? (NA if no follow-up)									
Is a case manager appointed? Is this the one closest to the case?									

Good Practice Indicators

Absent	*Strong presence*
Information sharing	
Parsimonious information sharing: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA[1]	
For the sharing of personal information, no trade-off is made between 'need-to-know' and 'nice-to-know'. 'Nice-to-know' information is shared, or 'need-to-know' information is withheld.	For the sharing of personal information, the trade-off is made between 'need-to-know' and 'nice-to-know'. Only 'need-to-know' information is shared.
Sharing of expertise: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Little to no expertise is shared during the meeting.	Participants use their specific expertise and share it with the group. Participants help each other with practical problems and questions and are motivated to learn from each other.

[1] 1: absent, 2: somewhat present, 3: present, 4: strongly present, NA = not applicable

Absent		Strong presence
Atmosphere/climate/cooperation		
	Horizontal interaction: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
One or more actors systematically has the upper hand in the discussion. *(Which actors are these?)* Decision-making by dominant actors.		Actors are equal parties in the discussion, are heard evenly. Focus on cooperation, coordination and negotiation. Joint decision-making (all actors participate)
	Open communication: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Refusal of information sharing by multiple actors or types of actors.		Actors have no problem entrusting sensitive personal information.
	Flexibility: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Rigid attitude of participants, situation is viewed from their own perspective. Participants are unable/unwilling to take other perspectives.		Participants are able to voluntarily adapt their own attitudes and views during the meeting. Participants are able to look from multiple perspectives/perspectives.
	Motivation: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Participants do not appear to be motivated to participate in the meetings. Multiple participants have a passive attitude (noticeably not paying attention, not listening, meanwhile dealing with other things on the mobile/laptop, etc.).		Motivated and enthusiastic participation by the participants in the MAW meeting. This is expressed in an open listening attitude, interested gaze, (critical) question making, active participation of all partners. Participants are passionate and willing to 'go the extra mile'

Absent		Strong presence
	Acting according to joint MAW purpose: *1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA*	
Conflict of interest – the actors act out of self-interest/interest of their own organisation.		The actors act firstly in the interests of the common MAW objective.
	Constructive interaction: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Feedback is generally destructive and focused on what goes wrong. Participants criticise each other in a non-constructive manner.		Participants provide informed, constructive feedback, focused on areas for improvement. Suggest alternatives. Feedback is given in a respectful way.
Case management		
	Cultural behaviour: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Participants fall into stereotypical thinking behaviour. No attention to diversity within cultures (tar all cultures with the same brush).		All participants demonstrate knowledge of specific customs, norms and values within different cultures. Recognising one's own prejudices and stereotypes. Show awareness of diversity within cultures. Respectful vocabulary.

Absent		*Strong presence*
	Distinction normal vs risk behaviour: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Participants lose sight of the distinction between 'normal' cultural, social and religious behaviour and potentially extremist and criminal behaviour.		Participants in the meetings can distinguish between 'normal' cultural, social and religious behaviour and potentially extremist and criminal behaviour. Participants encourage each other to keep the distinction in mind.
	Objective mapping: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
Facts are interpreted immediately. Opinions are not distinguished from facts. Interpretations are treated as facts. Information source is unknown. Contradicting signals are ignored.		Facts are described as factually as possible, immediate interpretations are avoided. Opinions and assumptions are separate from facts. Information source is listed. Contradicting signals are also heard.
	Case conceptualisation: 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – NA	
No profile or an incomplete profile of the cases is established. Information about the case has been obtained by a single source of information. No attempt is made to place the information obtained in a broader perspective or to hear other sources of information.		Full profile of the case is outlined; individual is seen as part of a broader framework. Various sources of information are consulted, heard and accounted for. Efforts are made to obtain information from multiple sources before a judgement or decision is formed.

Content

How much time is spent discussing each of the following objectives/responsibilities?

Responsibilities/topic	Explanation	Time spent (in minutes)[1]	%[2]
Objectives			
Prevention of radicalisation	*Discussion/agreements on preventing polarisation, removing breeding ground, increasing resilience, early signalling*		
Case management	*Signalling function: supplementing profile of people/networks discussed, creation of as complete an image as possible, developing a personalised follow-up*		
Reintegration and aftercare	*Reintegration and aftercare to returnees and condemned extremists. Discuss reintegration trajectory. Mediating in neighbourhood conflicts*		
Cooperation and exchange of information	*Making clear rules on cooperation and information exchange with security and social partners, on file approach, file formation, file evaluation and closure*		
Directing the operational meetings	*Directing and coordinating the operational (case management) meeting. Developing and refining the local architecture of the local MAW, tailored to the municipality*		
Trust building	*Building trust between the municipality, the police and local operators.*		

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[1] To be noted during observation (e.g. 12h–12h12). After observation, the sum can be made of the total number of minutes spent per topic.

[2] Calculate and fill in after observation. As a percentage of the total duration of the consultations. Total: 100%

Responsibilities/topic	Explanation	Time spent (in minutes)[1]	%[2]
Objectives			
Developing prevention policy	*Working on adapted, local prevention policies*		
Refine collaboration between services	*Refine cooperation between city and public administrations*		
Other (no objectives)			
Practical matters/appointments	*Introduction and closing of meeting, practical planning arrangements, Covid-19 measures, etc.*		
Informal time	*Informal conversations (both jointly and between participants), aimed at creating a positive atmosphere and connecting the participants*		
Critical self-reflection	*Reflection and/or evaluation on one's own operation, focused on process or outcome*		
Other (specifier)			

[1] To be noted during observation (e.g. 12h–12h12). After observation, the sum can be made of the total number of minutes spent per topic.

[2] Calculate and fill in after observation. As a percentage of the total duration of the consultations. Total: 100%

Unstructured Observation Form

Observed elements that might be important, but were not specifically addressed in the observation instrument. Beware: distinguish between facts (what did you observe?) and interpretation (why is this important?)

Potential pitfalls for the MAW
Possible success factors for the MAW

Possible success factors for the MAW

Elements for Debriefing

Write down aspects of the observation to be clarified in the debriefing

Information to Collect Before and After the Observation

Agenda:

- Is there an agenda?
- What is the agenda?
- When was the agenda sent out?
- To whom was the agenda sent out? (All participants?)
- Are other files sent with the agenda? Which ones?
- Who prepared the agenda?

Meeting minutes:

- Are meeting minutes distributed afterwards?
- Who wrote these minutes?
- When were these minutes sent out?
- To whom were these minutes sent out? (All participants? Those who couldn't make it?)
- Are other files accompanied with the minutes? Which ones?

Appendix 5: Interview Guide

Background

Could you tell me a little bit about your background?

- Organisation? Function?
- What is/are your role(s) in the MAW structure?
- How long have you been at the MAW structure?

Strategy and Approach

What are the objectives of the MAW structure?

What is the approach on how to achieve these objectives?

What are the concrete tasks and responsibilities of the MAW structure?

Do you feel that this vision is also supported by the other partners at the table?

- Is this vision kept in mind when you work together on your goals?
- How do you know?
- How is this shared vision manifested?

A MAW structure does not necessarily focus on one type of ideologically motivated violence. Which target groups does the MAW structure target in your city/municipality?

How were these target groups determined? Are there any other problems or social tensions in the city that you are not currently working on?

How do you tackle these issues? What are the actions that are done to prevent or counter radicalisation in your operation?

- Individual level? Is the social network of the individual included in the action as well?

Structure

The meetings take place with *[estimation of the number]* actors. What do you think of this group size to work with?

- Would you rather work with a smaller or larger group?
- Can you name the pitfalls of a MAW structure (e.g. Local Integrated Security Cell – LIVC) of this size?
- And the positives?

Are there certain relevant actors in targeted prevention of radicalisation that are currently missing in your network, in your opinion?

- When you need the expertise of this person, how is this currently addressed?
- Are there actors you no longer work with? Why was the collaboration discontinued?

The network is chaired by xxx. How do you experience this leadership?

- What specific tasks does the chair take on?
- How is the leadership style perceived?

What are your thoughts on the frequency of the MAW meetings?

Are there sufficient resources available for the network to function properly?

Are you sufficiently equipped to accomplish your mission?

Systems

Do you (sometimes) bring in cases to the meeting table? How do these signals reach you?

- Is there a fixed point of contact? Who is this? How can this frontline worker come into contact with this point of contact? When can the point of contact be reached *(accessibility)*?
- Is there a particular procedure or structure in operation for reporting signals? Is this procedure sufficiently known?
- Do you filter these signals before bringing them to the MAW meeting?

What (type of) information is generally reported when concerns are reported? Is this information 'rich' enough?

- Is this enough to make an informed decision? What information do you need to make an informed decision?
- Is this information generally clear and complete?
- About the signals and concerns received, would you generally say that they are reported sooner, early or late?
- Are concerns generally justified?

How are relevant partners informed about where/how to report concerns *(e.g. brochure, training, uninformed)*?

Is it clear to those who have concerns what happens to the information? What are they told?

Do you know if there exists some resistance to share concerns?

- Why is that? How did the MAW/point of contact deal with that resistance *(e.g. convincing that reporting makes a positive difference, clarifying what is done with the notification, persuading by invoking core responsibilities such as democratic citizenship)*?

What information is shared with the MAW partners? What are the formal or informal arrangements around this?

- Do participants generally adhere to these arrangements?

Case Management

Were there situations in the past where you deliberately didn't share certain information with the actors at the meeting table?

- Why didn't you share that information? (Past experience? General sense of distrust? From appointment framework?)
- (What) are the formal or informal rules on this? Are the rules clear?

Do you think it is possible that other actors did not share certain information (that should have been shared according to the rules)? Do you understand this?

If a specific tool is used for case management: Do you know why this tool was chosen? Did this choice take into account your specific local context?

How do you stay informed after an intervention has started? Are you kept up to date on developments in interventions/actions?

How do you check whether the intervention was successful or not?

- Is there any kind of reflection about what went right/wrong in the intervention?
- Are objectives evaluated at the end? Are objectives being set at all?
- Are actors involved in the intervention evaluated for their operation?

Staff

How were you introduced in the network when you just started?

Do you have enough time to do what you need to do in the network? Or is there a capacity problem?

Shared Values/Culture

Do you generally like to attend the meetings? Why? Why not?

Does your cooperation with the LIVC give you personal satisfaction?

- What gives you that satisfaction *(e.g. colleagues, internal motivation, success stories, recognition from the mayor)*? *(If internal examples are mainly cited, acknowledge this and also ask whether external parties or other actors from the network contribute to this.)*
- What would help to get more satisfaction out of the MAW operation?

Do you generally get along well? Would you say you can work well with the different partners?

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- What sometimes makes cooperation difficult?
- How could this be improved?

Are there occasions where you sometimes get to know each other in a more informal way (pre-Covid-19)?

Skills

Can you give an example of something (very broad, can be substantive knowledge or a way of addressing it) that you have learned from other key figures in the network?

Which of your skills are indispensable for the network? What knowledge or skills do you use in the MAW operation?

What skills or knowledge are actors within the network supposed to possess (in your view)?

Are these present in the current team? Can you give an example of where they are/are not present?

What measures are taken to deepen the knowledge and skills of the network and its actors?

- Do you receive training?
- Who initiates this?
- Is training provided based on the needs of the key figures?
- Do these training courses happen on a structural basis? Or ad hoc?
- Do you have the impression that what is learned in such training courses is also used effectively in the network? (If so, can you give an example?)

Where do you sometimes experience a lack of knowledge in the team?

How is this taken care of? How could this be taken care of?

How do you guarantee that team knowledge and skills are not lost?

How is the continuity of the expertise in the team ensured?

Are there also professionalisation initiatives for primary care workers *(e.g. in education)*?

Closing Questions

How do you check the effectiveness of the overall functioning of the network?

If there is some form of reflection: Is this structural or ad hoc?

What aspects are you evaluating exactly? And how do you verify this?

Do you sometimes check with the external community how they experience the MAW structure (if they are aware of this)? Do they have the ability to give feedback on the operation?

What score, out of 10, would you give for the general functioning of the MAW structure in fighting the threat of radicalisation?

Can you specifically mention three important areas of improvement that would improve the functioning of the LIVC, in your opinion?

What do you think is the greatest strength of your functioning, that makes you achieve your goals (can be several strengths)?

Appendix 6: Focus Group Questionnaire

Dear Chair

First of all: thank you for moderating this focus group! A focus group is a group discussion in which a small group of people led by a moderator discuss topics provided by the moderator. The interaction among the participants is an essential part of the focus group. **The most important key questions are in bold.** The other questions are more optional.

- Thank you
- Introduce yourself
- Length: 60 minutes
- Primary goal: to get some input about a self-evaluation tool of multi-agency working (MAW) in the context of preventing violent radicalisation
- Do not have to share things you do not want to share
- Only me and the research team from UGent have access to the notes of this focus group
- Everything is stored on a safe server
- In reporting, no names will be mentioned

Does everyone agree with the notetaking of the discussion in this focus group so we can use them in our research?

Any questions before we start?

Opening Questions

The purpose of the opening questions is to get everyone to talk early in the discussion. They are 'icebreakers' and should be answered quickly. The intent of the questions is not to get information but rather to get people talking and to help them feel comfortable.

There is a good chance that the respondents already know each other, in which case these questions can be left out.

- Tell us your name and introduce yourself with something typical of your city.
- What is your role in the MAW structure?
- How long have you been part of your MAW structure?

Transition Questions

Transition questions move the conversation on to the key questions that drive the study. They serve as logical links between the introductory questions and the key questions. Transition questions engage participants more deeply by probing for personal experiences or concrete behaviours

Do not spend too much time on these questions (a maximum of 10 minutes).

- Do you have a form of self-evaluation/evaluation in your MAW? How often?
- What makes/could make self-evaluation in your MAW difficult?

Key Questions

The preceding questions prepare participants to talk about the core of the topic. The key questions are the questions you really want answered. Here, attitudes, emotions and feelings come into play.

Currently, the structure of our preliminary draft for the self-evaluation tool looks like this:

- Tab 1: Instructions for using the evaluation tool
- Tab 2: Structure
- Tab 3: Vision
- Tab 4: Current working
- Tab 5: Case management
- Tab 6: Information sharing
- Tab 7: Collaboration
- Tab 8: Transfer of knowledge

What is your first impression of this structure?

What are some important questions or parts in self-evaluation to you?

Are there any missing parts in our structure?

What would you emphasise in a self-evaluation tool?

What do you think about the use of scores? Would a traffic light scoring system add value (see example below)?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of self-evaluation in your opinion?

How could a self-evaluation tool deal with goals specific to a MAW structure/ municipality? Suggestions?

How long should the self-evaluation take at most? Or: how much time are you willing to put into self-evaluation?

How many times should self-evaluation take place in a year?

What do you prefer: completing the self-evaluation together or everyone doing so separately/anonymously?

What do you think about using an external evaluator?

What would you do with the results of the self-evaluation after it has been done?

What should a self-evaluation tool not be?

Can you name pitfalls of such a tool?

Closing Questions

Moderator gives a two minute summary of the group discussion and the asks the participants if they agree or disagree. Specifically, this means that the most important findings are listed (they do not need to be in chronological order). Tip: use the participants' words so they know that you are strongly involved in the conversation and that you followed everything closely.

- Would it be correct to conclude that […] or would you like to add something to that?
- Is this an adequate summary?
- Did we overlook anything during the discussion?
- Is there anything that we should have talked about but didn't?

Traffic Light Assessment

WHAT | A rating system that evaluates the performance in relation to a goal.

Results are expressed using the three colors of the real traffic lights

RED   **YELLOW**   **GREEN**

Supports Decision Making
Good and poor performance can easily be identified.

? WHY
Benefits

Where ?
Applications

- **Performance** and trend reports
- **Customer** satisfaction reports
- **Financial** and marketing reports
- **Quality** and compliance audits
- **Risk** management & safety audits

Results are expressed in **Performance Management** as:

- A performance that is far below target
- A performance that is a bit below target
- A performance that is expected, or better than expected

Results are expressed in **Project Management** as:

- An activity that is incomplete
- Partially completed, or was completed after due date
- An activity that was completed on time or ahead of time

A Gantt Chart
Represents time duration of activities

Other Uses

1 Communicating production

2 Marking materials & inventory levels

3 Assessing the staff skill levels

4 Assessing a particular idea

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Appendix 7: Instructions for Using the EMMASCAN Tool

This appendix includes the background information about the tool that is provided to MAW practitioners, and lists the questions participants are asked to answer within each module. The manual is available as a video at: https://emmascan.eu/manual.aspx

Multi-agency working (MAW) is a multidisciplinary collaboration between local organisations (e.g. the police, social services, governments). In the context of radicalisation, it aims to prevent and combat violent radicalisation. It allows early and effective identification of individuals or communities who are at risk of violent radicalisation.

The EMMASCAN is a practical, evidence-based online tool that local MAW structures can use to carry out an organisational self-evaluation. Within the EMMASCAN website, separate modules evaluate the structure, vision, current working, case management, information sharing, collaboration, and knowledge transfer and expertise of your MAW network.

For more information about the indicators and the scoring process, please consult the EMMASCAN manual and the EMMA-project research report.

Module 1: Structure

This module deals with the overall structure and practical conditions (including availability of resources and continuity).

Module 2: Vision

This module examines the vision of your MAW structure.

Module 3: Current Working

This module explores current working. It is completed twice (modules 3A and 3B), using a *typical* and an *atypical* case/situation chosen by the coordinator.

Module 4: Case Management

This module should only be filled in twice (modules 4A and 4B) if your MAW structure carries out case management. This will be indicated by the coordinator.

Module 5: Information Sharing

This module is about information sharing within your MAW structure.

Module 6: Collaboration

This module deals with the collaboration processes within your MAW structure.

Module 7: Knowledge Transfer

This module is about knowledge transfer and expertise within your MAW structure.

Research

What will happen to the data collected through the EMMASCAN?

The EMMA research project does not stop with the completion of the tool. When municipalities use the EMMASCAN, valuable insights are collected on multi-agency practices tackling violent radicalization. This provides an overview of the variety of MAW practices in Europe, and these insights will be used to further optimize multi-agency collaboration in the future. In the long term, using this online tool will support multi-agency collaboration.

Contribute to future research by filling out the EMMASCAN!

Who is the EMMASCAN for?

The EMMASCAN tool is designed to be used by local officials who participate in municipal MAW networks.

Multi-agency working has increasingly been considered a promising approach in the early and effective identification of individuals at risk of violent radicalisation. The primary purpose of the EMMASCAN is to evaluate some key aspects of your MAW structure that evidence suggests can be indicators of good practice. The overall aim is to support and enhance the effectiveness of your multi-agency working practices.

The coordinator of the MAW network takes a leading role. They will create an account, then adapts the EMMASCAN to the local setting and invites the other MAW actors. The EMMASCAN has built-in privacy and secrecy features.

For more information, please consult the EMMASCAN manual and the EMMA-project research report.

Questions in the EMMASCAN

Module 1: Structure

How often do MAW meetings take place?

- Weekly
- Every ... weeks
- Half-yearly
- Yearly
- Ad hoc

What do you think about the frequency of the MAW meetings?

- Too few
- Sufficient
- Too many

How many hours per week (on average) do you spend on the MAW meetings (including preparatory work, the meetings themselves, work arising from the meeting, etc.)?

- ..... hours per week

Are you able to devote sufficient time from your own organisation or function to participate in the MAW meetings?

- The time I can devote is very insufficient
- The time I can devote is insufficient
- The time I can devote is approximately sufficient
- The time I can devote is sufficient
- The time I can devote is very sufficient
- Other:

Which sectors are present?

- Police/security services
- Municipality
- Social/wellbeing
- Health care
- Youth and education
- Judiciary (e.g. public prosecutor's office, probation services, etc.)
- Academia/experts
- Community/civil society
- Other:

Is a sector missing, in your opinion?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know
- Other:

What sector do you work in?

- …

How relevant do you find your sector's presence at the MAW meeting?

- Very irrelevant
- Rather irrelevant
- Neutral

- Rather relevant
- Very relevant
- Other:

How relevant do you find the presence of your role/function within your sector at the MAW meeting?

- Very irrelevant
- Rather irrelevant
- Neutral
- Rather relevant
- Very relevant
- Other:

Do you have a sufficient mandate from your function for the MAW meetings?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know
- Other:

Do you think the MAW structure is embedded enough in local policy?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know
- Other:

Do you think there is sufficient local government support for your MAW structure?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know
- Other:

Do you think your MAW network is well structured?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know
- Other:

Module 2: Vision

The following items can be elements of the vision/tasks of a MAW structure:

- Network building
- Gathering knowledge
- Creating awareness on radicalization
- Case management
- Rehabilitation
- (Early) detection of people at risk
- General prevention of radicalization
- Creating a shared language
- Follow-up
- Other:

Do you as an actor of the MAW meeting consider these items important for your MAW?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Do you think these items are considered important by the other MAW actors?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Other remarks?

- …

Is there room for dialogue about the vision of the MAW structure?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Is there feedback about the vision during MAW meetings?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Is the vision reconsidered during MAW meetings, if necessary?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Other remarks?

- …

Is there a written document describing the vision of the MAW structure?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

If yes: Are its written objectives relevant?

- Yes
- No

If yes: Does the written vision match the practice?

- Yes
- No

If no: Would a vision document add value?

- Yes
- No

Other remarks?

- …

Modules 3A and 3B: Current Working

If you think about the course of the case/situation presented above, what aspects went well, in your view?

- Thorough analysis of the situation/case
- Exchange of information among actors (speed/efficiency/amount of information shared)
- Decision-making (transparent decision-making, decisions clear for everybody)
- Coordinated action
- Allocation of roles and 'To do' tasks
- Follow-up (timely updates on status)
- Systems and procedures
- General efficiency
- Communication (clear communications lines, open and honest communication, balanced communication)
- Motivation and enthusiasm of the team
- Respectful towards involved persons
- Shared vision
- Trust
- Other, such as:

Can you specify what exactly went well?

- …

If you think about the course of the case/situation presented above, what aspects could have been better in your view?

- Thorough analysis of the situation/case
- Exchange of information among actors (speed/efficiency/amount of information shared)
- Decision-making (transparent decision-making, decisions clear for everybody)
- Coordinated action
- Allocation of roles and 'To do' tasks
- Follow-up (timely updates on status)
- Systems and procedures
- General efficiency
- Communication (clear communications lines, open and honest communication, balanced communication)
- Motivation and enthusiasm of the team
- Respectful towards involved persons

- Shared vision
- Trust
- Other, such as:

Can you specify what exactly could have been better/what exactly went wrong?

- …

Modules 4A and 4B: Case Management

Was it a new case or a re-registration?

- New case
- Re-registration
- I don't know

Was there sufficient information to open the case, in your opinion?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Did the case meet the objectives/vision of the MAW structure, in your opinion?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Did the case fall within the target group of the MAW structure, in your opinion?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Other remarks on the case registration?

- …

Was the case treated in the same way as other cases are usually treated?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Were you generally satisfied with how the case was handled?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Was attention paid to the local context?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Did actions take place on all the necessary levels (individual, family/social context, community, network)?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Other remarks on the case management?

- …

Was the case followed up?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

If yes: Was someone tasked with the follow-up of the case?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

If yes: Were you satisfied with the follow-up of the case?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

If no: Why was there no follow-up of the case?

- No time
- Incorrect assessment
- Forgotten
- No need
- Other:

Other remarks on the follow-up?

- …

Was the case closed?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

If yes: Did you agree with the closure of the case?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

If yes: Was the case closed at the right time, in your opinion?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

If no: Do you think the case should be closed by now?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes definitely
- I don't know

Other remarks on the closure of the case?

- …

Module 5: Information Sharing

Are you comfortable with sharing information within your MAW structure?

- Yes
- No

If yes: What makes you comfortable or able to share information?

- No GDPR related limitations
- Professional secrecy
- Trust
- Transparency about what happens with the shared information
- Other:

If no: What makes you not comfortable (enough) or unable to share information?

- GDPR related limitations
- Professional secrecy
- No trust
- No transparency about what happens with the shared information
- Other:

Is there an agreement (written/oral) on information sharing?

- Yes, a written agreement
- Yes, an oral agreement
- No
- I don't know

If yes: Is this agreement on information sharing useful?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know
- Other:

If no: Would an agreement on information sharing be an added value?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know
- Other:

Other remarks?

- …

Module 6: Collaboration

To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neutral
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree

We appreciate each other's unique capabilities

I do not hesitate to share my opinion during MAW meetings

We can work through differences of opinion without damaging relationships

Communication is open and honest

In this MAW structure people keep their word

People can rely on each other in this MAW structure

We have a 'we are in it together' attitude

People feel understood and accepted by each other

We build on each other's ideas in order to achieve the best possible outcome

I go beyond what is required and do not hesitate to take initiative

I feel inspired and motivated about the work I am doing

In general, I like to attend MAW meetings

Some actors are more listened to than others

I have little influence in the decision-making

Partners are considered equal during the MAW meeting

Module 7: Transfer of Knowledge

In your opinion, are you up to date with societal evolutions in the area of radicalisation?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Do you think the other MAW actors are up to date enough with societal evolutions in the area of radicalisation?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Are you able to share your specific knowledge with the MAW members?

- Not at all
- Not really
- Neutral
- A little bit
- Yes, definitely
- I don't know

Do you lack certain knowledge?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

If yes: On which topics do you lack knowledge?

- …

If yes: In which form(s) would you like to receive that knowledge?

- Training
- Conference
- Lecture
- Literature
- Workshop
- Participating in the field
- Informal discussion

- Consultation platform
- Webinar
- Knowledge clips
- Other:

Do you have any additional comments or reflections on expertise and knowledge transfer?

- …

The 'Evaluation and Mentoring of the Multi-Agency approach to violent radicalization' (EMMA) project was established (1) to evaluate the multi-agency working approach and (2) to mentor peer-to-peer assessment and exchange best practices among local practitioners. The EMMA project tried to fill this gap in evaluation research by developing a self-evaluation tool for local multi-agency working practitioners that will be widely applicable across different multi-agency working approaches in Europe. This book provides indicators of good multi-agency working practices and concrete recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers.

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